Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 24STCV31457, Date: 2025-06-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV31457    Hearing Date: June 3, 2025    Dept: 40

24STCV31457 Luis Delgado Gomez, et al. v. FCA US, LLC, et al.

Tuesday, June 3, 2025

[TENTATIVE] ORDER OVERRULING DEMURRER BY DEFENDANT, FCA US, LLC. (Res. No. 1227)

I.        BACKGROUND

       The complaint alleges that Plaintiffs entered into a warranty contract with Defendant, FCA US (“Defendant”) regarding a 2019 Jeep Compass. The engine manifested defects that Defendant could not repair. Plaintiffs alleges claims for violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; for negligent repair against the dealer, Los Angeles Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram;  and a sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement/concealment.

II.      ARGUMENTS

A.      Demurrer filed January 31, 2025.

       Defendant FCA demurs to the sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement/concealment for failure to allege the claim with specificity. Plaintiffs did not allege the representations that were purportedly made, or who sold the vehicle, what was said, or what induced Plaintiffs to purchase the vehicle. There is no allegation that Defendant had knowledge of the defect, nor did Plaintiff allege other occurrences of failures in similar vehicles.

B.      Opposition filed May 20, 2025

       Plaintiffs allege the claim for fraudulent concealment is adequately alleged. The economic loss doctrine does not apply based on binding authority. Heightened pleading requirements applicable to fraud claims do not apply to a claim for fraudulent concealment, which turns on whether a duty was owed to Plaintiffs.

C.      Reply filed May 27, 2025

       Defendant argues that Plaintiffs misunderstand the law; the allegations are conclusory and non-specific. Request for leave to amend should be denied.

III.    LEGAL STANDARDS

       A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. (Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4^th 1702, 1706.) In testing the complaint’s sufficiency, the court must assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations as well as facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded facts. The court may also consider matters properly subject to judicial notice. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

       The court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.) Plaintiff is required to allege facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4^th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer. Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e); Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4^th 1112, 1126.)

       Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case “with reasonable precision and with particularity that is sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.)  Whether the Plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant. (Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.)

       A demurrer may also be sustained if a complaint is “uncertain.” Uncertainty exists where a complaint’s factual allegations are so confusing, they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2; Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(f).)

       A pleading is required to assert general allegations of ultimate fact. Evidentiary facts are not required. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal. 4^th 26, 47; Lim v. The.TV Corp. Internat. (2002) 99 Cal. App. 4^th 684, 690.)

IV.    DISCUSSION

A.      The claim for fraudulent concealment is adequately alleged.

       The elements of a fraud claim based on concealment are: “(1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 310–311.)

       Contrary to Defendant’s argument, the concealment claim is not subject to the heightened pleading requirements governing fraud claims. Ordinarily, fraud claims are subject to strict requirements of particularity in pleading which necessitate pleading facts showing “how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered." (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73.)  However, the specificity rule is intended to apply to affirmative misrepresentations and not to concealment. (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384 ["As plaintiffs accurately respond, it is harder to apply this rule [of specificity] to a case of simple nondisclosure. ‘How does one show ‘how’ and ‘by what means' something didn't happen, or ‘when’ it never happened, or ‘where’ it never happened?’"].)

       In a claim for concealment, “the pertinent question is not who said what to whom;" rather the question is whether the defendants intentionally concealed material terms from the plaintiff to induce the plaintiff to proceed with the transaction. (Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 282, 296.)

       The claim is adequately alleged. The material fact not disclosed to Plaintiffs were that the subject vehicle equipped with 2.4L engines have defects that “can result in loss of power, stalling, engine running rough, engine misfires, failure or replacement of the engine (the “Engine Defect”.) (Complaint, ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant knew the vehicle was defective but failed to disclose this fact to Plaintiffs at the time of sale and thereafter. (Complaint, ¶ 21.) Defendant’s had knowledge of the vehicle’s defect from sources not available to consumers such as Plaintiffs. (Complaint, ¶ 22.) Defendant allegedly failed to disclose the defects to its sales representatives and Plaintiffs at the time of sale and thereafter. (Complaint, ¶ 23.)  Plaintiffs considered Defendant’s advertisement, and/or marketing materials prior to purchasing the vehicle, which supports the reliance element. (Complaint, ¶ 24, 70.) Defendant concealed the existence and nature of defect from Plaintiffs at the time of purchase, repair, and thereafter. (Complaint, ¶ 28.)

       Contrary to Defendant’s claim, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant had exclusive knowledge of the engine defect. (Complaint, ¶ 25—26, 44). In failing to disclose known defects, Defendant knowingly and intentionally concealed material facts. (Complaint, ¶ 68.) Plaintiffs sustained damage as a proximate result. (Complaint, ¶ 70-72.) Also contrary to Defendant’s argument, Plaintiffs allege the defects manifested themselves within the warranty period, that the defects substantially impair the use, value, and safety of the vehicle and the vehicle is now worthless. (Complaint, ¶ 14-18.) Plaintiffs delivered the vehicle to the dealer for repair. (Complaint, ¶ 60.)        Finally, Defendant did not raise the applicability of the economic loss rule to the complaint. The basis for demurrer is solely based on Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to allege the concealment claim with specificity, which as previously stated, does not apply to claims for concealment.

V.      CONCLUSION

       Based on the foregoing, demurrer by FCA US, LLC, to the complaint is OVERRULED. Defendant is ordered to file its answer within 30 days.