Judge: Michael Shultz, Case: 25STCV01196, Date: 2025-05-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 25STCV01196 Hearing Date: May 29, 2025 Dept: 40
25STCV01196
Ella Anastasiu v. Local Initiative Health, et al.
Thursday,
May 29, 2025
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
The
complaint alleges that the entity defendants constructively terminated Plaintiff’s
employment due to oppressive work conditions allegedly perpetrated by
Defendants. At the time, Defendant, Tanya Bonelli, was Plaintiff’s supervisor. Plaintiff
alleges claims for discrimination, harassment, retaliation and related claims
under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), violations of the
California Family Rights Act and related claims.
II.
ARGUMENTS
Defendant,
Tanya Bonelli (“Bonelli”), demurs to the harassment and intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged
harassing conduct or that she was subjected to severe or pervasive harassment. Since
the harassment claim fails, the intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim, on which it is based also fails.
In
opposition, Plaintiff argues that “official employment actions” is harassment
for purposes of FEHA. Whether Defendant’s conduct rises to the level of extreme
and outrageous conduct is an issue of fact for the jury. Plaintiff requests
leave to amend if the court sustains demurrer.
In reply,
Defendant argues that Plaintiff admits that Bonelli engaged in routine
workplace oversight which is not actionable conduct. Plaintiff does not provide
a factual or legal support for the claim against Bonelli.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a
complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. (Schmidt
v. Foundation Health (1995) 35
Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) In testing the complaint’s sufficiency, the
court must assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations as well
as facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded facts.
The court may also consider matters properly subject to judicial notice. (Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d
311, 318.)
The court may not consider contentions,
deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore
v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th
634, 638.) Plaintiff is required to allege facts sufficient to establish every
element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw
v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain
the demurrer. Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e); Zelig
v. County of Los Angeles
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.)
Sufficient facts are the essential facts of
the case “with reasonable precision and with particularity that is sufficiently
specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his
cause of action.” (Gressley
v. Williams (1961) 193
Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.) Whether the
Plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant. (Stevens
v. Superior Court (1986) 180
Cal.App.3d 605, 609–610.)
A demurrer may also be sustained if a
complaint is “uncertain.” Uncertainty exists where a complaint’s factual
allegations are so confusing, they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of
the issues it is being asked to meet. (Williams
v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2; Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(f).)
A pleading is required to assert general
allegations of ultimate fact. Evidentiary facts are not required. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty
Co. (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 26, 47; Lim
v. The.TV Corp. Internat.
(2002) 99 Cal. App. 4th 684, 690.) However, unlike federal courts,
California state courts are not a notice pleading jurisdiction, and notice
alone is not a sufficient basis for any pleading. California is a fact pleading
jurisdiction. Merely putting an opposing party on notice is not sufficient. (Bach
v. County of Butte (1983) 147
Cal.App.3d 554, 561; see Diodes,
Inc. v. Franzen (1968) 260
Cal.App.2d 244, 250.)
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Pertinent
allegations
The second cause of action alleges hostile
work environment/harassment on the basis of Plaintiff’s age, race, national
origin, ancestry, ethnicity, and disability in violation of FEHA. Plaintiff
alleges that Bonelli was a supervisor with the entity defendants. (Complaint, ¶
2.) Plaintiff alleges that her working conditions changed when Bonelli became
director of the IT Program Delivery and became Plaintiff’s superior.
(Complaint, ¶ 11.) Bonelli allegedly marginalized and micromanaged Plaintiff.
(Complaint, ¶ 11.a.) Bonelli openly expressed her dislike of older employees
and interfered with the hiring of qualified employees over the age of 40,
insisting that younger employees be hired. (Complaint, ¶ 11.b.)
Bonelli fired only Caucasian employees
based on their age. Bonelli expressly directed Plaintiff to falsify records of
a Caucasian employee in order to fire them. (Complaint, ¶ 11.c.) Bonelli
instructed Plaintiff to “dig up dirt” on an employee to lower that employee’s
performance reviews, which Plaintiff refused. (Complaint, ¶ 11.h.) In response,
Bonelli issued a PIP to Plaintiff.
Following Plaintiff’s repeated objections
to the conduct, Bonelli stripped Plaintiff of her job duties, and Plaintiff found
herself being issued meritless reprimands. (Complaint, ¶ 11.d.)
B.
Demurrer
to the second cause of action for hostile work environment is SUSTAINED.
In pertinent part, it is unlawful for an
employer or any other person to harass an employee because of age or race (or
other protected category). (Gov. Code, § 12940 subd. (j)(3).) The existence of a hostile work environment
depends on the totality of circumstances. (Hughes
v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035,
1044.) To be actionable, an
objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive;
therefore, “a plaintiff who subjectively perceives the workplace as hostile or
abusive will not prevail ... if a reasonable person ... considering all the
circumstances, would not share the same perception.” (Id.)
To prevail on the claim, a plaintiff
employee must show that (1) plaintiff belongs to a protected group, (2)
plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome harassment because of her protected status,
(3) the harassment complained of was sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the
conditions of employment and create a hostile work environment. (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 279.)
Unlawful harassment includes “‘[v]erbal
harassment’ such as ‘epithets, derogatory comments or slurs on a basis
enumerated in [FEHA].’” (Wawrzenski
v. United Airlines, Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 663, 692; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11019.) Actionable conduct must fall “outside the
scope of job duties which are not of a type necessary to business and personnel
management. This significant distinction underlies the differential treatment
of harassment and discrimination in the FEHA." (Janken
v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 65; Reno
v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640,
646–647 ["commonly
necessary personnel management actions such as hiring and firing, job or
project assignments, office or work station assignments, promotion or demotion,
performance evaluations, the provision of support, the assignment or
nonassignment of supervisory functions, deciding who will and who will not
attend meetings, deciding who will be laid off, and the like, do not come
within the meaning of harassment. These are actions of a type necessary to
carry out the duties of business and personnel management."] In other
words, if a supervisor’s conduct in carrying out personnel management duties is based on improper
motives, the proper remedy is an action for discrimination not harassment. (Reno
at 647.)
Citing Roby
v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47
Cal.4th 686, Plaintiff
argues that the misconduct alleged against Bonelli fall within the scope of
harassing conduct. Plaintiff argues Roby
determined that “official
employment actions” are actionable in a harassment claim. In distinguishing a
discrimination claim from a harassment claim, the Roby court observed that "harassment
focuses on situations in which the social environment of the workplace
becomes intolerable because the harassment (whether verbal, physical, or
visual) communicates an offensive message to the harassed employee." (Roby
at 706.) Roby affirmed Reno’s determination that “commonly necessary personnel management actions”
do not come within the meaning of harassment.
If such decisions are made with improper motives, then the conduct is
actionable as discrimination. (Id.)
While, discrimination and harassment claims can overlap as an evidentiary
matter, the principle distinction between harassment and discrimination claims
articulated in Reno and Janken remain.
Plaintiff alleges that Bonelli’s conduct
was motivated by bias based on Bonelli’s alleged preference for non-Caucasian
women under 40. (Complaint, ¶ 11.b). She expressed dislike of older employees.
(Id.) Bonelli allegedly stripped Plaintiff of hiring duties, was
reprimanded, and placed on performance improvement plans. (Complaint, ¶ 11.d.)
Bonelli allegedly filed a cross-complaint to Plaintiff’s complaint with Human
Resources. (Complaint, ¶ 11.e.) Plaintiff was allegedly excluded from meetings
and was deprived of her team members. (Complaint, ¶ 11.g.) Plaintiff was
reprimanded for giving an employee a favorable performance review. (Complaint,
¶11.h.)
Pursuant to the authority cited above, this
conduct falls within “commonly necessary personnel management decisions.” The
alleged improper motive for the conduct, namely a preference for non-Caucasian
women under 40 makes the claim one for discrimination, not harassment.
C.
Demurrer
to the 10th cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress is SUSTAINED.
To prevail on this claim, plaintiff must
allege facts showing (1) extreme and outrageous conduct with the intention of
causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional
distress, and (2) plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress as a
proximate result. (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.) This cause of action is based in part on the
harassment claim. Since Plaintiff did not allege actionable conduct to support
the harassment claim, this claim also fails.
V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s
demurrer to the complaint is SUSTAINED. The harassment claim, as alleged, fails
as a matter of law. Ordinarily, if there is a reasonable possibility that the
defect in a complaint can be cured by amendment, it is an abuse of discretion
to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend. [Citation.] The burden is on the
plaintiff, however, to demonstrate the manner in which the complaint might be
amended ... [appellant "must show
in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change
the legal effect of his pleading"].” (Association
of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Department of Industrial Relations (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 298, 302.)
Plaintiff does not describe how the
complaint can be amended to state actionable harassment claims. Accordingly,
the court is inclined to deny leave to amend.