Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 24STCV02493, Date: 2025-05-09 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 40 - MICHAEL J. SHULTZ - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call.
Case Number: 24STCV02493 Hearing Date: May 9, 2025 Dept: 40
24STCV02493
Martin Niwinski v. General Motors, LLC
[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
I. BACKGROUND
The complaint,
filed on January 31, 2024, alleges that Plaintiff was issued an express
warranty for the purchase of a 2016 Chevrolet Volt made by Defendant. The
vehicle developed defects that could be not be repaired. Plaintiff alleges
claims in violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly”).
II. ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff requests
leave to add a claim for violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“Magnuson-Moss”)
and the Uniform Commercial Code to address a recent change in the law that
precludes Plaintiff from recovering under Song-Beverly because the purchase of
a used vehicle with an unexpired manufacturer’s warranty is not a “new vehicle”
for purposes of the Act. (Rodriguez
v. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189.) Defendant is unwilling to stipulate. The
claims arise from the same alleged facts. The amendment will not subject
Defendant to any prejudice. If the motion is denied, Plaintiff will suffer
prejudice as Plaintiff no longer has a viable claim.
In opposition,
Defendant argues that Plaintiff could have asserted the two new claims at the
outset, but strategically based the claim on Song-Beverly. It is time for this
case to end. At the time Plaintiff filed this action, the Court of Appeal held
in Rodriguez that cases under Song-Beverly did not apply to used
vehicles, and the California Supreme Court had already granted review.
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff’s delay in amending the complaint is unjustified. The
parties have engaged in discovery in the context of Song-Beverly. The measure
of damages in a case filed under the Magnuson-Moss differs substantially from
the restitution provided under Song-Beverly. Plaintiff will open up a new field
of inquiry.
In reply,
Plaintiff argues that he did not anticipate amending the earlier because
despite the court of appeal opinion in Rodriguez, Jensen
v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th
112,
which held that used vehicles when sold with the remaining balance of a new
vehicle warranty fell within the scope of Song-Beverly. Jensen was
controlling authority up until the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rodriguez.
There was no need to include a claim under Magnuson-Moss, which is predicated
upon the same harm and damages alleged in the complaint. Discovery is still
ongoing.
III. LEGAL
STANDARDS
Leave to amend is permitted at the court’s
discretion upon any terms that may be just. (Code Civ. Proc., §
473 subd. (a)(1)). The statute is liberally construed to permit
amendment of the pleadings “unless an attempt is made to present an entirely
different set of facts by way of the amendment.” (Atkinson
v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 760).
The motion must be supported by a declaration stating the effect of the
amendment, why the amendment is necessary and proper, when the facts giving
rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and the reasons why the
request for amendment was not made earlier." (Cal.
Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324.)
If the motion is timely made, and the
granting of the motion will not result in prejudice to the opposing party, it
is error to refuse permission to amend. (Morgan
v. Superior Court of Cal. In and For Los Angeles County (1959)
172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.) Where denial of the motion will
result in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of
action, “it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.” (Id.) Amendments are permitted up to the date of
trial or during trial where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party. (Atkinson
v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761).
IV. DISCUSSION
A.
Procedural
requirements.
Plaintiff substantially complied with the procedures required
to request leave to amend. Cal Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324 subd. (a).)
Plaintiff provides the proposed pleading showing the new allegations proposed
to be added (fifth cause of action) set forth in bold. (Decl., Ex C, p. 5-8.) Plaintiff’s
counsel explains the effect of the proposed amendment, which is to recast the
same facts under a federal statute.
The motion is not untimely made given the Rodriguez decision which was published on October 31, 2024.
That Plaintiff elected to proceed on a state claim as opposed to one in
violation of a federal statute does not prevent Plaintiff from amending to
state a viable claim.
Contrary to Defendant’s argument, claims under Magnuson-Moss
and the Uniform Commercial Code do not open up a new field of inquiry. Magnuson-Moss
governs warranties for consumer products distributed in interstate commerce. It
requires disclosures in connection with written warranties, regulates the
substantive content of warranties, and establishes a federal cause of action
for breach of a written or an implied warranty (15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)), among
other provisions." (Orichian
v. BMW of North America, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1330.) The Uniform Commercial Code governs how
express warranties by the seller are created. (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 2313.)
The elements of a claim under the UCC for breach of an express
warranty “are (1) an express warranty (Com.Code, § 2313) to repair defects
given in connection with the sale of goods; (2) the existence of a defect
covered by the warranty; (3) the buyer's notice to the seller of such a defect
within a reasonable time after its discovery (id., § 2607, subd.
(3)(A)); (4) the seller's failure to repair the defect in compliance with the
warranty; and (5) resulting damages.”
Song-Beverly also governs warranties for consumer goods. (Civ. Code, § 1791.2.) The law “regulates warranty terms, imposes
service and repair obligations on manufacturers, distributors, and retailers
who make express warranties, requires disclosure of specified information in
express warranties, and broadens a buyer's remedies to include costs,
attorney's fees, and civil penalties. (Civ. Code, §§ 1790–1795.8 ....) It
supplements, rather than supersedes, the provisions of the California Uniform
Commercial Code." (Carver
v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 864, 877.)
The Magnuson-Moss claim arises from the same allegedly
defective vehicle that breached an express warranty.
Defendant has not demonstrated any prejudice caused by an
amendment. The type of prejudice that will support denying the motion include a
delay in trial, loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation. (Bidari
v. Kelk (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1173.) Defendant relies in part on Magpali
v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996)
48 Cal.App.4th 471. However, in that
case, the new cause of action "would have changed the tenor and complexity
of the complaint from its original focus.” (Magpali at 487.)
Witnesses had not yet been identified, a jury was impaneled, and a trial
continuance was necessary to permit opposing party to depose new witnesses. (Id.
at 488.) Moreover, trial in this case is set for June 24, 2025. The parties
have time to complete discovery.
V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an
amended complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to file the proposed
pleading within 10 days.