Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 24STCV09614, Date: 2025-03-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV09614 Hearing Date: March 6, 2025 Dept: 40
24STCV09614
Michael A. Longmire v. Geico Insurance Corporate, et al.
Thursday,
March 6, 2025
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
The
first amended complaint (“FAC”) alleges for breach of contract and insurance
bad faith arising from Defendant, Geico Insurance Corp.’s (“Geico”) failure to
properly investigate Plaintiff’s insurance claim following a motor vehicle
accident. Plaintiff alleges Geico towed the vehicle to Autotech Collision (“Autotech”)
center to perform a repair estimate although Plaintiff alleges that Autotech
did not proper credentials to perform repair work on Plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff
sues Geico, Autotech, CK Collision, Inc. (“CKCI”) and Eddie Cho.
Defendant
CKC demurs to the FAC for failure to state a cause of action for breach of
contract or insurance bad faith. The FAC is uncertain as to what claims are
being asserted against CKCI. Plaintiff did not file an opposition.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a
complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. (Schmidt
v. Foundation Health (1995) 35
Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) In testing the complaint’s sufficiency, the court must
assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations as well as facts
that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded facts. The court
may also consider matters properly subject to judicial notice. (Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d
311, 318.)
The court may not consider contentions,
deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore
v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th
634, 638.) Plaintiff is required to allege facts sufficient to establish every
element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw
v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e); Zelig
v. County of Los Angeles
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.)
Sufficient facts are the essential facts
of the case, alleged "with reasonable precision and with particularity
that is sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature,
source, and extent of his cause of action.” (Gressley
v. Williams (1961) 193
Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.) Whether the
Plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant. (Stevens
v. Superior Court (1986) 180
Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.)
A demurrer may also be sustained if a
complaint is “uncertain”. Uncertainty exists where a complaint’s factual
allegations are so confusing, they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of
the issues it is being asked to meet. (Williams
v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2; Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(f).)
III.
DISCUSSION
While the parties are ordinarily required
by statute to meet and confer prior to the hearing on demurrer, the requirement
does not apply in an action where counsel does not represent a party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41.) Plaintiff is self-represented.
The FAC fails to state a cause of action
against CKCI. While Plaintiff includes CKCI as a defendant in the caption of
the pleading, Plaintiff does not allege any facts implicating CKCI. The
FAC alleges that Plaintiff is suing Geico and Autotech only. (FAC, p. 4.).
Plaintiff
does not allege facts to support a cause of action for breach of contract
against CKCI. To state a cause of action, the plaintiff must allege facts showing
(1) the existence of the contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance or excuse
for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, and (4) resulting damages to
the plaintiff. (Maxwell
v. Dolezal (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 93, 97–98.) Plaintiff may also allege
the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language by alleging
the making and the substance of the relevant terms of the contract. (Perry
v. Robertson (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 333, 341; Construction
Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189,
199.) Plaintiff may also attach a copy of the written contract to the
complaint. (Id.)
The FAC
does not allege Plaintiff entered into a contract with CKCI, the terms of the
contract, Plaintiff’s performance, or Defendant’s breach. Plaintiff does not
allege the legal effect of any purported contract made with CDCI. Nor has
Plaintiff attached a copy of the contract. The allegations do not assert
whether the contract was oral or written.
To allege a claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff must allege facts to show the existence
of a contractual relationship and that benefits due under the contract were withheld
unreasonably and without proper cause. (Love v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1990) 221
Cal.App.3d 1136, 1151.) The prerequisite for this cause of action
is the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties, since the
covenant is an implied term in the contract. (Smith v. City and County of San Francisco
(1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 38, 49.) Plaintiff did not allege a contractual
relationship with CKCI or any facts that support the remaining elements of this
claim.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, CKCI’S demurrer to the
FAC is SUSTAINED. Leave to amend is ordinarily given if there is a reasonable
possibility that the defect can be cured. (Association of Community Organizations
for Reform Now v. Department of Industrial Relations (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th
298, 302.) Accordingly, the court allows Plaintiff
30 days to file a second amended complaint that cures the defects identified
above.