Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 24STCV34233, Date: 2025-04-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV34233    Hearing Date: April 17, 2025    Dept: 40

24STCV34233 Marc A. Menowitz v. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars NA, LLC

Thursday, April 17, 2025

TENTATIVE RULING OVERRULING DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT  [Res. No. -931602389865]

 

                                                  I.          BACKGROUND

              This is a typical lemon law case. Plaintiff is Marc A. Menowitz. Defendant is Rolls-Royce Motor Cars NA, LLC. Plaintiff alleges that in 2024, he leased a vehicle that was manufactured by Defendant, and that the vehicle has suffered from numerous and recurring defects.

Plaintiff filed their Complaint on December 27, 2025. Plaintiff alleges five causes of action: 1) Violation of CIV § 1793.2(d); Violation of CIV § 1793.2(b); Violation of CIV § 1793.2(a)(3); 4) Breach of Express Warranty; and 5) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability.

                                                   II.         ARGUMENTS

A.      Demurrer filed February 3, 2025.

              Defendant demurs to all five causes of action, on the grounds that Plaintiff has not established his standing to bring this matter. According to the lease agreement, Plaintiff was not the lessee of this vehicle – ARA II Inc. was. Plaintiff was only the facilitator and guarantor of the agreement.  Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of the lease.

B.      Opposition filed February 6, 2025.

              Plaintiff objects to judicial notice of the lease. Plaintiff also argues this demurrer is improper, as it raises a dispute of fact. Namely, who purchased the car. Plaintiff also argues that, even if ARA II Inc. was the purchaser, Plaintiff still has standing under California case law.

C.      Reply filed April 10, 2025.

              Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Opposition is based on incorrect and falsified legal precedent, and therefore the demurrer should be sustained.

 

 

 

                                              III.        LEGAL STANDARDS

              A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (CCP § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.)¿   

                                                         IV.        DISCUSSION

              Defendant demurs to all five causes of action on the basis that Plaintiff Marc Menowitz lacks standing to bring this case.

 

1)      Judicial Notice of the Lease Agreement

              Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of the lease agreement. Normally, in a demurrer, analysis would be limited to the allegations in the complaint.  The court can, however, consider matters properly subject to judicial notice. (Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 500, 505-505 [the court “accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint, together with facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged”].) Here, the lease agreement submitted by Defendants is clearly the same lease agreement referenced in the Complaint, as both the date and VIN number in the lease match the date and VIN number alleged in the Complaint. (See Foote Decl. Ex. 1; see also, Compl. ¶ 5.)

2)      Does Plaintiff properly allege they have standing?

              Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege standing to bring their five claims against Defendant.

              It is the Plaintiff's burden to plead that the Song-Beverly Act applies to his claims. (Dagher v. Ford Motor Co., (2015) 238 Cal. App. 4th 905, 917 (citing Park City Servs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 295).)

              Under California law, there are two types of plaintiffs who have statutory standing to bring Song-Beverly Act claims: (1) an individual whose new motor vehicle is "bought or used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes"; and (2) an individual or legal [*17]  entity who has "not more than five motor vehicles . . . registered in this state" and whose new motor vehicle is bought or used primarily for business purposes with a gross weight "under 10,000 pounds." (Park City Servs., Inc, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 305-06; Dagher, 238 Cal. App. 4th at 920.)

              Plaintiff does allege facts sufficient to establish their standing. Plaintiff alleges that in 2024, they purchased and/or leased a 2024 Rolls-Royce Spectre from Defendant. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges they purchased/leased the vehicle for “personal, family, or household purposes”. (Id. ¶ 7.)

              Defendant argues that these pleadings are insufficient because, according to the lease, Plaintiff was not the lessee, ARA II Inc. was the lessee. (Demurrer p. 1:18-20.) Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-115.) On a demurrer, a court’s function is limited to testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint. (Marina Tenants Assn. v. Deauville Marina Development Co. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 122, 127.) A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts. (Ramsden v. Western Union (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 873, 879.)

              The lease agreement referenced in the Complaint provided by Defendant raises a very serious factual dispute over who leased this vehicle. But a demurrer is not the proper avenue to litigate factual disputes. Taking the Complaint’s allegations at face value, Plaintiff has alleged facts to establish standing at the pleading stage.

              Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer as to all causes of action.

 

3)      Problematic Legal Citations

              While this demurrer is overruled, the Court wishes to address problematic aspects of Plaintiff’s Opposition. In their Opposition, Plaintiff insists that they have properly alleged standing because “Courts have repeatedly held that a plaintiff has standing to bring a Song-Beverly Act claim if they personally use and are financially responsible for the vehicle—regardless of the name on the lease.” (Opp. pp. 3-4:27-28, 1-2.) Plaintiff cites two cases to support this claim, Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th, 905, 928, and Nielsen v. Ford Motor Co., (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 99, 112. Dagher does not support Plaintiff’s contention and Nielsen does not exist.

              Plaintiff’s reliance on Dagher misplaced and Plaintiff’s characterization of Dagher is misleading.  In their opposition, Plaintiff writes, “In Dagher, the court held that a plaintiff who personally used and paid for a vehicle had standing under the Song-Beverly Act, even though the lease was in a business’s name. The key factor was actual use and financial burden, not the lessee’s name. (Dagher, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at 928.)” (Opp. p. 4:4-7.) Dagher does not discuss standing in the context of a lease on a business’ name. (Ibid.) They do not reference either “actual use” or “financial burden.” (Ibid.) and they certainly do not refer to them as “key factors” of their analysis. (Ibid.) In fact, Dagher is a case about a used car sale where the Plaintiff was found to not have standing. (Ibid.)

       As to Plaintiff’s citation to authority that does not exist (Nielson v. Ford Motor Corp., (2007) 150 Cal. App. 4th 112, Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE [OSC] why sanctions should not been imposed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 for citing to nonexistent case authority.  The hearing on the OSC will be held in Department 40, at 8:30 a.m. on April 28, 2025. Plaintiff cited Nielsen v. Ford Motor Co., (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 99 and this case citation does not exist.  Plaintiff is ordered to respond in writing two [2] before the OSC hearing date

 

 

CONCLUSION

              The Court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer as to all causes of action.

 

 





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