Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 24STCV31002, Date: 2025-04-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV31002 Hearing Date: April 17, 2025 Dept: 40
Thursday, April
17, 2025
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
This is a Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty
(lemon law) case.
On November 22, 2024, Plaintiff
Kyong Sook Kwak (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Hyundai
Motor America (“Defendant”) and Does 1 through 10 for (1) violation of the
Song-Beverly Act - breach of express warranty, (2) violation of the Song-Beverly
Act – breach of implied warranty, and (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Act
section 1793.2. This action arises out of Defendant’s warranty and repair
obligations in connection with a vehicle that Plaintiff leased. On February 11,
2025, Defendant filed the instant motion to compel arbitration, declarations of
Vijay Rao and Ali Ameripour, proposed order, and request for judicial
notice.
No opposition has been filed.
II.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
A court can take judicial notice of its own records. (Evid. Code,
§ 452, subd. (d); see Starr v. Ashbrook (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 999, 1014.)
Defendant request the Court take judicial notice of the Complaint which is
attached as an exhibit to the Declaration of Ali Ameripour.
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice. The
truth of allegations made in these Court documents are not judicially
noticeable.
III.
DISCUSSION
In a
motion to compel arbitration, the moving party must prove by a preponderance of
evidence the existence of the arbitration agreement and that the dispute is
covered by the agreement. The burden then shifts to the resisting party to
prove by a preponderance of evidence a ground for denial (e.g., fraud,
unconscionability, etc). (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413-414.)
Generally,
on a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless
it finds either (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) the right to
compel arbitration has been waived; (3) grounds exist for revocation of the
agreement; or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration
unnecessary or create conflicting rulings on common issues. (Code Civ. Proc., §
1281.2; see Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218-219.)
A. Existence and Coverage of Arbitration
Agreement - Warranty
Defendant
meets their burden of showing that a valid arbitration agreement exists in the
Warranty. The first agreement underlying Defendant’s Motion is the Warranty,
which Defendant asserts accompanied the lease of the subject vehicle to
Plaintiff. Defendant points to pages 12-14 of the Warranty entitled as “BINDING
ARBITRATION FOR CALIFORNIA VEHICLES ONLY.”
(Mot., p. 4; Ameripour Decl., Ex. 3, pp. 12-14 [emphasis in
original].) In the Warranty, the
Plaintiff or customer is referred to as “you”, and the Defendant or vehicle
manufacturer is referred to as “we” or “us”.
(Ameripour Decl., Ex. 3, pp. 9-10, 12-14.) The Warranty contains an
arbitration provision, which provides:
“If you
purchased or leased your Genesis vehicle in the State of California, you and
we, Genesis Motor America, each agree that any claim or disputes between us
(including between you and any of our affiliated companies) related to or
arising out of your vehicle purchase, advertising for the vehicle, use of your
vehicle, the performance of the vehicle, any service relating to the vehicle,
the vehicle warranty, representations in the warranty, or the duties
contemplated under the warranty, including without limitation claims related to
false or misleading advertising, unfair competition, breach of contract or
warranty, the failure to conform a vehicle to warranty, failure to repurchase
or replace your vehicle, or claims for a refund or partial refund of your
vehicle's purchase price (excluding personal injury claims), but excluding
claims brought under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, shall be resolved by
binding arbitration at either your or our election, even if the claim is
initially filed in a court of law.
If either you or we elect to resolve our dispute
via arbitration (as opposed to in a court of law), such binding arbitration
shall be administered by and through JAMS Mediation, Arbitration and ADR
Services (JAMS) under its Streamlined Arbitration Rules & Procedures, or
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Consumer Arbitration
Rules.”
[ . . . .]
“IF YOU
PURCHASED OR LEASED YOUR VEHICLE IN CALIFORNIA, YOUR WARRANTY IS MADE SUBJECT
TO THE TERMS OF THIS BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION. BY USING THE VEHICLE, OR
REQUESTING OR ACCEPTING BENEFITS UNDER THIS WARRANTY, INCLUDING HAVING ANY
REPAIRS PERFORMED UNDER WARRANTY, YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THESE TERMS. IF YOU
DO NOT AGREE WITH THESE TERMS, PLEASE CONTACT US AT OPT-OUT@GMA.COM WITHIN
THIRTY (30) DAYS OF YOUR PURCHASE OR LEASE TO OPT-OUT OF THIS ARBITRATION
PROVISION.”
[. . .]
Your Genesis Retailer or Authorized Service
Facility has factory-trained technicians who can perform the required
maintenance using new Genesis/Hyundai Genuine Parts or Genesis/Hyundai
authorized remanufactured parts.
(Ameripour Decl., Ex. 3, pp. 12-15
[emphasis added].)
Defendant
asserts that Plaintiff leased the subject vehicle in October 2023, and the
lease was accompanied by the Warranty. (Mot., p. 7:6-7.) Defendant asserts that
Plaintiff’s claims are subject to arbitration under the Warranty because
Plaintiff’s claims on their face arise out of Plaintiff's lease of the Subject
Vehicle and the Subject Vehicle’s Warranty, including Defendant’s duties
contemplated under the Warranty. (Mot., p. 15:22-28.)
B. Existence and Coverage of Arbitration
Agreement – CSA
Defendant
meets their burden of showing that a valid arbitration agreement exists in the Connected
Services Agreement. The second agreement underlying Defendant’s Motion is due
to Plaintiff’s enrollment of the Subject Vehicle in Defendant’s Bluelink
services, which required agreement to the Connected Services Agreement (“CSA”)
that contains an arbitration provision. (Rao Decl., ¶¶ 4-6.) For Plaintiff to
have enrolled in Hyundai’s Bluelink services, they would have had to click a
box to acknowledge that they “read and agree[d] to the Blue Link Terms &
Conditions” and then click the “Complete” button. (Id. at ¶ 6.)
In the
CSA, the terms “you” or “yours” apply to any person or entity who purchases or
leases the vehicle with the connected services as well as any person or entity
uses as a driver or occupant (e.g., additional drivers, passengers) of the
vehicle. (Rao Decl., Ex. 2, p. 1.) The CSA applies the terms “we” “us,” “our”,
“Hyundai Motor America”, “Hyundai” and “Connected Services” to (i) the
Defendant, Genesis Motor America and their affiliates, (ii) third-party service
providers and their affiliates, (iii) Connected Services Agents, and (iv) any
employees, directors, agents […] of the foregoing.” (Rao Decl., Ex. 2, p. 1.) The CSA contains the following arbitration
agreement:
“(a) Hyundai and you agree to arbitrate any
and all disputes and claims between us arising out of or relating to this
Agreement, Connected Services, Connected Services Systems, Service Plans, your
Vehicle, use of the sites, or products, services, or programs you purchase,
enroll in or seek product/service support for, whether you are a Visitor or
Customer, via the sites or through mobile application, except any disputes or
claims which under governing law are not subject to arbitration, to the maximum
extent permitted by applicable law. This agreement to arbitrate is intended
to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us
subject to arbitration to the fullest extent permitted by law. However,
any dispute you or we may have relating to copyrights or other intellectual
property shall not be governed by this agreement to arbitrate. For the
avoidance of doubt, this means that any claims you or we may have relating to
intellectual property rights against the other, including injunctive and other
relief sought, may be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction. The agreement
to arbitrate otherwise includes, but is not limited to: claims based
in contract, tort, warranty, statute,
fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal theory; claims that arose before
this or any prior Agreement (including, but not limited to, claims relating to
advertising) […]”
(Rao Decl.,
Ex. 2, p., ¶14 [emphais added].)
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff enrolled in
Defendant’s Bluelink services in October 2023. (Mot., p. 9:7-8.) Defendant
asserts that Plaintiff’s claims are within the scope of the agreement to
arbitrate because Plaintiff’s claims on their face arise out of Plaintiff's
lease of the Subject Vehicle and the Subject Vehicle’s Warranty. (Mot., p.
16:22-28.)
The Court finds that Defendant has established the
existence of an arbitration agreement and that Plaintiff’s claims are covered
by the agreement (1) in the Warranty, which became effective when Plaintiff
leased the subject vehicle, and (2) in the CSA, which became effective when
Plaintiff enrolled in Defendant’s Bluelink services. Defendant also relies on
the FAA as grounds to enforce the arbitration agreements [Mot., pp. 7-11.],
asserting that because the Plaintiff leased the Subject Vehicle in California,
the claims arise from the Warranty, and Defendant is the provider of the
Warranty, Defendant has standing to compel the arbitration clauses of the
Warranty and Handbook. (Motion, p.
11:24-28.)
Therefore, the burden then shifts to Plaintiff to
prove by a preponderance of evidence a ground for denial. Plaintiff has not
submitted an opposition. The Court finds that the arbitration provision of the
CSA and the Warranty are enforceable, and the motion to compel is granted.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Compel
Arbitration is GRANTED.