Judge: Michael Small, Case: 19STCV21657, Date: 2023-06-22 Tentative Ruling

Inform the clerk if you submit on the tentative ruling. If moving and opposing parties submit, no appearance is necessary.

Case Number: 19STCV21657    Hearing Date: June 22, 2023    Dept: 57

Introduction

 Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant The Longford Condominium Association (“Plaintiff”) is an association composed of owners of units in the condominium building located at 10790 Wilshire Boulevard in Los Angeles.  Defendants/Cross-Complainants Heidi Tabib and Roya Tabib (collectively, “Defendants”) owned and occupied Unit 205 in the condominium.  The rather protracted history of litigation between the parties regarding the Defendants’ unit at the condominium is not germane to the Motions pending before the Court.   In those Motions,  Plaintiff seeks orders pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sections 2023.010 and 2033.280 (1) establishing the truth of each matter specified in Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission, Set Two (“RFAs”) served on the Defendants and to which Defendants failed to provide timely responses; and (2) imposing monetary sanctions of $1,247.50 against each Defendant for failing to provide timely responses and thereby necessitating the filing of the Motions.  The Court is denying the Motions to the extent they seek the establishment of the truth of the matters specified in the RFAs, but granting the Motions to the extent of the sanctions sought.

Governing Law

Requests for admissions are one of the tools that the Civil Discovery Act makes available to parties in litigation.   Section 2033.010 sets forth the basics of this tool.  It states that “[a]ny party may obtain discovery … by a written request that any other party to the action admit the genuineness of specified documents, or the truth of specified matters of fact, opinion relating to fact, or application of law to fact.”   In turn, Section 2033.220 requires each answer to a request for admission “be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.”  Specifically, “[e]ach answer shall: ¶ (1) Admit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party. ¶ (2) Deny so much of the matter involved in the request as is untrue. ¶ (3) Specify so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient information or knowledge.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (b).) “If a responding party gives lack of information or knowledge as a reason for a failure to admit all or part of a request for admission, that party shall state in the answer that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).)

Section 2033.290(a) authorizes the party propounding requests for admissions to file a motion seeking further responses to the requests in the event the party believes that the responses were insufficient.

 Responses to requests for admission are due within 30 days after service of the requests.  (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2033.250, subd. (a).)  If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response, the following rules apply. 

 First, the party waives any objection to the requests unless the court, on the party’s motion, relieves the party from that waiver after determining the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) the party has subsequently served a Code-compliant response and (2) the party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (a)(1)-(2).)   

 Second, the “requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).)   The court is required to enter an order establishing the truth of any matters specified in the RFAs, “unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).)   In short, “a deemed admitted order establishes, by judicial fiat, that a nonresponding party has responded to the requests by admitting the truth of all matters contained therein.” (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 979.)  But Section 2033.280(c) provides an escape hatch for a party who failed to provide timely responses to requests for admission.  The party can avoid having the matters specified in the requests deemed admitted by dint of failing to respond within the deadline for the responses, if, before the hearing on the motion to have the matters deemed admitted, the party submits responses that substantially comply with the requirements of Section 2033.220.   In determining whether untimely, albeit pre-hearing, responses are in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220, the trial court must “evaluate qualitatively the  .  . .  responses in toto.”  (St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 780).  This means that the court must not “segregate each individual . . . response for the purpose of finding that portions of the document are code-compliant (and will therefore be accepted), while concluding that other portions are noncompliant (and will thus be rejected).” (Ibid.)

 Even when a party’s tardy responses to requests for admissions substantially comply with Section 2023.220, “[i]t is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction . . . on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated th[e] motion” to have the matters specified in the request be deemed admitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).)  This provision strips the court of discretion to decline to impose sanctions on the ground that the party’s failure to provide timely responses to the requests for admission was substantially justified or that it would be unjust to sanction that party.  

Analysis

Plaintiff served its RFAs on the Defendants on March 31, 2003.  The RFAs to as both of Defendants were identical.   Defendants’ responses to the RFAs were due on May 5, 2023.  Defendants missed that deadline.  In their oppositions to the Motions (the oppositions were themselves untimely), Defendants contend that they asked Plaintiff to extend the deadline to provide responses and Plaintiff wrongfully denied that request.  This contention is misplaced.  The request to extend the deadline to respond was made on May 17, 2003, nearly two weeks after the deadline had passed and a day after Plaintiff filed the Motions.

 More substantively, Defendants contend in their opposition that, prior to the hearing on the Motions, they served verified responses that were in substantial compliance with the Section 2033.220 requirements for responses, and that therefore Section 2033.280(c) precludes the Court from granting Plaintiff’s request in the Motions that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the RFAs be deemed admitted.  The Court agrees with the Defendants on this front. 

 The RFAs contained 19 requests.  Defendants’ responses to the RFAs contained general objections.  Specific objections were made to 5 of the 19 RFAs, without stating whether the Defendants admit or deny the RFA.  Both the general objections and the specific objections to 5 of the 19 RFAs are waived under Section 2033.280(a)(2) because, in the Court’s view, Defendants’ failure to serve timely responses was not the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. 

Notwithstanding the inclusion in the responses of waived objections, the Court has determined based on a qualitative evaluation in toto of the responses, (St. Mary, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 780), that Defendants’ responses to the RFAs substantially complied with Section 2033.220.   The Court’s reasoning is as follows.  First, Section 2033.220 permits a party to deny a request for admission.  Second, Defendants’ responses to 14 of the 19 RFAs stated that the request was denied.  And third, 14 of 19 valid responses manifests substantial compliance.   The result of the in toto evaluation of the untimely responses to the requests for admissions in St. Mary supports this determination.  In that case, there were 64 requests for admission.  The verified responses that were served prior to the hearing on the motion to have matters specified in requests for admissions deemed admitted contained, in the Court of Appeal’s view, “meaningful, substantive responses” to 41 of the 64 requests.  (Id at p. 782.)  The Court of Appeal held that because “the majority” (41 out of 64) of the responses were code-complaint, the responses in toto were code-complaint.  (Ibid.)  Defendants’ record here -- 14 of 19 responses that substantially complied with Section 2033.220 -- is superior to the record of the party who filed untimely, pre-hearing responses in St. Mary.  As to the 5 responses of Defendants that contained only waived objections and no denial, the matters specified in the corresponding requests are not deemed admitted (for that is what St. Mary instructs), but Plaintiff may move to compel further responses to the requests under Section 2033.290(a).  (Id. at pp.  782-783.)

Turning to the issue of sanctions, because the Defendants failed to serve timely responses to the RFAs, the Court must impose monetary sanctions against the Defendants pursuant to Section 2033.80(c). Plaintiff requests sanctions of $1,247.50 against each Defendant.  Per the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel, this amount reflects 1.5 hours that counsel spent on the opening briefs in support of the motion, 1 hour that counsel anticipated spending on the reply briefs, for a total of 2.5 hours at counsel’s billing rate of $475 per hour.   The Court finds that the amount of time that counsel spent on the matter and counsel’s billing rate are reasonable.   Defendants are ordered to pay the amount of the sanctions within 45 days of the hearing on the Plaintiff’s motion.