Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 24STCV17331, Date: 2025-06-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV17331    Hearing Date: June 10, 2025    Dept: 40

24STCV17331 Joshua Lorne Rogers v. Carlson Industries, LLC, et al.

Tuesday, June 10, 2025

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION AGAINST DEFENDANT, NATASHA SKIDMORE (Res. No. 5124)

 

I.        BACKGROUND

       This action arises from Defendants’ alleged breach of lease agreements relating to two parcels of real property. (Complaint, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges the following claims.

1.      Breach of contract against Natasha Skidmore (“Skidmore” or “Defendant”)

2.      Breach of contract against Carlson Industries (“Carlson”)

3.      Inducing breach of contract against Carlson and Nicholas Kanter (“Kanter”)

4.      Intentional interference with contractual relations against Carlson and Kanter

5.      Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Carlson

6.      Breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment against Carlson.

       The Hon. Anne Richardson granted two special motions to strike the third and fourth causes of action separately filed by Kanter and Carlson pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 (“anti-SLAPP”). The court subsequently dismissed the action against Kanter on October 21, 2024, as the remaining claims were not addressed to Kanter.

II.      ARGUMENTS

       Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication of the first cause of action for breach of contract against Skidmore. Plaintiff argues that the undisputed facts establish that Plaintiff leased two parcels of residential real property from Defendant, Carlson Industries, LLC, et al. (“Carlson”) known as 2100 N. Main Street and 660 South Avenue (“660”) in Los Angeles (the “Main Lease”).  Plaintiff subleased 660 (the “Sublease”) to Defendant Skidmore, who allegedly made only one payment of $8,400 toward a one-year lease.

       In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff brought an action on the same facts in small claims court against Skidmore, which was adjudicated in Skidmore’s favor. Plaintiff is bringing the same action in this case. The Sublease with Plaintiff was illegal because Plaintiff did not obtain permission from Carlson to sublet 660, resulting in Plaintiff’s breach of the Main Lease agreement with Carlson. Carlson commenced eviction proceedings against Plaintiff for non-payment of rent three days after Skidmore moved in.

       The first cause of action against Skidmore in this action is barred by res judicata as a matter of law by the small claims’ court ruling in Skidmore’s favor resulting in dismissal of the small claims action. (Skidmore Decl., Ex. B.)

       Defendant also argues that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether Plaintiff can collect on an invalid illegal sublease. Judicial admission applies to bar Plaintiff’s claim since Plaintiff argued in two other pleadings that the Master Lease is void, and therefore, Plaintiff had no right to enter into a sublease with Skidmore.

       In reply, Plaintiff argues that Skidmore failed to dispute any of the material facts proffered by Plaintiff. Defendant admitted in responses to requests for admission that the Sublease did not include a provision permitting early termination of the one-year lease. Defendant lived on the premises without paying rent.

III.    LEGAL STANDARDS

       A party may move for summary adjudication “as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, [or] that there is no merit to a claim for [punitive] damages.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c subd. (f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c. subd.(f)(1).)

       As the moving party, Plaintiff’s burden is to show that there is no defense to a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c subd. (p)(1).)  Plaintiff meets this burden by proving each element of the cause of action entitling Plaintiff to judgment. (Id.) If that threshold burden is established, the burden shifts to Defendant to show a triable issue of one or more material facts. (Id.)

       The court applies the three-step analysis to motions for summary judgment or adjudication: (1) identify the issues framed by the pleading, (2) determine whether the moving party established facts which negate the opponents’ claim, (3) if the moving party meets its threshold burden of persuasion and the burden shifts, determine whether the opposing party has controverted those facts with admissible evidence. (Torres v. Reardon (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 831, 836.)

 

IV.    DISCUSSION

A.      Pertinent allegations of the complaint against Defendant Skidmore and Skidmore’s answer.

       The first cause of action against Skidmore alleges that Plaintiff entered into the Main Lease with Carlson and sublet 660 South Avenue 21 to Skidmore. (Complaint, ¶¶ 5, 8.) Defendant allegedly breached the 12-month sublease by failing to make payments after the first month. (Complaint, ¶ 9.)

       Defendant asserted res judicata as a seventh affirmative defense. (Answer filed 10/7/24.)

B.      Elements of a claim for breach of contract.

       To state a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must allege and prove facts showing (1) the existence of the contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, and (4) resulting damages to the plaintiff. (Maxwell v. Dolezal (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 93, 97–98.)

C.      The undisputed facts.

       Plaintiff submits five material facts: the parties entered into a sublease, the sublease did not contain an early termination clause, Defendant lived on the premises for 7.5 months but made only one payment of $8,400. Plaintiff incurred damages of $42,000. (PUF[1] 1-5.)

       Defendant objects to all material facts on grounds they are irrelevant to Defendant’s seventh affirmative defense of res judicata. Defendant’s objections are well taken and are sustained; none of the proffered material facts negate the seventh affirmative defense as further discussed below. The five material facts are probative of the creation of the sublease, which neither party disputes.

D.     Plaintiff’s objections and Defendant’s request for judicial notice.

       Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s declaration because it was served by Defendant and is not signed under penalty of perjury. Objections to statements 1-12 asserted in the declaration are SUSTAINED.

       Objections 13-19 to Exhibits A, B, D, F are OVERRULED. Court records and instruments recorded by the County Recorder are properly subject to judicial notice. Exhibits C and E appear to be evidence submitted in the small claims action against Defendant and are not subject to judicial notice.

       Accordingly, the court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the court records in Case No. 24STSC00003 Joshua Rogers v. Natasha Skidmore (“Small Claims action”.) (Evid. Code, § 452(c), Exs. A, B, D, F.) In particular Exhibit B reflects that judgment in favor of Skidmore was entered on February 13, 2024.           

E.      Analysis

       Plaintiff’s motion asserts five facts that do not negate Defendant’s affirmative defense of res judicata. As none of Plaintiff’s facts are material to that defense, the motion is procedurally defective and denied on that ground.

       To the extent that the material facts establish without dispute the creation of the sublease between the parties and Defendant’s failure to make lease payments for one year, the motion is DENIED on an independent ground: Defendant’s judicially noticed evidence establishes that Plaintiff’s claim against Skidmore is barred by res judicata.

       Defendant’s additional facts (“DAF”)[2] establish that Rogers commenced a small claims action against Skidmore for breach of contract based on the same facts and circumstances alleged here, and that litigation was finally adjudicated in Skidmore’s favor. Defendant’s evidence establishes the following: Rogers sued Skidmore in small claims court for $8,400 for Skidmore’s alleged breach of the sublease by failing to make lease payments on November 15, 2023 and December 15, 2023 ($4,200 per month) and that Skidmore remained in possession at 600 S. Avenue 21, #5, Los Angeles. (RJN Ex. A, Section 3.) The small claims court entered judgment in favor of Skidmore on February 13, 2024. (RJN Ex. B.)

       In this action, Rogers alleges that Skidmore entered into a 12-month sublease with Rogers for the period October 15, 2023 to October 14, 2024 for $4200 per month but paid “one payment of $8,400 and failing to make any additional payments, while continuing to reside at the property. (Complaint, ¶20.) Rogers alleges damages of $42,000. (Complaint, ¶ 21.) Both the small claims action and this action sought enforcement of the sublease between Rogers and Skidmore, for Skidmore’s alleged failure to pay rent.

       Plaintiff asserts a different calculation of damage in this action, however, both this action and the small claims action arise from Skidmore’s alleged breach of the same sublease agreement, which bars the claims asserted here. Res judicata bars litigation actually raised in the first action as well as “causes of action which could have been litigated.” (Goldberg v. Frye (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1258, 1264.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s reconstituted claims arising from breach of the sublease asserted here are barred.

F.       Defendant’s argument -- that Plaintiff’s admissions made in the Carlson unlawful detainer action bars the claim here -- lacks merit.  

       An admission of fact in a pleading is a “judicial admission,” which concedes the truth of the statement and removes that issue from the case. (Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 482, 497 ["At least in the absence of some showing of mistake or inadvertence by the pleading party ......, and as long as the opposing party is not contesting the factual allegation ..., there is nothing unfair or inappropriate about holding a party to the truth of its unverified factual allegations.”].) A pleader is bound by well pleaded material allegations or by failure to deny well pleaded material allegations. (Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Construction (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271 [“… a fact admitted by the pleadings should be treated as ‘found’.”].)

       Not every document filed by a party constitutes a “pleading” from which a judicial admission may be “extracted.” (Humane Society of U.S. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1249.) The statement must have been made in a pleading, by stipulation during trial, or in responses to requests for admission. (Estate of Nicholas (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1090.)

       Here, Defendant relies on Plaintiff’s assertions made in opposition to Carlson’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Rogers’ motion for new trial in the unlawful detainer case. (Defendant’s RJN D-1, ¶ 10; D-2, 5:26-6:4.) These documents are not “pleadings” for purposes of applying the doctrine of judicial admissions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 420.)

V.      CONCLUSION

       Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication is DENIED. Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that he is entitled to judgment in his favor as alleged in the first cause of action for breach of contract against Defendant Skidmore.  

      



 



[1] “PUF” is “Plaintiff’s undisputed facts.”

[2] “DAF” is Defendant’s Additional Facts





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