Judge: Michael Small, Case: 22STCV22115, Date: 2025-06-06 Tentative Ruling

Inform the clerk if you submit on the tentative ruling. If moving and opposing parties submit, no appearance is necessary.

Case Number: 22STCV22115    Hearing Date: June 6, 2025    Dept: 57

The Court is denying the motion of Defendant City of Los Angeles ("the City") for summary adjudication of the claims of Plaintiff Pablo Vera ("Vera") for violations of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Civil Code Section 52.1 ("Bane Act"), and Ralph Civil Rights Act ("the Ralph Act"), Civil Code Section 51.7.

Plaintiff's claims arise from his participation in an impromptu celebration of the Los Angeles Lakers' NBA Championship in October 2020 in downtown Los Angeles.  While Vera was at the celebration, Officer Alexander Alvarez ("Alvarez") of the Los Angeles Police Department ("the LAPD") struck Vera with a baton.  Vera alleges that he suffered injuries as a result of Alvarez's action.

The Bane Act authorizes a civil action for damages against "a person . . . [who] interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion  . . .with  the exercise or enjoyment by any individual . . . of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of [California]." (Civil Code Section 52.1 (b), (c).)  In the Court's view, Vera carried his burden of presenting evidence through his opposition to the City's motion that shows the existence of disputed issues of material fact on his Bane Act claim. 

The City contends that the LAPD had declared the celebration in which Vera was participating an unlawful assembly and thus Vera was not exercising constitutionally protected rights at the time of his encounter with Alvarez.  Vera's evidence shows, however, a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Vera was aware of that declaration when he was struck by Alvarez's baton. Vera's evidence -- in particular, the images from Alvarez's body camera that he was wearing at the time of the incident with Vera -- also shows the existence of disputed issues of material fact as to whether Alvarez was acting with the specific intent to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion with Vera's rights in striking Vera with his baton, which is the evidentiary standard for proving a Bane Act violation.  (Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 801-802.) 

Vera is not collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of Alvarez's specific intent to violate the Bane Act by dint of the ruling of the federal court dismissing Vera’s previously-filed federal action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 that Alverez was entitled to qualified immunity from suit arising from his encounter with Vera at the celebration of the Lakers NBA Championship.  Specific intent for Bane Act purposes and qualified immunity for Section 1983 purposes are not identical issues -- they ask different questions.  (Reese v. County of Sacramento (9th Cir. 2018) 88 F.3d 1020,1045).  The lack of identity of issues disables the federal court's decision from having collateral estoppel effect here.  (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824, 825.)

The Ralph Act provides that “[a]l persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property because of political affiliation, or on account of any characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of section 51, or position in a labor dispute, or because another person perceives them to have one or more of those characteristics." (Civ. Code, § 51.7, subd. (b)(1).)  To plead a claim for violation of the Ralph Act, a plaintiff must allege (1) the defendant threatened or committed violent acts against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant was motivated by his perception of plaintiff’s protected characteristic; (3) the plaintiff was harmed; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm. (Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th.860, 880-881.)

Vera alleges in his complaint that his protected characteristic is that he is Hispanic and that Alverez’s baton attack on him was motivated by Alvarez’s perception of Vera as being Hispanic.  In support of the City’s motion for summary adjudication, Alvarez submitted a declaration in which he stated as follows: “I did not know Plaintiff’s race or ethnicity, and I did not take any action against him because of his race, ethnicity, or any other protected reason.”  In his deposition testimony, however, Alvarez admitted that he perceived Vera as Hispanic at the time of the incident and that he recorded that perception in his report of the incident.  This contradiction between Alvarez’s declaration and his deposition testimony regarding his perception of Vera’s racial background creates a disputed issue of material fact as to Alvarez’s motivation for swinging his baton at Vera, even though Alvarez did not in his deposition or report confess to being motivated by his perception of Alvarez’s background.  (Harris v. Thomas Dee Eng'g Co. (2021) 68 Cal. App. 5th 594, 603.)