Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 24CMCV00159, Date: 2024-07-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24CMCV00159 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: A
24CMCV00159
Lakendrea Cole v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, et
al.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
The complaint
alleges that Plaintiff sustained injury while traveling on Defendants’ train.
The bus operator allegedly braked suddenly, causing Plaintiff to strike a rail
guard inside the train. Plaintiff alleges a claim for premises liability.
II.
ARGUMENTS
Defendant
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“LACMTA” or
“Defendant”) moves to strike a portion of the complaint that alleges that it is
liable for the negligent supervision of its employees. Defendant contends that
claims against public entities must be based on statute, and there is no
statute imposing direct liability on a public entity for negligent supervision.
In
opposition, Plaintiff argues that public entities can be liable for their
employee’s negligence in failing to train and supervise the train operator. Plaintiff
is not required to identify that Doe employee at this point of the litigation.
Alternatively, Plaintiff asks for leave to amend to more clearly state a vicarious
liability claim against LACMTA for its employee’s negligence.
In
reply, LACMTA argues that Plaintiff has not alleged a special relationship
between LACMTA and bus passengers such as Plaintiff from which direct liability
could be imposed.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The court may, upon motion or at any time
in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike
out all or any part of the pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the
laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the Court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436 subd (a)-(b).) Grounds for a motion
to strike are limited to matters that appear on the face of the complaint or on any matter of which the court shall
or may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
IV.
DISCUSSION
The
complaint alleges the following:
“Defendants negligently, recklessly and/or wantonly owned,
maintained, managed, operated, controlled and safeguarded the premises on a
Line A (Train No. 117B) train traveling on Willowbrook Ave. near and between E
Compton Blvd. & Walnut St., such that Defendants failed to properly train
their employees and/or supervise their staff and failed to barricade the area
and/or to warn of the dangerous condition, rendering the area on said premises
dangerous and resulting in serious bodily injury to the Plaintiff … .”
(Complaint, Attachment.)”
Contrary to Defendant’s argument, de
Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238 did not
hold that there is no statutory basis for a claim for negligent supervision against
a public entity for the negligent operation of a vehicle by an employee. (Mot. 4:12-16.)
Rather, the case distinguished between direct and vicarious liability against a
public entity for the negligent supervision of its employee. The claim is
proper where Plaintiff alleges that the public entity is vicariously liable for
its employees’ negligent supervision/hiring/training of others. (Gov. Code § 815.2.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants,
including Doe defendants, were negligent in failing to properly train their
employees or supervise their staff. Plaintiff is not required to identify the
Doe defendant in the complaint. (C.A.
v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872
[“Lopez does not stand for the proposition that a plaintiff must
specifically plead, before undertaking discovery, the identity of a
government employee whose alleged negligence is made the basis for vicarious
liability under section 815.2, and we doubt such an impracticable rule would be
consistent with the legislative intent in enacting that statute.”].)
Defendant contends in reply and without
authority that there is no supervisory duty in the operation of a bus and “no
special relationship exists.” (Reply, 4:5-7.) To the extent that LACMTA implies
that a public entity as a common carrier cannot be directly liable for
negligence in the operation of public transportation, this argument is
unsupported. A “carrier of persons for reward must use the utmost care and
diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything necessary for that
purpose, and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill.” (Civ.
Code, § 2100.) Additionally, “[a] public entity is liable for death or
injury to person or property proximately caused by a negligent or wrongful act
or omission in the operation of any motor vehicle by an employee of the public
entity acting within the scope of his employment." (Veh.
Code, § 17001.)
A “special relationship” exists between a
common carrier and its passengers and requires a duty of “utmost” care. (Lopez
v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 789 ["the
special relationship between a carrier and its passengers is even greater than
that between other types of businesses and their customers who come on to the
premises for business purposes.”].)
V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s
Motion to Strike is DENIED.