Judge Michael Shultz, Case Number: 24STCV26598, Date: 2025-04-15 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs are six tenants of an apartment complex owned and managed by Defendants. The property is a multi-family residence that is subject to the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance. Plaintiff Petrona Lopez has resided at the premises since 2004. Plaintiffs Patricia, Santos, Yoland and Cristian have resided at the property since 2008. Minor Plaintiff Isabel Trujillo has resided at the premises since 2010.

Plaintiffs allege that during their tenancies, the property has been uninhabitable. Plaintiffs allege the property suffers from rodent infestations, sewer line defects, lack of consistent hot water, ceiling leaks, plumbing leaks, a faulty electrical system, cracked walls, mold and moisture on the kitchen and bathroom ceilings, holes in the floors, lack of a working heater and dilapidated doors and windows. Plaintiffs allege Defendants have had actual and constructive knowledge of the uninhabitable conditions by means of government notices informing them of numerous housing and health and safety code violations, government orders to repair the premises and Plaintiffs’ repeated complaints to repair and abate the uninhabitable conditions.

Defendant Farhad Nozar is or was the alleged owner of the property. Defendants Aida Coronado Deleon and Delecor Investments LLC have been owners and managers of the property since at least 2022.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants on October 11, 2024 alleging (1) negligence; (2) negligent failure to provide habitable premises; (3) breach of the implied warranty of habitability; (4) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; (5) nuisance; (6) premises liability; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (8) collection of rent for substandard dwelling; (9) constructive eviction and willful interruption of services; (10) retaliation; (11) harassment; (12) violation of unfair competition law; (13) violation of Los Angeles Tenant Harassment Ordinance.

On January 7, 2025, Defendants Aida Coronado Deleon (“Deleon”) and Delecor Investments LLC (“Delecor”) (collectively “Defendants”) filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike. On April 2, 2025, Plaintiffs filed oppositions to the demurrer and motion to strike. On April 8, 2025, Defendants Deleon and Delecor filed replies.

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”); Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 (“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”).) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

Defendants demur to the first through fifth causes of action for negligence, negligent failure to provide habitable premises on grounds, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, private nuisance and premises liability on grounds that (1) Plaintiffs fail to allege facts specifying the nature of the substandard, uninhabitable conditions on the property; and (2) Plaintiffs fail to allege facts to support the element of causation.

Elements of Breach of Warranty of Habitability. To establish a claim for breach of the implied covenant of habitability, plaintiff must show “[1] the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability, [2] notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition, [3] the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and [4] resulting damages.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298, emphasis and italics added.) Furthermore, “[a]n action by a tenant alleging a breach of the warranty of habitability is an action on the contract. . .” (Fairchild v. Park (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 919, 924-925.)

Elements of Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment. “In the absence of language to the contrary, every lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, whereby the landlord impliedly covenants that the tenant shall have quiet enjoyment and possession of the premises. The covenant of quiet enjoyment insulates the tenant against any act or omission on the part of the landlord, or anyone claiming under him, which interferes with a tenants right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy.” (Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 588.) “Minor inconveniences and annoyances are not actionable breaches of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. To be actionable, the landlords act or omission must substantially interfere with a tenants right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy.” (Id. at 589.)

Elements of Private Nuisance. “Anything which is injurious to health ... or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property” is a nuisance. (Civ. Code, §3479; Citizens for Odor Nuisance Abatement v. City of San Diego (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 350, 358–359.)

“A nuisance may be either a negligent or an intentional tort.” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 920. The essential elements of private nuisance are:

2. Defendant created a condition that (1) was harmful to health; (2) was indecent or offensive to the senses; (3) was an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property; or (4) unlawfully obstructed the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway;

3. That this condition interfered with Plaintiff's use or enjoyment of his or her land;

5. That an ordinary person would be reasonably annoyed or disturbed by Defendant's conduct;

7. That Defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's harm; and

8. That the seriousness of the harm outweighs the public benefit of [name of defendant]'s conduct. (CACI No. 2021; Civ. Code, §3479; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Supr. Ct. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893.)

Elements of Premises Liability. The elements of a premises liability cause of action are (1) defendant’s ownership, lease or control of the property; (2) defendant’s negligence in use or maintenance of the property; (3) plaintiff’s harm and (4) defendant’s negligence being a substantial factor in plaintiff’s harm. (CACI 1000).

Elements of IIED. To state an IIED claim, the plaintiff must allege facts showing: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. (Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 138, 147 (plaintiff alleged outrageous conduct based on three racially offensive statements made by defendant’s employee before 50 of plaintiff’s coworkers and 3 of his supervisors); Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 534 (affirming order sustaining demurrer to IIED cause of action without leave to amend based on failure to allege outrageous conduct).) “Only emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that an individual in civilized society should not be expected to endure it constitutes severe emotional distress.” (Angie M. v. Supr. Ct. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.)

Whether conduct is outrageous is usually a question of fact but can be determined as an issue of law. (Smith, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at 147.) “Mere insulting language, without more, ordinarily would not constitute extreme outrage unless it is combined with aggravated circumstances. But behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress.” (Id. at 147.)

Plaintiffs sufficiently allege each cause of action. Plaintiffs allege sufficient ultimate facts to plead the nature of the substandard conditions, Defendants’ notice, Defendants’ outrageous conduct and causation. At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) Evidentiary facts need not be alleged. (Roe v. Hesperia Unified School District (2022) 85 Cal.App.5^th 13, 23.)

Plaintiffs allege the nature of the substandard, uninhabitable conditions that breached Defendant’s duty of care, the warranty of habitability and covenant of quiet enjoyment at ¶¶2, 36, 38, 55, 64, 66, 68. Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding allegations into each cause of action. Plaintiffs allege the following “pervasive” conditions on the property and refusing to abate them despite government orders to do so and Plaintiffs’ repeated complaints: “rodent infestations, sewer line defects, lack of consistent hot water, ceiling leaks, plumbing leaks, a faulty electrical system, cracked walls, mold and moisture on the kitchen and bathroom ceilings, holes in the floors, lack of a working heater, and dilapidated doors and windows.” (Complaint, ¶2; see also Complaint, ¶¶36, 38, 55, 56, 64, 68.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants have allowed and refused to abate bedbug and cockroach infestations. (Complaint, ¶56.) Plaintiffs allege the conditions have been present “during the life of each Plaintiff’s tenancy,” which range from 17 years to 15 years, and they have been complaining about those conditions during that period. (Id. at ¶¶5, 9-15.) Plaintiffs also allege that the government issued notices of violations and notices to abate from 2017 through 2023 but Defendants have failed to remediate the conditions. (Id. at ¶¶28-40.)

Plaintiffs also allege Defendants constructive or acknowledge of the conditions based on government notices and orders to abate the conditions, as well as Plaintiffs’ repeated complaints. (Complaint, ¶¶2, 5, 28-40, 54.)

In addition to the physical conditions on the property, Plaintiffs allege in detail the harassment they suffered at the hands of Defendants for purposes of the breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment claim. (Complaint, ¶¶41-53.) Defendants allegedly threatened Plaintiffs with eviction, threatened to withdraw the property from the rental market, intimidated them into paying illegal rent increases and made unreasonable demands of Plaintiffs regarding removal of certain personal property on the premises and Plaintiffs’ improvements thereon. (Id.)

Plaintiffs also sufficiently allege causation. Plaintiffs allege they have had to discard their belongings due to the vermin infestations. (Complaint, ¶56.) Plaintiffs allege they have suffered multiple illnesses and emotional distress due to the unsanitary and uninhabitable conditions. (Complaint, ¶¶55-57.)

Defendants’ Demurrer to the first through seventh causes of action is overruled.

Elements of “collection of rent for substandard dwelling” (Civil Code §1942.4) cause of action. Civil Code §1942.4(a) states, “[a] landlord of a dwelling may not demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to pay rent or quit pursuant to subdivision (2) of Section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if all of the following conditions exist prior to the landlord’s demand or notice….” Civil Code §1942.4(b) provides, “[a] landlord who violates this section is liable to the tenant or lessee for the actual damages sustained by the tenant and lessee and special damages of not less than one hundred dollars and nor more than five thousand dollars…” (Civ. Code, §1942.4, subd. (a).)

Elements of constructive eviction and willful interruption of services (Civ. C. §789.3) cause of action. “Abandonment of premises by the tenant within a reasonable time after the wrongful act of the landlord is essential to enable the tenant to claim a constructive eviction.” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 926.) “However much the tenant may be disturbed in the beneficial enjoyment of the premises by the landlord's wrongful act, there is no constructive eviction if the tenant continues in possession of the premises. Possession must be given up by the tenant in consequence of the landlord's acts, and those acts must be such as to justify the tenant in doing so.” (42 Cal.Jur.3d (2016) Landlord and Tenant, §147.)

Civil Code §789.3 prohibits a landlord from terminating a tenancy by turning off or interrupting any utility service to the tenant, preventing the tenant from accessing the property by changing the locks or using a bootlock, removing outside doors or windows or removing the tenant’s property from the premises. (Civ. Code, §789.3, subd. (a) and (b).) Civil Code §789.3 creates a civil right of action in the tenant and against the landlord. (Civ. Code, §789.3, subd. (c).)

Elements of Civil Code §1942.5 claim Retaliation Cause of Action. Under Civil Code §1942.5(a): “If the lessor retaliates against the lessee because of the exercise by the lessee of the lessee's rights under this chapter or because of the lessee's complaint to an appropriate agency as to tenantability of a dwelling, and if the lessee of a dwelling is not in default as to the payment of rent, the lessor may not recover possession of a dwelling in any action or proceeding, cause the lessee to quit involuntarily, increase the rent, or decrease any services within 180 days of any of the following:

(1) After the date upon which the lessee, in good faith, has given notice pursuant to Section 1942, has provided notice of a suspected bed bug infestation, or has made an oral complaint to the lessor regarding tenantability.

(2) After the date upon which the lessee, in good faith, has filed a written complaint, or an oral complaint which is registered or otherwise recorded in writing, with an appropriate agency, of which the lessor has notice, for the purpose of obtaining correction of a condition relating to tenantability.

(3) After the date of an inspection or issuance of a citation, resulting from a complaint described in paragraph (2) of which the lessor did not have notice.

(4) After the filing of appropriate documents commencing a judicial or arbitration proceeding involving the issue of tenantability.

(5) After entry of judgment or the signing of an arbitration award, if any, when in the judicial proceeding or arbitration the issue of tenantability is determined adversely to the lessor.” (Civ. Code, §1942.5, subd. (a).)

Elements of Civil Code §1940.2(a)(3) Cause of Action. Per CC §1940.2(a)(3), “it is unlawful for a landlord to do any of the following for the purpose of influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling…(3) Use, or threaten to use, force, willful threats, or menacing conduct constituting a course of conduct that interferes with the tenant’s quiet enjoyment of the premises in violation of Section 1927 that would create an apprehension of harm in a reasonable person.”

Elements of a violation of Bus. & Prof. C. §17200 Cause of Action. “As used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) “By prohibiting unlawful business practices, section 17200 ‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” (De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 966, 980 (plaintiffs stated a UCL cause of action based on high interest rate consumer loans; such loans violated Financial Code §22302 and UCL claim could be stated based on that violation even though Financial Code §22302 did not itself create a separate right of action).)

Elements of a Los Angeles Municipal Code §45.33 Tenant Harassment Cause of Action. Relying on the Los Angeles Municipal Code (“LAMC”) effective as of the date of the complaint, Plaintiffs allege section 45.33 prohibits a landlord from “engaging [in] actions that serve no lawful purpose and cause [a] tenant detriment and harm. (Complaint, ¶186.)[1]

Plaintiffs sufficiently allege each statutory cause of action. Defendants argue there is not a “timeline” alleged for when Plaintiffs complained to Defendants about the defects. Defendants argue they purchased the property from defendant Nozar on December 16, 2022 and Nozar provided them with notices that all alleged violations had been remedied. These facts are outside the scope of the complaint and may not be considered on demurrer.

Moreover, Plaintiffs allege the conditions have been present “during the life of each Plaintiff’s tenancy,” which range from 17 years to 15 years, and they have been complaining about those conditions during that period. (Id. at ¶¶5, 9-15.) Plaintiffs also allege that the government issued notices of violations and notices to abate from 2017 through 2023 but Defendants have failed to remediate the conditions. (Id. at ¶¶28-40.) Plaintiffs allege they complained to Defendants Deleon and Delecor about the conditions and citations were issued by the Los Angeles Department of Public Health to Deleon from February 2023 through September 2023. (Id. at ¶¶35-40.)

Defendants argue Plaintiffs ninth cause of action for constructive eviction fails, because Plaintiffs allege they are still residing at the premises. Plaintiffs must allege that they abandoned the premises within a reasonable time in order to state a claim for constructive eviction. Plaintiffs fail to do so.

In response, Plaintiff argues the ninth cause of action states a claim for willful interruption of services in violation of Civil Code §789.3. The ninth cause of action is clearly captioned one for violation of Civil Code §789.3. Defendants do not identify any defect in Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of Civil Code §789.3 based on willful interruption of services. Plaintiff alleges willful interruption of utility services, including, but not limited to, heat and water utility services. (Complaint, ¶153.)

A demurrer does not lie to only part of a cause of action. (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1167.) Defendants’ demurrer to the ninth cause of action only identifies a pleading defect to the extent Plaintiffs allege constructive eviction. However, the ninth cause of action also alleges a claim for violation of Civil Code §789.3. Demurrer must be overruled if any valid cause of action is stated, even one not intended by the plaintiff. (New Livable Calif. v. Association of Bay Area Governments (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 709, 714-715 (any valid cause of action overcomes a general demurrer.) Here, the caption and allegations of the ninth cause of action clearly indicate Plaintiffs intended to allege a cause of action for violation of Civil Code §789.3.

Defendants demur to the tenth cause of action for retaliation on grounds that no facts of retaliatory conduct are alleged. However, Defendants cite factual allegations of retaliation in their demurrer at ¶162 of the Complaint in the form of elimination and reduction of services at the property, refusing to remedy uninhabitable conditions and threats of eviction. (Complaint, ¶162.) In addition, Plaintiffs allege retaliation based on threats of eviction, attempts to intimidate Plaintiffs into paying illegal rent and unreasonable demands regarding removal of certain personal property and improvements at the property. (Complaint, ¶¶41-53.) Plaintiffs allege these retaliatory actions were undertaken within 180 days of Plaintiffs’ complaints to the Department of Public Health and the City of Los Angeles and Plaintiffs’ multiple requests for repairs and return of lost or diminished services made by Plaintiffs to Defendant. (Complaint, ¶161.)

Defendants argue there are no facts alleged to support a claim of harassment. Defendants argue the allegations are legal conclusions without supporting facts. Defendants argue Plaintiffs fail to “show” that Defendants acted knowingly and willfully and in a way that would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress. Defendants rely on inapposite authority regarding civil harassment orders under Code of Civil Procedure §527.6(b)(3), not harassment under Civil Code §1940.2. (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4^th 484, 496.) Moreover, Plaintiffs allege specific acts of harassment in response to their complaints to Defendants regarding the uninhabitable conditions and their complaints to the City of Los Angeles and Department of Public Health. (Complaint, ¶¶41-53, 160, 161, 167.) (Complaint, ¶¶41-53, 160, 161, 167, 187.)

Defendants argue Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts suggesting they engaged in any business acts, or that Defendants unfairly or deceptively misrepresented the subject property in any form of advertisement. Defendants ignore the allegations of the complaint. Plaintiffs allege Defendants own and lease residential property, a “business act.” A landlord’s violation of housing codes can be the basis of a section 17200 claim. (See e.g. City & County of S.F. v. Sainez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1308 (code violations constituted unfair business practices).) Plaintiffs allege multiple statutory violations against Defendants in the eighth through twelfth causes of action, which is sufficient to support a claim for unfair business practices based on illegal business practices.

Defendants’ demurrer to the eighth through thirteenth causes of action is overruled.

Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ allegations in support of their claim for punitive damages, including substantive allegations of Defendants’ intentional conduct. Defendants argue Plaintiffs fail to allege malicious, fraudulent or oppressive conduct.

Defendants again ignore the complaint allegations. In fact, the allegations Defendants identify in their notice of motion are factual allegations that would support of a finding of malice. As discussed in connection with Plaintiffs’ breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, harassment and retaliation claims, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege intentional conduct by Defendants that would qualify as malice, i.e. “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff.” (Civ. Code §3294(c)(1).)

In addition, Defendants’ refusal to fix the uninhabitable conditions despite Plaintiffs’ complaints and the City’s notices of code violations could reasonably be construed as malice under the “conscious disregard” prong of the definition of malice, i.e. “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others.” (Civ. Code §3294(c)(1).) Accepting the allegations as true, reasonable minds could find the totality of Defendants’ alleged conduct “despicable.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Supr. Ct. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 (punitive damages should only be awarded in cases of unintentional conduct where defendant acted in ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests and his or her conduct was “despicable”); Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1212 (punitive damages awards have been reversed where defendant's conduct was merely in bad faith and overzealous)(affirming summary adjudication of punitive damages where snowboarder crashed into plaintiff while going down mountain at high rate of speed but there was no showing of despicable conduct).)

Conclusion

Defendants’ Demurrer to the Complaint is overruled and the Motion to Strike is denied. Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to state the thirteen causes of action alleged and Defendants fail to identify any pleading defects therein. Plaintiffs have also alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for punitive damages based on malicious conduct. Defendants are ordered to answer in 20 days.

[1] The current version of LAMC §45.33 on the City of Los Angeles website contains no such language. The version of section 45.33 effective as of 12/29/24 reads: “Tenant Harassment shall be defined as a landlord’s bad faith conduct directed at a specific tenant or tenants that causes the latter detriment or harm.” There is no requirement that the conduct have “no lawful purpose.”

I. BACKGROUND

Conclusion