Judge Michael Shultz, Case Number: 24STCV25756, Date: 2025-04-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 24STCV25756, Date: 2025-04-17 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 40 - MICHAEL J. SHULTZ - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call.

Case Number: 24STCV25756 Hearing Date: April 17, 2025 Dept: 40

24STCV25756 Dr. Christiana Baskaran, et al. v. Los Angeles Community College District, et al.

Thursday, April 17, 2025

ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER, AND DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO STRIKE

I. BACKGROUND

The first amended complaint (“FAC”) alleges that Defendants Los Angeles Community College District, the Board of Trustees of Los Angeles Community College District and Los Angeles City College (“Defendants”) subjected Plaintiffs Dr. Christiana Baskaran, Linda Silva, Dr. Ruth Dela Cruz, and Dr. Adriana Portugal (“Plaintiffs”), who had built a thriving nursing program at Los Angeles City College, to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, and terminated their employment without properly investigating their complaints.

II. ARGUMENTS

A. Demurrer and Motion to Strike filed February 3, 2025.

Defendants demur to Plaintiffs' first cause of action for retaliation in violation of Education Code Section 44112, et seq., arguing it fails as a matter of law because a claim under 44113 cannot be maintained against LAUSD and Plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim under Section 44114 because they are management employees and failed to allege that they filed a complaint with a local law enforcement agency. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot maintain a cause of action under Section 44114 because Section 44114 does not apply to management employees.

Defendants also demur to the eighth cause of action for Negligent Supervision, arguing that Workers’ Compensation is Plaintiffs’ sole remedy for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. Defendants contend that while it is true that discriminatory and harassing actions fall outside the employment bargain, that exception to Workers' Compensation Act exclusivity rule does not apply here because discrimination and harassment are intentional acts, whereas Plaintiffs’ Eighth Cause of Action is based on alleged negligent conduct.

Defendants also move to strike punitive damages, arguing that Plaintiffs' allegations again fail to demonstrate that Defendants engaged in any conduct that is fraudulent, malicious or oppressive or could in any way provide a basis for punitive damages. In Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63, the court held that the plaintiff's allegations that her employer discriminated against her based on her gender did not rise to the level of malice, oppression or fraud necessary under Civil Code section 3294 to state a claim for punitive damages. The plaintiff worked at a halfway house, complained to her supervisor that male residents propositioned her for sex, exhibited sexual gestures in front of her, described her as a "whore," and other derogatory terms, and was told that she should "try to be nicer to them," and that they "did not really mean it." (Id. at 56.) The abuse in that case allegedly made the plaintiff feel degraded and sick, and continued on a daily basis for two years until her employment was terminated. The court observed that these underlying facts, though sufficient to withstand a demurrer, did not plead oppression, fraud, or malice, as required to plead punitive damages. (Id. at 63.)

B. Oppositions filed April 3, 2025.

Plaintiffs argue school districts can be liable under Education Code 44114. Plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint to name the individuals involved in the retaliatory conduct under Education Code 44113. They are set forth in the cause of action, and have been named in the DFEH complaint, MARY GALLAGHER, ARMANDO RIVERA-FIGUEROA, ANN HAMILTON, JAMES LANCASTER, JOCELYN SIMPSON, JIM LANCASTER, ANNIE REED, all of whom were supervisors of plaintiffs and thus would be liable under Education Code 44113.

Plaintiff Baskaran and Portugal are supervisors under the Hartnett case and thus permitted to maintain their causes of action.

As to whether Plaintiffs failed to allege that they filed a complaint with a local law enforcement agency, the FAC alleges that Plaintiff Silva did file a police report. As to the remaining plaintiffs, they filed Government claims -as properly plead- and whether that suffices to comply with the statute is an issue of first impression.

Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action is not barred by the exclusivity doctrine. In Shirvanyan v Los Angeles Community College District (2020) 59 Cal. App. 5th 82, the court differentiated between risks that are covered by workers compensation- emotional distress from a physical injury such as wrist injury. Under the negligent supervision claim the plaintiffs are not seeking recovery for any physical injury that arose from negligent supervision and therefore, this claim is not barred by Workers Compensation.

Plaintiffs argue punitive damages are available under Education Code § 44114.

C. Replies filed April 10, 2025

In reply, Defendants argue that even if Plaintiffs amend the FAC, this cause of action fails as a matter of law. Defendants argue these are management employees, not supervisors, and thus Education Code Section 44113(d) does not apply to them. Under Section 44114(c), an action for damages shall not be available to the injured party unless the injured party has first filed a complaint with the local law enforcement agency. Plaintiffs cannot plead that they filed the requisite complaint with the local law enforcement agency. In fact, in Plaintiffs' Opposition, they admit that only Silva filed a police report, although failed to provide any evidence indicating so. The other remaining Plaintiffs did not file with the local law enforcement agency as required by Section 44114(c).

Furthermore, it was held in Hartnett v. Crosier that Section 44114(c) did not apply to Plaintiff, who was a claims coordinator for the San Diego County Office of Education because he was a management employee. See Hartnett v. Crosier, 205 Cal. App. 4th 685, 694-695 (2012). Thus, it is established that Section 44114 does not apply to management employees, which Plaintiff Baskaran and Plaintiff Portugal are.

The Eighth Cause of Action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention fails as a matter of law because it is rooted in principles of negligence for which workers' compensation is the sole and exclusive remedy. Shrivanyan also found that "[t]he compensation bargain - and thus workers' compensation exclusivity - also encompasses injury "collateral to or derivative of a compensable workplace injury", such as emotional distress stemming from the experience of a physical injury at work. Since Plaintiffs allege emotional distress related to negligent hiring, supervision, or retention, their cause of action fails as it would fall under the Workers Compensation Exclusivity.

Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' FAC clearly requests that the Court, "strike punitive damage related language in Paragraph 24 of the FAC." Plaintiffs misunderstand Defendant's Motion to Strike and interpret it as to strike the entire Paragraph 24 of the FAC, not just the language related to punitive damages. Plaintiffs continue to fail to adequately address the deficiencies in the FAC with regard to the lack of factual allegations necessary to support a request for punitive damages.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.¿ (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)¿When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.¿ (Wilson v. Transit Authority of City of Sacramento (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 716, 720-21.)¿In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿“A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not on the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successfully stating a cause of action. (Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 86, 92.)

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (CCP § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP § 436(b).) “In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Clauson v. Superior Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

It may be an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend after granting a motion to strike a complaint if the defect is curable. (CLD Const., Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146-1147.)

IV. DISCUSSION

A. First Cause of Action for Violation of Education Code § 44112, 44113 et seq.

Section 44113 provides that “[a]n employee may not directly or indirectly use or attempt to use the official authority or influence of the employee for the purpose of intimidating, threatening, coercing, commanding, or attempting to intimidate, threaten, coerce, or command any person for the purpose of interfering with the right of that person to disclose to an official agent matters within the scope of this article.” “Employee” is defined as “a public school employee.” (See Educ. Code §44112.)

Section 44113 “makes school officials liable in damages¿for interfering with the right of a schoolteacher to disclose evidence of improper governmental activities to an administrator or school board.” (Conn v. Western Placer Unified School Dist. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1166.) “A school district is subject to liability under section 44114, subdivision (c), not section 44113. (Id., at 1175.) “‘Employee’ means a public school employee as defined in as defined in subdivision (j) of Section 3540.1 of the Government Code.” (§ 44112, subd. (a).) Government Code section 3540.1, subdivision (j) defines “ ‘a [p]ublic school employee’ ” as “any person employed by any public school employer except persons elected by popular vote, persons appointed by the Governor of this state, management employees, and confidential employees.” In Conn, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at 1175, the Court found that the district is not a person under subdivision (j) of Government Code section 3540.1, and thus is not an employee under the Act. (Id.) Here too. Defendants are not persons, and thus, not employees under Section 44113. Plaintiffs, in their opposition, concede that demurring Defendants cannot be liable under section 44113. Accordingly, the demurrer to the cause of action under Education Code section 44113 is sustained with leave to amend as Plaintiffs propose to name the individual defendants. While Defendants argue in reply that these individual defendants are management employees, and Education Code Section 44113(d) does not apply to them, the Court cannot make this determination at this time without analyzing any amended complaint. Defendants’ argument appears to relate to extraneous matters not within the FAC, as Plaintiffs have not specifically alleged each of these employees’ titles.

Section 44114 provides that a public school employee who files a written complaint with his or her supervisor, a school administrator, or the public school employer alleging retaliation may also file the complaint with the local law enforcement agency within twelve months of the most recent act or reprisal that is the subject of the complaint. (Educ. Code § 44114(a).) A person who intentionally retaliates against a public school employee for having made a protected disclosure is liable for damages. (Id. §44114(c).) “[A]n action for damages shall not be available to the injured party unless the injured party has first filed a complaint with the local law enforcement agency.” (Id.) Although there is an allegation in the FAC that Plaintiff Silva filed a complaint with the police (FAC, ¶¶ 33-34), there are no allegations that the other Plaintiffs made such a complaint regarding retaliation to the local law enforcement agency. As such, as alleged, the remaining Plaintiffs cannot recover for a violation under §44114. (See §44114(c).)

As to Plaintiff Silva, Defendants’ demurrer to the cause of action for Violation of Section 44114 is overruled. As to the remaining Plaintiffs, it is sustained with leave to amend.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot maintain a cause of action under Section 44114 because Section 44114 does not apply to management employees. (See Hartnett v. Crosier (2012) 205 Cal. App. 4th 685, 694-695, [Plaintiff, who was a claims coordinator for the San Diego County Office of Education, was a management employee as a matter of law and, thus, Section 44114(c) did not apply to him].)

“A ‘public school employee’ is ‘a person employed by a public school employer except persons elected by popular vote, persons appointed by the Governor of this state, management employees, and confidential employees.’ (Gov. Code, § 3540.1, subd. (j), italics added; see § 44112, subd. (a).) A ‘[m]anagement employee' is an employee with ‘significant responsibilities for formulating district policies or administering district programs. Management positions shall be designated by the public school employer subject to review by the Public Employment Relations Board.’” (Gov. Code, § 3540.1, subd. (g).) (Hartnett, supra, 205 Cal. App. 4th at 694.)

Defendants contend that while Plaintiffs Silva and Cruz may fall outside the exceptions presented in Government Code section 3540.0(j), Plaintiffs Baskaran, who was Director of the Nursing Program (FAC, ¶ 54), and Portugal, a tenured professor (FAC, ¶ 59), certainly do not. The demurrer, however, is being sustained as to Plaintiffs Baskaran and Portugal for failure to allege they made a complaint to the local law enforcement agency, the Court need not make this determination at this time.

B. Eighth Cause of Action for Negligent Supervision

“The [Workers’ Compensation Act] provides the exclusive remedy for an injury sustained by an employee in the course and scope of employment. The workers’ compensation exclusivity rule is based on the ‘presumed ‘compensation bargain’’ in which, in exchange for limitations on the amount of liability, the employer assumes liability regardless of fault for injury arising out of and in the course of employment. The compensation bargain encompasses both psychological and physical injury arising out of and in the course of the employment.” The compensation bargain—and thus workers’ compensation exclusivity—also encompasses injury “collateral to or derivative of a compensable workplace injury” such as emotional distress stemming from the experience of a physical injury at work. (Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College District (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 82, 105 (internal citations omitted). “The general rule of workers’ compensation exclusivity ‘applies only if the risks resulting in the injury were encompassed within the ‘compensation bargain’ ... [which] does not encompass conduct that contravenes a fundamental public policy or exceeds the risks inherent in the employment relationship.’ Thus, ‘some claims, including those based on ... discrimination or other conduct contrary to fundamental public policy, are not subject to the exclusivity provisions of the workers’ compensation law. Thus, such claims may be the subject of both workers’ compensation proceedings and civil actions.’” (Id.)

In Shirvanyan, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th 82, the Court of Appeal held that an employee’s FEHA claims for failure to provide reasonable accommodations and/or engage in an interactive process to identify reasonable accommodations for two injuries are not barred by the WCA exclusivity. (Id.)

The Court of Appeal explained its reasoning as follows:

Shirvanyan’s reasonable accommodation and interactive process claims based on the District’s handling of her wrist condition involve an injury that might fall within the compensation bargain (her carpal tunnel syndrome), but the harm for which she seeks to recover is not “derivative of” or “on account of” that injury. Shirvanyan does not claim she suffered emotional distress because her wrist was injured, or because her wrist injury was painful, or because her wrist injury prevented her from working. Rather, she claims she suffered emotional distress because the District repeatedly denied her the reasonable accommodations to which FEHA entitled her and failed to engage in the process FEHA requires for identifying such accommodations. Her FEHA causes of action seeking compensation for such distress thus do not seek to recover on account of her wrist injury and disability, but rather on account of the way the District treated her because of those limitations. This is a separate harm and not derivative of anything falling within the compensation bargain.

(Id., at 106.)

Here, the same reasoning applies to support the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent hiring, supervision and retention is not barred by WCA exclusivity. Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent hiring, supervision and retention is based on discrimination, harassment and retaliation based on race and age (among other things). (FAC, ¶¶ 296-300.) “This is a separate harm and not derivative of anything falling within the compensation bargain.” (Shirvanyan, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at 106.) Further, discrimination violates the fundamental public policy underlying all of FEHA: “to promote equal employment opportunity.” (Id.)

Defendants cite to Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1595, 1606, which held that a claim for negligent or improper supervision is barred by the workers’ compensation laws. Coit, however, is factually distinguishable as in that case “no claim for negligent supervision was made in the complaint and none was supportable by the facts; and the sexual abuse of female employees by Kearn was so widespread, well-known, and so ratified by the corporation as to constitute intentional corporate policy, which cannot be the subject of insurance coverage.” (Id., as modified on denial of reh’g (May 12, 1993). In the instant case, there is a claim for negligent hiring, supervision and retention that is supported by the facts. (See Jefferson v. Kellogg Sales Co. (N.D. Cal., Nov. 11, 2008, No. C 08-04132 SI) 2008 WL 4862511, at *3–4 (rejecting Coit in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim because “plaintiff’s claim for negligent supervision is based on a purported pattern of discriminatory behavior” and “[s]uch acts are contrary to public policy and therefore fall outside the exclusivity provisions of the WCA”); Greenfield v. America West Airlines, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Nov. 16, 2004, No. C03-05183 MHP) 2004 WL 2600135, at *8 (“As in Accardi, plaintiff’s claim of negligent supervision is related to the same set of facts alleged in her claim of sexual harassment and thus, the claims are based on allegations of acts outside the normal scope of employment. To the extent that these acts constitute the underpinnings of plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim, the claim does not fall within the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.”).

Therefore, because Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent hiring, supervision and retention stems from discriminatory acts based on race and/or disability, etc., Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is not barred by the exclusive provisions of the Workers Compensation Act. The demurrer to this cause of action is overruled.

C. Motion to Strike

Defendants notice of motion states they seek to strike paragraph 24 from the FAC, and paragraph 9 of the prayer for relief.

i. Paragraph 24

Paragraph 24 cannot be stricken as it alleges the basis for Plaintiffs’ cause of action under Education Code section 44114 and is therefore relevant. Defendants argue their Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' FAC clearly requests that the Court, "strike punitive damage related language in Paragraph 24 of the FAC” and that Plaintiffs misunderstand Defendant's Motion to Strike and interpret it as to strike the entire Paragraph 24 of the FAC, not just the language related to punitive damages.

California Rules of Court 3.1322(a) provides, “[a] notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading must quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count, or defense.” Since Defendants did not quote the portion, they seek to strike in paragraph 24, the motion to strike the language for punitive damages in paragraph 24 is denied.

ii. Prayer for Punitive Damages

To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.) The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. (Id.) A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud or oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 53, 63.)

“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in section 3294(c)(2) as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” The term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” (See, e.g., Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.)

Punitive damages are available in actions based on FEHA or violations of public policy. (Commodore Home Systems v. Sup. Ct. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 220.) Plaintiff is required though to provide specific factual allegations that could support a claim for such damages. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1982) 117 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6-7.) First, Plaintiff Silva’s cause of action for violation of Education Code section 44114 remains viable, which allows for punitive damages. As to the remaining Plaintiffs, they allege discrimination, harassment and retaliation based on a disability, sex, age, and race, among other things. Specific allegations, as to those Plainitffs, showing malicious conduct have not been alleged. Nor have Plaintiffs argued in their opposition that they have alleged such specific conduct. Thus, the motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages is granted in part and denied in part. It is denied as to Plaintiff Silva’s prayer for punitive damages but granted with 30 days leave to amend as to the remaining Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants demurrer is overruled in part and sustained with 30 days leave to amend in part. The demurrer to the cause of action for violation of Education Code Section 44113 is sustained with 30 days leave to amend. The demurrer to the cause of action for violation of Education Code Section 44114 is overruled as to Plaintiff Silva but sustained with 30 days leave to amend as to the other Plaintiffs. The demurrer to the eighth cause of action for negligent supervision, and retention is overruled.

Defendants’ motion to strike is denied in part and granted in part. It is denied as to paragraph 24. It is also denied as to Plaintiff’s Silva’s prayer for punitive damages, but granted with 30 days leave to amend as to the remaining Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages.

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