Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 24STCV10024, Date: 2025-01-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV10024    Hearing Date: January 9, 2025    Dept: 40

24STCV10024 Chaim Rochester v. 6th St Loft LLC, et al.

Thursday, January 9,  2025

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER OVERRULING DEMURRER AND DENYING THE MOTION TO STRIKE

 

I.       BACKGROUND

      This complaint alleges that Plaintiff rents an apartment owned, managed, and/or controlled by Defendants pursuant to a rental agreement.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to keep the premises in a safe and habitable condition. Plaintiff alleges seven causes of action arising from the condition of the premises and civil rights violations for allegedly discriminatory conduct by Defendants.

II.     ARGUMENTS

      Demurring parties are four LLCs (collectively, “Defendants” or “SBDTLA”) who challenge all causes of action on grounds of certainty because the complaint alleges all claims against all Defendants as a group. Defendants contend it is “impossible” for all defendant to have committed the same acts as alleged. SBDTLA did not own the property at the same time as other Defendants. Plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to support all claims, and some claims are duplicative of others.

      Defendants separately move to strike the claim for punitive damages because Plaintiff did not allege predicate facts to support the conclusory allegation that Defendants acted with malice, fraud, or oppression, or facts showing that an officer, director, or managing agent ratified such conduct.

      Defendants filed a notice on January 2, 2025, that opposition were not served or filed, although the court’s records reflect that Plaintiff untimely filed oppositions.

 

III.    LEGAL STANDARDS

      The bases for demurrer are limited by statute and may be sustained for reasons including failure to state facts to state a cause of action and uncertainty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.) A demurrer “tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law.” (Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) The court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638.)

      All that is required is to "set forth the essential facts of plaintiff's case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint defendant of the nature, source, and extent of the cause of action.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643–644.)

      A motion to strike is limited to matters that appear on the face of the pleading or on any matter of which the court can take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) The court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or strike all or any part of the pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. §436 subd. (a)-(b).)

IV.   DISCUSSION

A.     Untimely oppositions.

      Plaintiff’s oppositions, filed on January 2, 2025, are untimely. Oppositions were due on December 26, 2024, nine court days before the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005 (b).) Defendants have suffered prejudice as they have not been able to file timely reply briefs. Therefore, the court has not considered the oppositions to the demurrer and motion to strike.

 

B.     Uncertainty

      A demurrer may be sustained if a complaint is “uncertain.” Uncertainty exists where a complaint’s factual allegations are so confusing, vague, or ambiguous that they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2; Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(f).) Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, “because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.) Demurrers should be overruled "when the facts as to which the complaint is uncertain are presumptively within the defendant's knowledge." (Chen at 822.)  

      As alleged, the complaint is not fatally uncertain. Plaintiff alleges the claims against Defendants as a whole as each Defendant’s liability arises from their roles as administrator, owner, agent, trustee and manager of the subject property during different time periods. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) SBDTLA is alleged to have acting in those roles[s] until April 2023. (Id.)

      Whether or not Plaintiff has actually been evicted is not material.  Plaintiff alleges she has been a tenant from January 2020 to the present. (Complaint, ¶ 3.) A fair reading of the allegations considered as a whole assert that Defendants’ liability for the conditions of the premises arises from the date that Plaintiff’s tenancy began up through the date that Defendants were no longer owners, managers, or supervisors.

      Whether it is “impossible that all defendants could have been alleged to commit the same acts” is not a basis for demurrer. (Dem. 5:12-14.) A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations. It does not test their truth, the Plaintiff’s ability to prove them, or the possible difficulty in making such proof. (Saunders v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.)

      Defendants contend the failure to allege a specific date or time frame when each violation or claim occurred renders it “impossible to answer any allegation.” (Dem. 7:15-18.)  The complaint alleges the dates when Plaintiff made specific complaints and the time frame during which Defendants were responsible for the condition of the premises, given the Plaintiff’s date of tenancy until SDTLA was no longer owner/manager in April 2023. (Complaint, ¶¶ 6, 24.a – b.)

 

C.     Breach of warranty of habitability

      Defendants’ claim that it is “impossible” to determine when Plaintiff was ever in possession of premises or how long thereafter the conditions persisted. Plaintiff expressly alleged the date of her tenancy and that the conditions persisted “[d]uring Plaintiff’s residency at the subject property, and while Defendants administered, owned and operated it.” (Complaint, ¶ ¶ 20.)

 

D.     Negligence

      A negligence claim requires factual allegations showing that defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care, breach of that duty, causation and damages. (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 477.) Negligence claims can be alleged in general terms by stating the acts or omissions that were negligently performed. (Greninger v. Fischer (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 549, 552; Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital (1941) 18 Cal.2d 97, 101.)

      Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, and as pointed out above, the complaint adequately gives notice of the time frames during which Defendants were responsible for the premises; ostensibly during the time Defendants served as owners, managers, as administrator, owner, agent, trustee and manager of the subject property. (Complaint, ¶ 6.)

 

E.     Third cause of action for nuisance and fourth cause of action for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment

 

      Defendants contend the nuisance claim is duplicative of the negligence claim as both claims arise from the same facts. (Dem. 9:1-7.) Defendants contend that a nuisance claim is essentially a negligence claim, citing El Escorial Owners' Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349 ["Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim.”].) The issue in Escorial was double recovery. The plaintiff prevailed on the negligence claim for construction defect for which the trial court awarded damages. The plaintiff also sought damages under the nuisance claim, which the trial court rejected since it was based on the same facts as the negligence claim. (El Escorial  at 1343.) The trial court also pointed out that a nuisance claim is different because an injunction can be issued, and Escorial did not ask for one. (Escorial at 1349.)

      The court here is not concerned about Plaintiff’s double recovery at the demurrer stage. Contrary to the facts in Escorial, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to abate the conditions (albeit under Los Angeles County Code § 8.52.130), but such relief is also available in a nuisance claim. (People ex rel. Burns v. Wood (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 700, 712.)

      The nuisance claim is not “duplicative” to the extent Plaintiff is entitled to additional remedies not permitted in a negligence cause of action. Plaintiff can allege alternative theories of recovery. (Rader Co. v. Stone (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 10, 29 [“Where the exact nature of the facts is in doubt, or where the exact legal nature of plaintiff's right and defendant's liability depend on facts not well known to the plaintiff, the pleading may properly set forth alternative theories in varied and inconsistent counts.”].)

      The only argument asserted by Defendants as to the quiet enjoyment claim is that it is vague, ambiguous, and conclusory and generally alleged. (Dem. 9:13-14.) The court has previously addressed the alleged facts that do not render the complaint fatally uncertain.

 

 

F.      The fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action for violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Anti-Harassment statutes (Civ. Code, § 1940.2); and the Anti-Harassment statutes under the Los Angeles County Municipal Code § 8.52.130.

 

      Defendants contend that they had “long since sold the property by the time Plaintiff alleges, she was discriminated against.” (Dem. 9:20-21.) This is a fact extrinsic to the complaint, which is not considered.

      The Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits intentional discrimination in access to public accommodations. It entitles all persons to “the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51.)  Plaintiff must plead and prove intentional discrimination in public accommodations in violation of the act. A disparate impact analysis or test does not apply to Unruh Act claims. (Minton v. Dignity Health (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1162.)

      Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ acts of retaliation, harassment, threatening to file unlawful detainer proceedings, intimidation, diminution of services, and other menacing conduct were done “in an effort to effectuate its strategy to evict long term African American tenants including Plaintiff.” (Complaint, ¶ ¶¶ 138, 145-147, 150.) Defendants have considered only paragraph 138 of the complaint, which cannot be read in isolation. The complaint is adequate if “as a whole [it] apprises the adversary of the factual basis of the claim.”(Lim v. The.TV Corp. Internat. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 684, 690.)

      While Defendants contend that Plaintiff is required to allege who engaged in the discriminatory conduct, when, and how, Defendants do not cite any authority that requires that level of specificity in the complaint. Nor are evidentiary facts required to be alleged. (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1390 [“It is both improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead the evidence by which he hopes to prove such ultimate facts."].)  Finally, these are issues that can be determined in discovery.

      Defendants do not specifically address the sixth and seventh causes of action for violations of various anti-harassment statutes.

G.    Motion to Strike

      A plaintiff may recover on a claim for exemplary damages where the defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (a).) The predicate acts to support the claim must be intended to cause injury or must constitute “malicious” or “oppressive” conduct as defined by statute. “Malice” is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (c)(1); College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 ["malice involves awareness of dangerous consequences and a willful and deliberate failure to avoid them"].) "Oppression" is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (a) subd. (c)(2).)

      Additionally, punitive damages against a corporate employer are permitted where there is a showing of advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud or malice on the part of an officer, director or managing agent of the corporation. (Civ. Code, § 3294.)

      To support recovery of punitive damages, Plaintiff can allege ultimate facts. Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 ["In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff."].) Whether a principal authorized the doing and manner of the act can be alleged using “conclusional words.” (Kiseskey v. Carpenters' Trust for So. California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 235 ["We accordingly conclude that the conclusional words ‘permission and consent’ used in the FAC, coupled with the factual allegations therein, constitute an allegation, sufficient if proven, upon which punitive damages may be assessed against defendant for the conduct of its agents."].)

      Plaintiff has alleged discriminatory animus on the part of Defendants which is sufficient to support the requirement that the acts be malicious or oppressive as those terms are statutorily defined. Plaintiff further alleges that the acts complained of were carried out by Defendants’ “managing agents.”  (Complaint, ¶ 159.)

V.     CONCLUSION

      Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED. The motion to strike is DENIED. Defendants are ordered to file their answer within 10 days.