Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 24STCV17331, Date: 2025-06-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV17331 Hearing Date: June 10, 2025 Dept: 40
24STCV17331
Joshua Lorne Rogers v. Carlson Industries, LLC, et al.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION AGAINST DEFENDANT, NATASHA SKIDMORE
(Res. No. 5124)
I.
BACKGROUND
This
action arises from Defendants’ alleged breach of lease agreements relating to
two parcels of real property. (Complaint, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges the
following claims.
1.
Breach of contract against Natasha Skidmore
(“Skidmore” or “Defendant”)
2.
Breach of contract against Carlson Industries
(“Carlson”)
3.
Inducing breach of contract against Carlson
and Nicholas Kanter (“Kanter”)
4.
Intentional interference with contractual
relations against Carlson and Kanter
5.
Breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing against Carlson
6.
Breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
against Carlson.
The
Hon. Anne Richardson granted two special motions to strike the third and fourth
causes of action separately filed by Kanter and Carlson pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure 425.16 (“anti-SLAPP”). The court subsequently dismissed the
action against Kanter on October 21, 2024, as the remaining claims were not
addressed to Kanter.
II. ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff
moves for summary adjudication of the first cause of action for breach of
contract against Skidmore. Plaintiff argues that the undisputed facts establish
that Plaintiff leased two parcels of residential real property from Defendant,
Carlson Industries, LLC, et al. (“Carlson”) known as 2100 N. Main Street and
660 South Avenue (“660”) in Los Angeles (the “Main Lease”). Plaintiff subleased 660 (the “Sublease”) to
Defendant Skidmore, who allegedly made only one payment of $8,400 toward a
one-year lease.
In
opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff brought an action on the same facts
in small claims court against Skidmore, which was adjudicated in Skidmore’s
favor. Plaintiff is bringing the same action in this case. The Sublease with
Plaintiff was illegal because Plaintiff did not obtain permission from Carlson
to sublet 660, resulting in Plaintiff’s breach of the Main Lease agreement with
Carlson. Carlson commenced eviction proceedings against Plaintiff for
non-payment of rent three days after Skidmore moved in.
The
first cause of action against Skidmore in this action is barred by res judicata
as a matter of law by the small claims’ court ruling in Skidmore’s favor resulting
in dismissal of the small claims action. (Skidmore Decl., Ex. B.)
Defendant
also argues that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether Plaintiff can
collect on an invalid illegal sublease. Judicial admission applies to bar
Plaintiff’s claim since Plaintiff argued in two other pleadings that the Master
Lease is void, and therefore, Plaintiff had no right to enter into a sublease
with Skidmore.
In
reply, Plaintiff argues that Skidmore failed to dispute any of the material
facts proffered by Plaintiff. Defendant admitted in responses to requests for
admission that the Sublease did not include a provision permitting early
termination of the one-year lease. Defendant lived on the premises without
paying rent.
III. LEGAL
STANDARDS
A party may move for summary adjudication
“as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative
defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the
party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no
affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an
affirmative defense as to any cause of action, [or] that there is no merit to a
claim for [punitive] damages.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c subd. (f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted
only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a
claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c. subd.(f)(1).)
As the moving party, Plaintiff’s burden is
to show that there is no defense to a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c
subd. (p)(1).) Plaintiff meets this
burden by proving each element of the cause of action entitling Plaintiff to
judgment. (Id.) If that threshold burden is established, the burden
shifts to Defendant to show a triable issue of one or more material facts. (Id.)
The court applies the three-step analysis
to motions for summary judgment or adjudication: (1) identify the issues framed
by the pleading, (2) determine whether the moving party established facts which
negate the opponents’ claim, (3) if the moving party meets its threshold burden
of persuasion and the burden shifts, determine whether the opposing party has
controverted those facts with admissible evidence. (Torres
v. Reardon (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 831, 836.)
IV.
DISCUSSION
A. Pertinent allegations of the complaint against Defendant Skidmore and Skidmore’s
answer.
The first cause of action
against Skidmore alleges that Plaintiff entered into the Main Lease with
Carlson and sublet 660 South Avenue 21 to Skidmore. (Complaint, ¶¶ 5, 8.)
Defendant allegedly breached the 12-month sublease by failing to make payments
after the first month. (Complaint, ¶ 9.)
Defendant asserted res judicata as a
seventh affirmative defense. (Answer filed 10/7/24.)
B. Elements of a claim for breach of contract.
To state a cause
of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must allege and prove facts
showing (1) the existence of the contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance or
excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, and (4) resulting
damages to the plaintiff. (Maxwell v. Dolezal (2014) 231
Cal.App.4th 93, 97–98.)
C. The undisputed facts.
Plaintiff submits five material facts:
the parties entered into a sublease, the sublease did not contain an early
termination clause, Defendant lived on the premises for 7.5 months but made
only one payment of $8,400. Plaintiff incurred damages of $42,000. (PUF[1] 1-5.)
Defendant objects to all material facts
on grounds they are irrelevant to Defendant’s seventh affirmative defense of
res judicata. Defendant’s objections are well taken and are sustained; none of
the proffered material facts negate the seventh affirmative defense as further
discussed below. The five material facts are probative of the creation of the
sublease, which neither party disputes.
D. Plaintiff’s objections and Defendant’s request for
judicial notice.
Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s
declaration because it was served by Defendant and is not signed under penalty
of perjury. Objections to statements 1-12 asserted in the declaration are
SUSTAINED.
Objections 13-19 to Exhibits A, B, D, F
are OVERRULED. Court records and instruments recorded by the County Recorder
are properly subject to judicial notice. Exhibits C and E appear to be evidence
submitted in the small claims action against Defendant and are not subject to
judicial notice.
Accordingly, the court GRANTS Defendant’s
request for judicial notice of the court records in Case No. 24STSC00003 Joshua
Rogers v. Natasha Skidmore (“Small Claims action”.) (Evid. Code, § 452(c), Exs.
A, B, D, F.) In particular Exhibit B reflects that judgment in favor of
Skidmore was entered on February 13, 2024.
E. Analysis
Plaintiff’s motion asserts five facts
that do not negate Defendant’s affirmative defense of res judicata. As none of
Plaintiff’s facts are material to that defense, the motion is procedurally
defective and denied on that ground.
To the extent that the material facts
establish without dispute the creation of the sublease between the parties and
Defendant’s failure to make lease payments for one year, the motion is DENIED on
an independent ground: Defendant’s judicially noticed evidence establishes that
Plaintiff’s claim against Skidmore is barred by res judicata.
Defendant’s additional facts (“DAF”)[2] establish that Rogers
commenced a small claims action against Skidmore for breach of contract based
on the same facts and circumstances alleged here, and that litigation was
finally adjudicated in Skidmore’s favor. Defendant’s evidence establishes the
following: Rogers sued Skidmore in small claims court for $8,400 for Skidmore’s
alleged breach of the sublease by failing to make lease payments on November
15, 2023 and December 15, 2023 ($4,200 per month) and that Skidmore remained in
possession at 600 S. Avenue 21, #5, Los Angeles. (RJN Ex. A, Section 3.) The
small claims court entered judgment in favor of Skidmore on February 13, 2024. (RJN
Ex. B.)
In this action, Rogers alleges that
Skidmore entered into a 12-month sublease with Rogers for the period October
15, 2023 to October 14, 2024 for $4200 per month but paid “one payment of $8,400
and failing to make any additional payments, while continuing to reside at the
property. (Complaint, ¶20.) Rogers alleges damages of $42,000. (Complaint, ¶
21.) Both the small claims action and this action sought enforcement of the
sublease between Rogers and Skidmore, for Skidmore’s alleged failure to pay
rent.
Plaintiff asserts a different calculation
of damage in this action, however, both this action and the small claims action
arise from Skidmore’s alleged breach of the same sublease agreement, which bars
the claims asserted here. Res judicata bars litigation actually raised in the
first action as well as “causes of action which could have been litigated.” (Goldberg
v. Frye (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1258,
1264.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s reconstituted claims
arising from breach of the sublease asserted here are barred.
F. Defendant’s argument -- that Plaintiff’s admissions made in the Carlson
unlawful detainer action bars the claim here -- lacks merit.
An admission of fact in a
pleading is a “judicial admission,” which concedes the truth of the statement
and removes that issue from the case. (Aljabban
v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 482, 497 ["At
least in the absence of some showing of mistake or inadvertence by the pleading
party ......, and as long as the opposing party is not contesting the factual
allegation ..., there is nothing unfair or inappropriate about holding a party
to the truth of its unverified factual allegations.”].) A pleader is bound by
well pleaded material allegations or by failure to deny well pleaded material
allegations. (Valerio
v. Andrew Youngquist Construction
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271
[“… a fact admitted by the pleadings should be treated as ‘found’.”].)
Not every document filed by a party
constitutes a “pleading” from which a judicial admission may be “extracted.” (Humane
Society of U.S. v. Superior Court
(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1249.)
The statement must have been made in a pleading, by stipulation during trial,
or in responses to requests for admission. (Estate
of Nicholas (1986) 177
Cal.App.3d 1071, 1090.)
Here, Defendant relies on Plaintiff’s
assertions made in opposition to Carlson’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Rogers’ motion for new trial in the unlawful detainer case. (Defendant’s RJN
D-1, ¶ 10; D-2, 5:26-6:4.) These documents are not “pleadings” for purposes of
applying the doctrine of judicial admissions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 420.)
V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s
motion for summary adjudication is DENIED. Plaintiff has not met his burden of
showing that he is entitled to judgment in his favor as alleged in the first
cause of action for breach of contract against Defendant Skidmore.