Judge Michael Shultz, Case Number: 24STCV18756, Date: 2025-03-05 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - MICHAEL J. SHULTZ - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call.

The complaint alleges that Plaintiffs rent an apartment that is owned, managed, and/or controlled by Defendants pursuant to a rental agreement. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to keep the premises in a safe and habitable condition. Plaintiffs allege 12 causes of action arising from the condition of the premises, contract-related claims, and claims in violation of statute.

Demurring parties, four LLCs and Greystar California, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) challenge all causes of action because the complaint alleges all claims against all Defendants as a group, rendering the complaint uncertain. Defendants contend it is “impossible” for all defendants to have committed the same acts as alleged as each Defendant did not own the property at the same time. Nor did Plaintiffs sign a rental agreement with all Defendants. Plaintiffs did not allege sufficient facts to support all claims.

Defendants separately move to strike the claim for punitive damages because Plaintiffs did not allege that any specific "’officer, director, or managing agent’ of Defendants, acting on behalf of the companies, acted with ‘malice, oppression, or fraud.’ Defendants, as corporate entities, allegedly hired that carried out the acts complained of or the name of the specific director, officer, or managing agent involved.”

Plaintiffs argue that the complaint adequately gives notice of the issues. General allegations against multiple defendants are permitted where Defendants are alleged to have acted in concert or share responsibility. Plaintiffs allege that former and current landlords and managers jointly contributed to the substandard conditions. Any minor ambiguities can be cleared up in discovery. The alleged facts support the elements of each claim alleged.

Plaintiffs argue that the systemic pattern of intentional neglect by Defendants, despite Plaintiffs’ repeated complaints to Defendants, Defendants’ regulatory citations, and their knowledge of the hazardous conditions meet and exceed the standard to permit recovery of punitive damages.

Defendants contend that the cases cited by Plaintiffs in their oppositions to both motions are construed incorrectly and are not applicable. The alleged facts do not adequately support all claims.

The bases for demurrer are limited by statute and may be sustained for reasons including failure to state facts to state a cause of action and uncertainty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.) A demurrer “tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law.” (Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) The court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638.)

All that is required is to "set forth the essential facts of plaintiff's case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint defendant of the nature, source, and extent of the cause of action.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643–644.)

A motion to strike is limited to matters that appear on the face of the pleading or on any matter of which the court can take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) The court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or strike all or any part of the pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. §436 subd. (a)-(b).)

A demurrer may be sustained if a complaint is “uncertain.” Uncertainty exists where a complaint’s factual allegations are so confusing, vague, or ambiguous that they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2; Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(f).) Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, “because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.) Demurrers should be overruled "when the facts as to which the complaint is uncertain are presumptively within the defendant's knowledge." (Chen at 822.)

As alleged, and taken as a whole, the complaint is not fatally uncertain. Plaintiffs allege that each Defendant acted both individually and in alignment with other defendants, and as such, “Defendants conspired together building upon each other’s wrongdoing, in order to accomplish the acts alleged in this Complaint.” (Complaint, ¶ 17.) Plaintiffs allege each Defendant participated in the acts alleged, that each defendant was an agent of the other, and that each Defendant “concurred and contributed” to the alleged acts and omissions, and each ratified the others’ conduct. (Complaint, ¶¶ 13-15.) The court must accept the allegations as true for purposes of the demurrer.

Defendants contend it is impossible to determine from the complaint which Defendant did what and or which Defendant entered into the contract. (Dem. ¶ 14:15.) Defendants do not cite any authority that require Plaintiffs, at this stage of the proceeding, to isolate with particularity, each Defendants’ involvement, at what stage, or during a specific time period. The complaint does not allege that each Defendant’s liability arises solely from their ownership, management or control of the premises. Plaintiffs also allege that each Defendant participated in and contributed to the malfeasance, acted in concert, and ratified the others’ conduct. Alleging facts to establish when Defendants owned the property does not clarify the pleading since each Defendant’s liability arose from their acts made in concert and allegedly on behalf of the other Defendants.

A. First, second, third, and ninth causes of action for breach of contract, breach of implied warranty of habitability, tortious breach of warranty of habitability, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, respectively.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not identify the particular defendant with whom Plaintiffs contracted. (Dem. 14:14-18.) Defendants contend that because the contract claim does not specifically identify the lessor, “it is impossible to ascertain from the pleadings,” which of the defendants owed a contractual duty to Plaintiffs. (Dem. ¶ 15:8-13.) Defendants state that because the contract claim is defective, the habitability and bad faith claims which depend on the existence of a contract equally fail.

A general demurrer for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint on assumed facts, and raises issues of law, not fact. (Wittenberg v. Bornstein (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 556, 566.) Plaintiffs have alleged the existence of a lease agreement, the legal effect of the agreement, that Plaintiffs performed their obligations, at least eight ways that Defendants breached the agreement, and resulting damage to Plaintiffs. (Complaint, ¶¶ 77-84.) Plaintiffs specifically allege the date that Plaintiffs entered into the lease (August 2018.) The essential elements of a contract claim are alleged.

Defendants require specific facts to determine which Defendant is liable on these claims. Special demurrers for uncertainty or ambiguity evaluate the manner in which a claim is articulated. (Butler v. Sequeira (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 143.) It should not be sustained if the complaint is sufficiently clear to apprise Defendants of the issues to be met. (People v. Lim (1941) 18 Cal.2d 872, 882 [“A special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach the failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading, but is directed at the uncertainty existing in the allegations actually made.”].)

Defendants are not restricted to the complaint for facts to determine each Defendant’s potential liability on the contract and contract-related claims. These are issues that can be determined in discovery. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 [Demurrers for uncertainty are strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, “because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.”].)

Defendants again argue that alleging this claim against Defendants as a group and without specificity as to each defendant’s particular act or omission is insufficient to put Defendants on notice of claims they are asked to meet. Plaintiffs allege Defendants acted in concert, as agents, as conspirators, and as aiders and abettors and that each Defendant ratified the conduct of the others. (Complaint, ¶¶ 15-17.) The alleged facts support all elements sufficient to apprise Defendants that they are being sued on a negligence theory. The failure to parse specific conduct according to each defendant with specificity does not render the claim fatally uncertain.

C. Fifth and tenth causes of action for private nuisance and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, respectively.

Defendants argue that the nuisance claim is really a negligence claim as both depend on the same facts and is inappropriately alleged as a separate cause of action, citing El Escorial Owners' Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349 ["Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim.”].) El Escorial is distinguishable.

The issue in El Escorial was double recovery. The plaintiff prevailed on the negligence claim for construction defect for which the trial court awarded damages. The plaintiff also sought damages under the nuisance claim, which the trial court rejected since it was based on the same facts as the negligence claim. (El Escorial at 1343.) The potential for double recovery is not a basis for demurrer and is not an issue that can be determined at demurrer stage.

Defendants do not address how the cause of action for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment is defective.

D. Sixth and seventh causes of action for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress

Defendants generally demurrer to these claims for failure to state a cause of action and repeat their arguments that Plaintiffs failed to distinguish between each of the Defendants. Defendants cannot determine which Defendant is the landlord or which Defendant particularly ignored which conditions. Defendants require more detail. (Dem. 17:13-26.)

To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) extreme and outrageous conduct with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, and (2) plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress as a proximate result. (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.) Conduct is “extreme and outrageous” where a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff’s interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress.” (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 946.) If the court concludes that reasonable minds may differ as to whether the conduct rises to the level of “extreme and outrageous conduct,” then “it is for the jury, subject to the control for the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.” (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 499.)

The complaint is replete with specific facts describing what Defendants failed to do over years despite repeated complaints, which a jury could find to be extreme and outrageous. The infestations are alleged to be severe, pervasive, and non-hygienic; Plaintiffs’ claims were ignored, and Plaintiffs were required to fund remediation efforts. (Complaint, ¶¶ 26-30.)

The conditions allegedly worsened over a three-year period. (Complaint, ¶ 31.) Defendants were deceitful in promising remedies that were never provided. (Complaint, ¶ 32.) Defendants promised rent credits that were never issued. (Complaint, ¶ 33.) The infestation became rampant and reached crisis levels, forcing Plaintiffs to temporarily relocate. (Complaint, ¶ 34-46.)

The allegations go on to describe at length Plaintiffs’ attempts to obtain remediation, the ailments they experienced, and the severe disrepair and dilapidation of the premises in detail. (Complaint, ¶¶ 34-53.) The plumbing issues are specifically described. (Complaint, ¶¶ 54-59.) The failure to mitigate the conditions over more than a three-year period implies intentional or -unreasonable acts with knowledge that the acts would result in mental distress resulting from conditions that Plaintiffs repeatedly brought to Defendants’ attention.

Alleging that Defendants were collectively responsible for all of these alleged failures does not make the claim deficient in its elements.

A claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires proof of the traditional elements of negligence: duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages, as well as severe emotional disturbance or suffering by reason of defendant’s conduct. (Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 583, 588.) The alleged misconduct referred to above is sufficient to support each element of this claim. The Defendants’ inability to determine what they want to determine from the complaint does not render the claim defective.

E. Eighth cause of action for violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200 (“Unfair Competition Law or UCL”)

Defendants argue that the allegations against Defendants as a collective render the claim defective. Defendants require individual allegations to support this cause of action. Defendants contend the failure to allege distinct facts specific to each defendant renders the claim inadequately alleged. These arguments are unavailing for reasons previously stated.

As defined by statute, “unfair competition” includes “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200). Its purpose is to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services. (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1265.) A plaintiff alleging unfair business practices under the UCL must state with “reasonable particularity” the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation.

A UCL claim “borrows” violations of other laws and treats these violations, when committed pursuant to business activity, as unlawful practices independently actionable under section 17200 et seq. and subject to the distinct remedies provided thereunder.”(Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 383.) As the UCL claim is derived from the underlying causes of action, the claim is adequately “tethered” to unlawful or unfair practices sufficient to support the claim for unfair competition. (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1265 ["Virtually any statute or regulation (federal or state) can serve as a predicate for a UCL unlawful practice cause of action."].)

. The previously discussed causes of action, all of which are adequately alleged, serve as predicate acts to support the UCL claim.

Section 45.33 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibits a landlord’s knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a tenant or tenants that causes detriment and serves no lawful purpose. Such wrongful conduct includes failing to perform and timely complete necessary repairs and maintenance required by law. (LAMC 45.33 subd. (2).) Plaintiffs allege additional wrongful conduct such as abusing the right of access into a rental unit and threatening to or engaging in any act or omission which interferes with the tenant’s right to use and enjoy the rental unit or whereby the premises are rendered unfit for human habitation and occupancy. (Complaint, ¶ 1732 (b-d).)

A tenant has a private right of action for a landlord’s violation of this section, which may be initiated “only after the tenant provides written notice to the landlord of the alleged violation, and the landlord fails to remedy the repair or maintenance issue within a reasonable period of time.” (LAMC 45.35 subd. (f).)

Contrary to Defendants’ argument Plaintiffs allege repeated complaints often daily to Defendants about the infestation, disrepair, and uninhabitable conditions and Defendants’ failure to take any remedial action. (Complaint, ¶¶ 27 – 30, 32, 33, 36, 42., 45, 47, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 59.) The failure to allege whether the complaints were written or oral is not fatal to the alleged claim. Whether Plaintiffs can prevail because the complaints were not written is a matter to be resolved by way of a dispositive motion.

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants violated Chapter 15, § 151.05.A[1] of the Los Angeles Municipal Code by failing to serve Plaintiffs with a copy of a valid registration or annual registration renewal statement as required by the code. (Complaint, ¶ 61.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ failure to serve or display the valid written registration statement prohibited Defendants from demanding or receiving rent from Plaintiffs. However, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants demanded and obtained $163,300 in rent from August 2018 to the present and unlawfully demanded and obtained $2,300 as a security deposit. (Complaint, ¶ 63-64.)

Contrary to Defendants’ claim, the failure to specify which Defendant had a duty to serve the required documents does not render the claim fatally defective.

Defendants argue that they are all business entities, and Plaintiffs did not identify a specific person who was hired by Defendants who engaged in the alleged wrongful acts. Plaintiffs also did not allege corporate ratification of that employee’s conduct. Defendants concede that Plaintiffs mentioned a managing agent, however, Plaintiffs do not identify a specific director, or officer, or managing agent.

To support recovery of punitive damages, Plaintiffs can allege ultimate facts. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 ["In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff."].) Whether a principal authorized the doing and manner of the act can be alleged using “conclusional words.” (Kiseskey v. Carpenters' Trust for So. California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 235 ["We accordingly conclude that the conclusional words ‘permission and consent’ used in the FAC, coupled with the factual allegations therein, constitute an allegation, sufficient if proven, upon which punitive damages may be assessed against defendant for the conduct of its agents."].)

Plaintiffs allege that at all times, Defendants ratified the conduct, and every act or omission alleged. (Complaint, ¶ 15.) After describing the specific misconduct to support the claim, Plaintiffs conclude that Defendants acted intentionally and maliciously by and through their respective managing agents. (Complaint, ¶ 174.) The alleged misconduct to support the claim is specifically alleged. (Complaint, ¶¶ 70-75.) Plaintiffs are entitled to include allegations against DOE defendants who have not been specifically identified at the time the complaint is filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 474.)

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED. The motion to strike is DENIED. Defendants are ordered to file their answer within 30 days.

[1]“On or after July, 1979, no landlord shall demand or accept rent for a rental unit without first procuring and serving on the tenant or displaying in a conspicuous place a valid written registration statement from the Department or its designee. On or after April 30, 1983, no landlord shall demand or accept rent for a rental unit without first serving a copy of a valid registration or annual registration renewal statement on the tenant of that rental unit.”