Judge: Michael Small, Case: 22STCV24943, Date: 2023-10-10 Tentative Ruling

Inform the clerk if you submit on the tentative ruling. If moving and opposing parties submit, no appearance is necessary.

Case Number: 22STCV24943    Hearing Date: December 12, 2023    Dept: 57

Plaintiff Daryoush Sameyah sued Rami Gishi and Keyes European, LLC (“Keyes”) for malicious prosecution.  Sameyah’s complaint alleges that Gishi was an employee of Keyes, and that in the course of his employment, Gishi became embroiled in an incident with Sameyah at a restaurant.  The complaint further alleges that in the wake of the incident, Gishi filed false criminal charges against Sameyah, which led to a criminal prosecution of Sameyah.  The complaint goes on to allege that Gishi testified against Sameyah at Sameyah’s criminal trial, and that ultimately, the prosecution ended in a favorable outcome for Sameyah.

On February 17, 2023, the Court (per Judge Steven Kleifield) granted Gishi’s Special Motion to Strike Sameyah’s complaint as to Gishi under the statute (Codd of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 et seq) governing motions to strike strategic lawsuits against public participation (“anti-SLAPP”).  On the same day, the Court denied Keyes’ joinder in Gishi’s anti-SLAPP motion.  The following month, Keyes filed a motion for leave to file its own anti-SLAPP motion as to Sameyah’s complaint against Keyes beyond the deadline for filing anti-SLAPP motions (which is normally 60-days after service of the complaint that is the target of the anti-SLAPP motion).  The Court granted Keyes’ motion.   Keyes anti-SLAPP motion is now pending before the Court.  The Court is granting it and striking Sameyah’s complaint as to Keyes.

In granting Gishi’s anti-SLAPP motion, the Court applied the two-part test set forth in the anti-SLAPP statute and determined that (1) Gishi’s communications with law enforcement authorities that led to the filing of criminal  charges against Sameyah constituted speech protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, and (2) Sameyah failed to show a probability of prevailing on his malicious prosecution claim against Gishi.  Based on those determinations under the anti-SLAPP statute, the Court struck Sameyah’s complaint as to Gishi.

The issue posed by Keyes’ anti-SLAPP motion is whether Sameyah’s complaint should also be stricken as to Keyes.  Sameyah’s claim against Keyes is based on the complaint’s allegation that at all relevant times Gishi was an agent or employee of Keyes and that Gishi was acting within the scope of his agency or employment when he committed the tort of malicious prosecution against Sameyah. (Complaint, ¶ 22.)  It is axiomatic that “where the liability of an employer in tort rests solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior, a judgment on the merits in favor of the employee is a bar to an action against the employer [Citation].” (Hilts v. County of Solano (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 161, 176.)  In short, Keyes’ liability stands or falls on Gishi’s liability, and because the Court determined in granting Gishi’s anti-SLAPP motion that Gishi is not liable to Sameyah, then Keyes is not liable to Sameyah either.  Sameyah fails to address this fundamental point in its opposition to Keyes’ anti-SLAPP motion.  Keyes’ anti-SLAPP motion is granted for the same reasons that Gishi’s anti-SLAPP motion was granted.  Accordingly, the Court is striking Sameyah’s complaint as to Keyes.