Judge: Michael Small, Case: 22STCV09585, Date: 2024-08-13 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV09585    Hearing Date: August 13, 2024    Dept: 57

Defendants Joanna Borbon and Francisco Fernando Borbon (collectively, “the Borbons”) moved for summary judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication, on the causes of action that Plaintiff Shara Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) asserted against them in her complaint.  The basis of the Borbons’ motion is that there are no triable issues of material fact bearing on the Borbons’ contention that all six of Rodriguez’s causes of action are subject to, and barred by, a three-year statute of limitations, and that therefore the Borbons are entitled to summary judgment or summary adjudication.   The Court agrees and is granting the Borbons’ motion for summary judgment.

Through their separate statement of undisputed material facts submitted with their motion and opening memorandum in support of the motion, the Borbons carried their initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that are no triable issues of material fact on the statute of limitations issued they raised.  The burden thus shifted to Rodriguez in her opposition to the motion to present evidence showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2000) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [discussing burden shifting rules in connection with motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication].)  Rodriguez failed to carry that burden.

Preliminary, the Court notes two procedural defects with Rodriguez’s opposition papers. 

First, under Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(b)(2), Rodriguez’s opposition papers were due 14 days prior to the hearing on the Borbons’ motion.  Rodriguez missed that deadline by a week.  She filed and served her opposition papers only 7 day before the hearing, which left the Borbons with only two days to file and serve their reply papers. Rule 3.1300(d) of the California Rules of Court gives the Court discretion to decline to consider Rodriguez’s untimely opposition papers.  The Court decided to consider the papers, anyway even though they were very tardy.  The Court admonishes Rodriguez’s counsel to observe filing deadlines, and, at minimum, to seek an extension of time to file papers if counsel believes that a deadline cannot be met.

Second, under Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(b)(3), Rodriguez was required to include with her opposition papers a separate statement responding to each of the material set forth in the Borbons’ separate statement.  Rodriguez failed to comply with that requirement.  She simply submitted a declaration of her own, along with her brief in opposition to the Borbons’ motion.  Section 437c(b)(3) gives the Court discretion to grant the Borbons’ motion based on Rodriguez’s failure to provide a separate statement with her papers.  The Court is declining to exercise that discretion, however, because the evidentiary issues presented by the Borbons’ motion are relatively minimal and forward thereby limiting the utility for the Court of a separate statement accompanying  Rodriguez’s opposition papers.  (Gilbertson v. Osman (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 308, 315 [discussing the circumstances in which a court should consider an opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication even when the opposition papers do not contain a separate statement as required by Section 437c(b)(3); see also Security Pacific Nat. Bank v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 89, 93-94 [same].)

All told, notwithstanding the late-file opposition papers and the absence of a separate statement accompanying those papers, the Court has considered Rodriguez’s opposition brief and the declaration she submitted with the opposition.  (The Borbons’ evidentiary objections to the declaration are overruled.)   Having considered Rodriguez’s brief and declaration, the Court has concluded that Rodriguez failed to carry her burden of showing the existence of triable issues of material fact as to the statute of limitations issues presented by the Borbons in their motion.

Rodriguez concedes in her opposition brief and supporting declaration that four of the six causes of action in her complaint against the Borbons are subject to, and barred by, a three-year statute of limitations.   She argues, however, that the remaining two causes of action, which are for an order to quiet title to the real property that is at the heart of this action and for breach of fiduciary duty are subject to a four-year statute of limitations and are not time-barred.  Rodriguez bases this argument on the proposition that those two cause of action do not sound in fraud, and hence are not subject to three-year statute of limitations for claims on fraud.  

Rodriguez has failed to offer any evidence to support that proposition.  The allegations in her complaint supporting the quiet title and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action plainly show that those claims rest on assertions of fraudulent conduct by the Borbons.  This is critical because a defendant’s motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is framed by the plaintiff’s complaint; put another way, summary judgment/summary adjudication motions are directed at the allegations in the complaint.  (Meda v. Autozone, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 366, 373-374; Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 635, 641.)   Nothing in Rodriguez’s declaration in support of her opposition to the Borbons’ motion is to the contrary.  Indeed, the declaration, like the complaint itself, speaks of the quiet title and breach of fiduciary claims in terms of fraud by the Borbons.  Rodriguez’s bald assertion in the declaration that the claims are not predicated on fraud is supported by no evidence whatsoever, just her say-so.  Rodriguez’s complaint, which, as indicated above, frames the issues for summary judgment/summary adjudication, governs over the unsubstantiated, contrary assertion in the declaration.

In sum, the Court has determined that all of Rodriguez’s claims are subject to, and barred by, a three-year statute of limitations.  Accordingly, the Borbons are entitled to summary judgment in this action.  In light of that determination, the Court is vacating the final status conference and trial in the action.  The Court directs counsel for the Borbons to prepare a proposed order memorializing the Court’s ruling on their motion for summary judgment and a proposed judgment.