Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 25STCV00074, Date: 2025-05-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV00074    Hearing Date: May 6, 2025    Dept: 40

25STCV00074 Hunter Armani Cotton, et al v. Peter Dunham, et al.

Tuesday, May 6, 2025

[TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING MOTION BY DEFENDANT, MIGUEL TORRES TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

[TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING MOTION BY DEFENDANT, PETER DUNHAM, TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

 

                                                                                         I.         BACKGROUND

      The complaint alleges Plaintiffs rented residential real property from Defendants pursuant to a written lease agreement. Plaintiffs allege seven causes of action arising from Defendants’ alleged failure to keep the premises in a habitable condition, for harassment, violation of the Rent Stabilization Ordinance, and for wrongful eviction.

                                                                                          II.        ARGUMENTS

      Defendants, Miguel Torres (“Torres”) and Peter Dunham (“Dunham”) (collectively, Defendants) file separate motions to strike the claim for punitive damages on the same grounds, namely that Plaintiffs have not alleged specific facts to support recovery of punitive damages against Defendants. Torres argues that the conduct relating to his fixing of the gas stove does not support a claim for punitive damages. Plaintiffs did not allege that Torres knowingly made a misrepresentation with respect to the stove’s safety.

      Defendant Dunham argues that the complaint alleges only that Dunham sent an unqualified repair person to work on the stove, which does not rise to the level of fraudulent, oppressive, or malicious conduct. Any alleged negligent conduct by Dunham cannot support a claim for punitive damages.

      In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Dunham is the property owner and Torres is the manager of the premises. Plaintiffs argue that the punitive damage claim is based on Defendant Dunham sending Torres to work on Plaintiff’s gas stove “to save a buck.” The gas line had been disabled and “red tagged” by Southern California Gas. Defendant Torres told Plaintiffs the stove was safe; however, Plaintiffs were exposed to carbon monoxide poisoning that required Plaintiffs’ hospitalization.

      Defendants’ replies reiterate that the facts do not support recovery of punitive damages.

 

 

                                                                                  III.       LEGAL STANDARDS

      A plaintiff may recover on a claim for exemplary damages where the defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (a).) The predicate acts to support the claim must be intended to cause injury or must constitute “malicious” or “oppressive” conduct as defined by statute. “Malice” is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (c)(1); College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 ["malice involves awareness of dangerous consequences and a willful and deliberate failure to avoid them"].) "Oppression" is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (a) subd. (c)(2).)

      Plaintiff can allege ultimate facts. Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 ["In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff."].)

      Absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The conduct must be “despicable” which is a "powerful term that refers to circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’" (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)

 

                                                                                                IV.       DISCUSSION

      Where the facts show evil motive, such as where a "defendant's primary interest in conducting a low-cost operation irrespective of consequences" and reflecting a lack of concern for safety, is “in and of itself an expression of evil motive, i.e., actual malice.” (Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 289; American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1051 [“Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff's rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.'”].)       

      Elevating one’s own economic interest above others will also support recovery of punitive damages. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 906–907 [where the complaint alleged that defendants “consciously chose to disregard the dangers; elevated their own economic interests above those of their neighbors; sprayed their fields without forewarning Petitioners; and dusted in a ‘reckless and callous’ manner.”].)

      Plaintiffs allege that Dunham sent Defendant Torres rather than a qualified repair professional to remedy the inherently unsafe condition of the stove to “cut corners.” (Complaint, ¶ 7.) Dunham allegedly knew that the property manager and vendor were unfit to perform repairs and that unqualified repairs to red-tagged gas appliances posed a substantial risk of injury or death to Plaintiffs. (Complaint, ¶ 37.) Defendant hired these unqualified persons to save money on a proper repair. (Id.)  

      Plaintiffs allege Dunham continues to send unqualified persons to work on appliances although Defendant knew the services provided required Plaintiffs to be hospitalized. (Complaint, ¶ 14.) These facts are sufficient to allege an evil motive in elevating profits in conscious disregard of the Plaintiffs’ safety.

      Plaintiffs allege Defendant Torres is Defendant’s boyfriend who doubles as a part-time property manager. (Complaint, ¶ 7). Torres allegedly informed Plaintiffs that the stove could be used except for one faulty burner. (Complaint, ¶ 7.) Torres removed the red tag and turned the gas back on. (Complaint, ¶ 7). Plaintiffs allege they suffered headaches dizziness in the ensuing days. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs inquired with Torres about the carbon monoxide alarms which Torres said were working properly. However, the statement was false. (Id.)

      Torres contends that Plaintiffs did not allege that Torres knowingly and willfully made false representations. As previously stated, in the absence of intentional conduct, punitive damages may be recovered if the conduct rises to the level of malice, oppression, evil motive, despicable conduct, and extreme indifference to the rights and safety of others. Here, Plaintiffs allege Torres removed the red tag, although he was not qualified to repair the stove.

      The gas company confirmed that the stove was emitting dangerous levels of carbon monoxide, and the detectors were not installed or functioning correctly. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) The gas company again shut off the gas to the stove and advised Plaintiffs to seek medical attention. (Complaint, ¶ 11.). Plaintiffs required overnight hospital stays. (Complaint, ¶ 12.) These allegations are sufficient to support Torres’ and Dunham’s “extreme indifference” for the Plaintiffs’ rights and safety.

                                                                                               V.        CONCLUSION

      Based on the foregoing, the separate motions to strike by Defendant, Peter Dunham, and Defendant, Miguel Torres, respectively, are DENIED. Defendants are ordered to file their respective answers within 30 days.





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