Judge: Michael Small, Case: 20STCP01877, Date: 2024-05-21 Tentative Ruling
Inform the clerk if you submit on the tentative ruling. If moving and opposing parties submit, no appearance is necessary.
Case Number: 20STCP01877 Hearing Date: May 21, 2024 Dept: 57
The Court is
denying Defendant Randy Thomas’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Andrew
Keiller’s complaint, which seeks recognition and enforcement in this Court of a
default judgment that Keiller obtained against Thomas in an Australian
court.
Keiller
passed away after Thomas filed his summary judgment. Keiller’s widow Louise Tanish substituted in
for Keiller as the Plaintiff in the case.
California
courts “shall recognize a foreign-country judgment” (Code of Civil Procedure
Section 1716(a)), unless, inter alia, “[t]he foreign court did not have
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”
(Section 1716(b)(2).) In turn, “a foreign court lacks personal
jurisdiction over a defendant if [inter alia] [t]he foreign court lacks a basis
for exercising personal jurisdiction that would be sufficient according to the
standards governing personal jurisdiction in [California].” (Section 1717(a)(2).)
There are
two ways in which a California court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant. The first is general jurisdiction,
which applies to any and all claims brought against a defendant in California
if California is the defendant’s place of domicile. (Preciado v. Freightliner Custom Chassis
Corp. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 964, 976.) The second is specific jurisdiction, which
applies when the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits of
conducting activities in California and the claim against the defendant arises
from those contacts with California. (Id.
at p. 977.) A defendant purposefully
avails itself of the benefits of conducting activities in California when the
defendant “deliberately reached out” to California by, inter alia, “entering
into a contractual relationship centered” here. (Ibid., citation omitted.) Because this case involves whether the Australian
court had jurisdiction under either of these two standards for personal
jurisdiction to enter default judgment against Defendant, Australia must be
substituted for California as the forum in applying the standards here.
It is
undisputed that general jurisdiction provides no basis for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Thomas in Australia because he is not domiciled
there.
As to specific jurisdiction, Thomas
contends in his summary judgment motion that this method of obtaining personal
jurisdiction over him in Australia is inapplicable as well because, according
to Thomas, the undisputed evidence shows that he did not purposefully avail
himself of the benefits of conducting activities in Australia.
The Court disagrees. Tanish has presented evidence in the form of
her declaration in opposition to Thomas’s motion that (1) Thomas purposefully
availed himself of the benefits of conducting activities in Australia by
reaching out and travelling to Australia where he met and stayed with Keiller,
who was a resident of Australia, to discuss the parties’ business relationship
and contractual arrangements for the sale by Thomas in California of a special
vehicle that Keiller built in Australia, and for payment by Thomas to Keiller
in Australia of a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the vehicle, and (2)
Keiller’s claim against Thomas arises from Thomas’s contacts with Keiller in Australia. Tanish’s evidence creates a disputed issue of
material fact as to whether the parties’ contractual arrangements were centered
in Australia. The evidence is sufficient
to defeat Thomas’s motion for summary judgment.
The authorities that Thomas cited in his supplemental brief do not
compel a different outcome. The factual
record in each of those cases is distinguishable from the factual record before
the Court in connection with Thomas’s summary judgment motion.