Judge: Michael Small, Case: 23STCV06384, Date: 2023-10-02 Tentative Ruling
Inform the clerk if you submit on the tentative ruling. If moving and opposing parties submit, no appearance is necessary.
Case Number: 23STCV06384 Hearing Date: October 2, 2023 Dept: 57
Plaintiff
William Moz-Murcia alleges that he contracted silicosis in the course of his
work cutting, grinding, installing, and finishing stone products manufactured,
distributed and/or supplied by Defendants.
Moz-Murcia asserts causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) strict
liability – warning defect, (3) strict liability – design defect, (4)
fraudulent concealment and (5) breach of implied warranties. As relief, Moz-Murcia seeks compensatory and
punitive damages from the Defendants.
Pending before the Court is the demurrer of Defendant Francini, Inc. to the cause of action for fraudulent concealment. Francini also has moved to strike the allegations in the complaint that (a) are related to Moz-Murcia’s claim for punitive damages, and (b) refer to “Defendants’ other products” that will be identified in discovery. The Court is overruling the demurrer and denying the motion to strike.
Francini’s Demurrer
To state a cause of action for fraud based on concealment, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact; (2) the defendant was under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff sustained damage. (Hahn v. Mirada (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 748.) The allegations of fraudulent concealment must be made with specificity because the law imposes a heightened pleading requirement on fraud claims. (Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1477.) Fraudulent concealment claims against corporations do not, however, require the same level of specificity as claims against corporations based on affirmative misrepresentations. (See Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199-1201.)
Francini argues that Moz-Murcia’s “fraudulent
concealment claim fails as to Francini because it does not adequately allege,
with specificity, that Francini willfully misstated or concealed material
information with the intent to defraud Plaintiff or that Plaintiff relied upon
any misrepresentation by Francini.” (Dem., 5.)
The Court disagrees.
Moz-Murcia’s Complaint alleges that all
of the Defendants, including Francini, were aware of the toxic and fibrogenic
nature of their stone products. (Compl., ¶ 382.) Defendants are alleged to have owed a duty to
disclose pursuant to the federal Hazard Communication Standard and California
common law. (Id., ¶¶ 383-384.) Defendants’
duty to disclose to Moz-Murcia also arose from Defendants’ exclusive knowledge
of material facts, i.e. that their stone products were toxic, and from having
made representations about their stone products but failing to disclose
additional facts that materially qualify the disclosed facts, and because a
transactional relationship existed between Moz-Murcia and Defendants. (Id., ¶¶
385-387.) The complaint further alleges that Moz-Murcia was unaware that
Defendants’ products were toxic and fibrogenic and would not have acted as he
did had he known of said concealed hazards. (Id., ¶ 389.) Additionally, the complaint alleges that the Defendants
intended that their products be used by Moz-Murcia and thus intended that their
concealment of toxic hazards and health risks would be acted upon by Moz-Murcia.
(Id., ¶ 390.) And the complaint alleges that Moz-Murcia acted in justifiable
reliance that Defendants had not concealed such material facts about their
products. (Id.) Finally, the complaint alleges that as a result of Defendant’s
fraudulent concealment, Moz-Murcia was exposed to their stone products in the
course of his work as a countertop fabricator and installer and suffered
silicosis among other injuries. (Id., ¶ 391.) All told, the complaint alleges
that “Defendants concealed known hazards of their stone
products from Plaintiff, specifically by failing to warn Plaintiff of adverse
toxic effects of their stone products, and such hazards were known by and such
concealment was ratified by the corporate officers and managers of each of the
defendants.” (Id., ¶ 401.)
As to Francini in particular, the complaint
alleges that Francini concealed from
Moz-Murcia the true nature and severity of the hazards of its products in its
written materials. (Compl., ¶¶ 433-437.) The complaint further alleges Francini’s duty to
disclose arose, inter alia, from partial disclosure, for example, that “this
preparation is not classified as hazardous according to the latest adaption [sic]
of European Union Directives 67/548/EEC and 1995/45/EC.” (Id., ¶ 434.)
The Court concludes that the complaint alleges
with sufficient specificity the elements of a fraudulent concealment against
Francini. At bottom, the complaint
alleges that Francini concealed the toxicity of its stone products with the
intent to defraud by failing to warn when it expected its products to be used
by Moz-Murcia. The Complaint also alleges that Moz-Murcia relied on the nondisclosure
of these material facts; had he known of those facts, he would not have used
the products. This suffices to
withstand Francini’s demurrer.
Code of Civil
Procedure Section 436 allows a court to “[s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in any pleading” and “[s]trike out all or any part of
any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a
court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.). “When the
defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court
should allow leave to amend.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th
761, 768.)
Civil Code Section
3294(a) provides: “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in
addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and
by way of punishing the defendant.” “‘Malice’
means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the
plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a
willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. ‘Oppression’
means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person’s rights. ‘Fraud’ means an intentional
misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the
defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving
a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code,
§ 3294(c)(1)-(3).)
In the Court’s view, the
allegations supporting the fraud claim against Francini are sufficient to support
an award of punitive damages against Francini.
The motion to strike the allegations
related to the punitive damages request is denied.
As a separate basis for
its motion to strike, Francini contends that the complaint’s catch-all language
referring to “other products to be identified in discovery” does not sufficiently
identify the products alleged to have cause Moz-Murcia’s injuries. Francini’s contention is misplaced. The complaint alleges that Defendants’ stone products contain, inter
alia, silica and identifies some of Francini’s stone products containing
silica. (Compl., ¶¶ 33.) The Court is satisfied with the identification of
silica and silica-containing products as alleged in the Complaint and denies
the motion to strike the catchall reference to other products.