Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 24STCV31395, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV31395 Hearing Date: April 22, 2025 Dept: 40
24STCV31395
José Pérez v. Alicia Galván
Tuesday,
April 22, 2025
FINAL [MODIFIED]
ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
On November 27, 2024, Plaintiff José Pérez (“Plaintiff”) commenced
this action against Defendant Alicia Galván (“Defendant”). On December 17,
2024, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserting
eight (8) causes of action for Elder Abuse, Quiet Title, Slander of Title, Deed
Fraud, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”), Conversion,
Trespass to Chattels, and Slander of Title 2008 Cadillac.
The FAC alleges that Defendant forced Plaintiff to sign over
three of his properties to her while recovering from a stroke and illegally
transferred title to Defendant’s vehicle to her name without the permission or
consent.
II.
ARGUMENTS
A.
Demurrer filed February 28, 2025; Motion filed
March 4, 2025.
Defendant demurs to the second and fourth causes of action in
the FAC on the grounds that they fail to state sufficient facts to constitute a
cause of action against Defendant. With respect to the second cause of action
for Quiet Title, Defendant contends the FAC does not contain a date of which
the determination is sought and Plaintiff failed to properly verify the
operative FAC. As for the fourth cause of action for Deed Fraud, Defendant contends
it is not plead with the required specificity.
Moreover, Defendant moves for an order striking Plaintiff’s
request for punitive damages and corresponding allegations, and Exhibits 7 and
8, which purport to be declarations of a third party seeking to introduce
medical notes and hearsay facts about financial elder abuse from the FAC.
B.
Oppositions filed March 24, 2025 and April 8,
2025.
Plaintiff contends Paragraphs 23 through 25 state sufficient
facts to constitute a cause of action for Quiet Title. Furthermore, Plaintiff
asserts his signed verification per Code of Civil procedure Section 761.020 is
attached to the Opposition to the Demurrer as Exhibit A. As for the fourth
cause of action for Deed Fraud, Plaintiff argues that the FAC has dates, states
when and where the conduct occurred, and that Defendant got the deeds by way of
fraud and forgery of Plaintiff’s signature.
With respect to the motion to strike, Plaintiff contends the
FAC states sufficient facts to establish Defendant’s conduct amounted to
oppression, fraud, and malice, thus Plaintiff properly seeks punitive damages
for his Elder Abuse and IIED claims. Furthermore, Plaintiff contends Exhibit 7
– Kaiser Medical records are exempted from hearsay under Then Existing Mental,
Emotional or Physical Condition, Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or
Treatment, Business Record Exception, and Residual Catchall Exception.
Likewise, Plaintiff contends the Business Record and State of Mind hearsay
exceptions also make Exhibit 7 proper. As for Exhibit 8, Plaintiff contends it
is admissible under the Residual Catchall exception.
C.
Replies filed April 8, 2025
Defendant argues that the purported verification attached as
Exhibit A to the Opposition appears to have been executed after the filing of
the operative FAC, thus the second cause of action fails as a matter of law.
With respect to the fourth cause of action, Defendant contends absent a more
specific allegation of the actual misrepresentation, the notary’s alleged
participation, the FAC allegations are insufficient.
As for the motion to strike, Defendant contends the FAC does
not allege facts rising to the level of oppression, fraud, or malice. Also,
Defendant contends Exhibits 7 and 8 do not fall under any hearsay exceptions.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Demurrer: “The
primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may
prepare its case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly
notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial rights.” (Harris v.
City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.)¿ “A¿demurrer¿tests the
legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Ivanoff v.
Bank of America, N.A.¿(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) The Court looks to
whether “the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or
discloses a complete defense.” (Id.) The Court does not “read passages
from a complaint in isolation; in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we read the
complaint ‘as a whole and its parts in their context.’ [Citation.]” (West v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 804.) The Court
“assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that
reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which
judicial notice has been taken.” (Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th p. 240.)
“The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or
conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)¿¿¿
A general demurrer may be brought under Code of Civil Procedure
section 430.10, subdivision (e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the
cause of action asserted or under section 430.10, subdivision (a), where the
court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the
pleading. All other grounds listed in Section 430.10, including uncertainty
under subdivision (f), are special demurrers. Special demurrers are not allowed
in limited jurisdiction courts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 92, subd. (c).)¿¿¿
Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable
possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18
Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a
pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.)¿¿
Motion to Strike:
“Any party, within the time allowed to
respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole
or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions
specified in subdivision (e).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)¿¿
“The court may, upon a
motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon
terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter
inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)¿
IV.
MEET
AND CONFER
Prior to filing a demurrer
or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and
confer in person, by telephone, or by videoconference with the party who filed
the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to
strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached
through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be
raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41 and 435.5.)¿¿¿¿
Defendant’s counsel of
record, Oscar A. Acosta states on January 28, 2025, he sent an email to
Plaintiff’s counsel, Angela Swan, Esq. to request a date and time to meet and
confer concerning the issues now raised in the demurrer and motion to strike.
(Acosta Decl., ¶3, Ex. A.) The following day, Ms. Swan replied and stated that
she was not in agreement with Defendant’s reading of the FAC and would not be
amending the pleading. (Id. at ¶4.) Although Mr. Acosta did not meet
and confer with Ms. Swan in-person, by telephone, or by videoconference, the
declaration demonstrates that such efforts were attempted. Therefore, the Court
will exercise its discretion and rule on the merits below.
V.
DISCUSSION
VI.
Demurrer for Second Cause of Action for Quiet Title is SUSTAINED
“Quiet title claims may
establish title against adverse claims to real property or any interest
therein. [Citation]. A complaint alleging such a claim must be verified and
include (1) a description of the property; (2) the basis for plaintiff's title;
(3) the adverse claim or claims to title; (4) the date as of which the
determination is sought; and (5) a prayer for determination of plaintiff's
title against the adverse claims. [Citation].” (Mehta v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (S.D. Cal. 2010) 737 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1206.)
California Rules of Court,
Rule 2.257, subdivision (b) states: “When a document to be filed electronically
provides for a signature under penalty of perjury of any person, the document
is deemed to have been signed by that person if filed electronically provided
that either of the following conditions is satisfied:
(1) The declarant has signed
the document using an electronic signature and declares under penalty of
perjury under the laws of the state of California that the information
submitted is true and correct. If the declarant is not the electronic filer,
the electronic signature must be unique to the declarant, capable of
verification, under the sole control of the declarant, and linked to data in
such a manner that if the data are changed, the electronic signature is
invalidated; or
(2) The declarant, before
filing, has physically signed a printed form of the document. By electronically
filing the document, the electronic filer certifies that the original, signed
document is available for inspection and copying at the request of the court or
any other party. In the event this second method of submitting documents
electronically under penalty of perjury is used, the following conditions
apply:
(A) At any time after
the electronic version of the document is filed, any party may serve a demand
for production of the original signed document. The demand must be served on
all other parties but need not be filed with the court.
(B) Within five days
of service of the demand under (A), the party or other person on whom the
demand is made must make the original signed document available for inspection
and copying by all other parties.
(C) At any time after
the electronic version of the document is filed, the court may order the filing
party or other person to produce the original signed document in court for
inspection and copying by the court. The order must specify the date, time, and
place for the production and must be served on all parties.
(D) Notwithstanding
(A)-(C), local child support agencies may maintain original, signed pleadings
by way of an electronic copy in the statewide automated child support system
and must maintain them only for the period of time stated in Government Code
section 68152(a). If the local child support agency maintains an electronic
copy of the original, signed pleading in the statewide automated child support
system, it may destroy the paper original.”
Here, the purported
Verification page of the FAC appears to contain an electronic signature.
Defendant argues this signature is not in compliance with California Rules of
Court, Rule 2.257, subdivision (b)(1) because it is not unique, capable of
verification, and under the sole control of Plaintiff. In opposition, Plaintiff
does not dispute this contention. Likewise, there is no indication that the
purported electronic signature is linked to data like DocuSign or Adobe Reader in
such a manner that if the data are changed, the electronic signature would be
invalidated. Plaintiff advances a physically signed printed “Verification” form
with his opposition. (Opp. at pp. 7, Ex. A.) The purported “Verification,”
indicates it was signed on January 1, 2024, which is after the FAC was filed.
As such, the FAC is not properly verified as required to establish a claim for
Quiet Title.
Nevertheless, “California
appellate courts have held that a pleading may be amended for the purpose of
curing a signature defect.” (Board
of Trustees v. Superior Court
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163.) In fact, amendment may cure a signature
defect even when submitted after the statute of limitations period has run on
the time to file the original complaint because verification of a complaint is
procedural defect not a jurisdictional requirement. (Id. at 1164.)
Assuming arguendo the FAC was properly verified, the second cause of action would still
fail because the FAC does not plead the date as of which the determination is
sought.
Thus, the demurrer to the
second cause of action for Quiet Title is SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to
amend.
Demurrer for fourth Cause of Action for Deed Fraud is OVERRULED
“The essential elements of
fraud, generally, are (1) a misrepresentation; (2) knowledge of falsity; (3)
intent to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.”
(City of Industry v. City of
Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
191, 211.) “Each element must be pleaded with particularity so as to apprise
the defendant of the specific grounds for the charge and enable the court to
determine whether there is any basis for the cause of action, although less
specificity is required if the defendant would likely have greater knowledge of
the facts than the plaintiff.” (Id.)
The FAC alleges on or about
August 4, 2024, Plaintiff had a stroke and stayed at Kaiser of Baldwin Park during
recovery. (FAC ¶9.) Defendant visited Plaintiff on August 8, 2024 and
approached him with paperwork, stating that the paperwork needed to be signed
by him for his benefit and assignment of Power of Attorney (“POA”). (Id.) Plaintiff was heavily medicated and doing dialysis at this time and
signed the single document. (Id.) The FAC further alleges that Plaintiff was
never informed that he was signing over the deeds to any of his properties nor
did he make any promises or guarantees to Defendant that he would do so. (FAC
¶11.) Plaintiff did not sign any documentation that made any statement that
mentioned any of his three properties and none of the deeds bear the real
signature of Plaintiff. (Id.) Defendant stole Plaintiff’s three
properties by forging his signatures, copying the one signature Plaintiff
provided, and recording the forged deeds at the county clerk’s office. (Id.) The FAC re-alleged these facts in regard to the fourth cause of
action. (FAC ¶¶34-40.)
Plaintiff has adequately alleged these claims. While specificity in pleading is required,
both state and federal rules do not require “the pleader to go into minute
detail or to allege evidentiary, as opposed to ultimate, facts.” (Gervase v.
Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App. 4th 1218, 1244.) Here, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that he
did not sign the deeds, and that Defendant forged his signature. (FAC ¶11.)
Motion to Strike is DENIED
Defendant separately moves to strike the
prayer for punitive damages and moves to strike Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 8 attached
to the complaint. Exhibits 7 and 8 are
STRICKEN. Both exhibits lack an adequate
foundation and contain inadmissible hearsay.
In addition, Exhibit 8 contains inadmissible opinion evidence and the purported
speaker lacks personal knowledge.
A plaintiff may recover on a claim for
exemplary damages where the defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (a).) The predicate acts to support the claim must be
intended to cause injury or must constitute “malicious” or “oppressive” conduct
as defined by statute. “Malice” is defined as “conduct which is intended by the
defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is
carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (c)(1); College
Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994)
8 Cal.4th 704, 725 ["malice
involves awareness of dangerous consequences and a willful and deliberate
failure to avoid them"].) "Oppression" is defined as “despicable
conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust
hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ.
Code, § 3294 subd. (a)
subd. (c)(2).)
Plaintiff can allege ultimate facts. Clauson
v. Superior Court (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255
["In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive
damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled
by a plaintiff."].)
The claim for deed fraud alleges the
predicate acts to support the assertion that Defendant’s conduct was
“malicious” in that Defendant allegedly forged Plaintiff’s signature on the transfers.
VII.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the
demurrer to the second cause of action for Quiet Title is SUSTAINED with 30
days leave to amend. The demurrer to the
fourth cause of action for Deed Fraud is OVERRULED. The Motion to Strike is GRANTED in part and
OVERRULED in part.