Judge Michael Small, Case Number: 21STCV13319, Date: 2024-04-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michael Small, Case: 21STCV13319, Date: 2024-04-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV13319 Hearing Date: April 9, 2024 Dept: 57

Plaintiff Miguel Vega Cazares sued Defendant General Motors (“GM”) under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly Act”) alleging that Cazares’s 2017 Chevrolet Tahoe that was manufactured and/or distributed by GM suffered from widespread defects and that GM was unable to repair Cazares’s vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts. Cazares further alleged that GM knew that the vehicle suffered from the defects, but nevertheless refused to purchase the vehicle.

The parties settled the litigation. The settlement agreement deems Cazares the prevailing party in the litigation, which, per Civil Code Section 1794(b), entitles Cazares to recover the fees and costs that were reasonably incurred in litigating the case. The parties were unable, however, to agree on the amount of fees and costs to which Cazares is entitled. Accordingly, Cazares filed motion for an award of the fees and costs that he says were reasonably incurred in connection with the litigation. The motion is currently pending before the Court. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

In the motion, Cazares requests $55,308.23 in fees and costs. This figure reflects (A) $47,854.50 in attorneys’ fees, including fees incurred in filing the opening brief in support of the motion; (B) $3,320 in additional fees anticipated to review GM’s opposition to the motion, prepare a reply brief in support of the motion, and attend the hearing on the motion; and (C) $4,133.73 in recoverable costs and expenses. The $4,133.73 in costs and expenses that Cazares seeks in the motion already were awarded to Cazares through the Court’s November 29, 2023 order on GM’s motion to tax Cazares’s costs. GM has not yet paid that amount. GM does not (and cannot, at this point, in light of the Court’s order) contest the amount of costs and expenses that Cazares seeks in the motion. GM argues that Cazares’s request for attorney’s fees is untimely and therefore his motion to recover fees should be denied outright. As a fallback, GM argues that the amount of fees that Cazares seeks in his motion is unreasonable in multiple respects and thus the amount of any award should be reduced below that amount.

Taking the timeliness argument first, the Court disagrees with GM. Cazares’ motion is timely. It was not subject to a time limit for two reasons. First, this case settled and neither a dismissal nor a judgment has been entered. Accordingly, the time limitation on a motion for attorney’s fees following a dismissal or judgment set forth in the California Rules of Court is inapplicable. Second, the parties’ settlement agreement did not set forth a time limitation by which Cazares had to file a motion for attorney’s fees.

Turning to GM’s argument that the amount of fees that Cazares seeks is unreasonable, the Court first notes that GM does not dispute the reasonableness of the hourly billing rates of the attorneys and paralegals who performed work in the litigation on Cazares’s behalf. GM’s argument for a reduction in the fees to be awarded to Cazares from the amount that Cazares seeks is thus based on the asserted unreasonableness of the amount of hours that Cazares’s attorneys and paralegals worked in carrying out certain, specified tasks. All told, GM requests a reduction of 47.8 hours-worth of attorney and paralegal fees from the amount that Cazares is seeking. GM’s requested reductions are broken down into several categories of work. The Court disagrees with GM’s proposed reductions, except as follows.

First, the Court agrees with GM that it was unreasonable for Cazares’ counsel, Iraida Gonzalez, to have spent 10.1 hours to review GM’s discovery responses and draft a corresponding meet-and-confer letter because the responses and letter essentially followed the same template that Gonzalez and her firm, and GM and its firm, use in the many Song-Beverly cases in which the firms are pitted against one another. Gonzalez’s billing rate is $415 per hour. The Court’s is awarding Cazares attorney’s fees for 5 hours of Gonzalez’s time spent in this category of work. This means that the fees that Cazares seeks for this category of work are reduced by $2,116.50 (5.1 hours x 415).

Second, the Court agrees with GM that it was unreasonable for Gonzalez to have spent 17.7 hours drafting Cazares’s motion to compel GM to provide further responses to Cazares’s request for production of documents, reviewing GM’s supplemental document production, and reviewing and replying to GM’s opposition to the motion. Here too, Gonzalez’s work mirrored activities that she and her firm conduct in the myriad Song-Beverly cases that they litigate against GM’s firm. The Court is awarding Cazares attorney’s fees for 10 hours of Gonzalez’s time spent for this category of work. This means that the fees Cazares seeks for this category of work are reduced by $3,195.50 (7.7 hours x 415).

Third, the Court agrees with GM that the 8 hours that Gonzalez estimated in the motion that she would spend on the reply brief (6 hours) and attending the hearing on the motion (2 hours), totaling $3,320 is unreasonable. (Gonzalez misstates the hours she anticipated spending on the reply as 6.5 hours -- she presumably meant 6 hours because $3,320 divided by her hourly rate of $415 yields the 8 hours sought for this category.) The Court is awarding Cazares attorney’s fees for 5 hours of Gonzalez’s time spent for this category of work: 4 hours for the reply brief and 1 hour for the hearing. This means that the fees Cazares seeks for this category of work are reduced by $1,245 (3 hours x 415).

When the Court’s three categories of reductions are added together and then subtracted from the amount of fees and costs that Cazares seeks in the motion, this leaves $48,751.23. That is the amount of fees and costs that the Court is awarding to Cazares.