Judge: Michael Small, Case: 23STCV18177, Date: 2023-11-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV18177 Hearing Date: November 30, 2023 Dept: 57
Plaintiff Adrian Enrique Renteria formerly
was employed by Defendant C&J Construction Solutions, LLC (“CJCS”) as a
delivery truck driver. After CJCS
terminated his employment, Renteria sued CJCS, as well his former supervisor at
CJCS, Roberto Milli. Renteria’s
complaint asserts fourteen causes of action.
In the main, those causes of action can be broken down into two
categories. One category -- the first
through fifth and twelfth through fourteenth causes of action -- asserts
violations of the wage and hour and meal and rest break provisions of the
California Labor Code. The other
category --- the sixth through tenth causes of action -- asserts discrimination
and retaliation in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
(“FEHA”). The complaint’s eleventh cause
of action, which fits in neither of those categories, asserts a claim for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The California Labor Code causes of action
are asserted against both CJCS and Milli.
The FEHA and wrongful termination causes of action are asserted against
CJCS alone.
Renteria filed his suit in Los
Angeles County Superior Court. Pending
before the Court is the motion of CJCS and Milli (collectively, “the
Defendants”) to transfer the venue in this action from Los Angeles County to
Riverside County. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court is denying the Defendants’ motion. Venue is proper in Los Angeles County.
The Defendants’ motion to transfer
venue relies primarily on Code of Civil Procedure Section 395(a), which is the
general venue provision for actions that are “transitory” in nature. (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37
Cal.3d 477, 482 [“Brown”].) For
venue purposes, the term “transitory” refers to actions that seek to vindicate
personal rights, as opposed to “local” actions, which seek to vindicate
property rights. (Id. at p. 482
fn.5.) Renteria’s causes of action are
transitory. Thus, the general venue rule
of Section 395(a) is in play. Section
395(a) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law and subject to the
power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided in this
title, the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them
reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of
the action.” Defendants contend in
their motion to transfer venue that, under Section 395(a), the venue of the
action should be Riverside County because that is where Milli resides and where
CJCS has its principal place of business, which is thus CJCS’s residence as
well.
Defendants’ motion overlooks the
phrase “except as otherwise provided by law” that leads off Section 395(a) and
makes the general venue rule subject to exceptions. In this case, two separate exceptions setting
forth special venue rules apply. These special
venue rules override Section 395(a)’s general venue rule.
First, FEHA has a special venue
rule. In pertinent part, it authorizes
the plaintiff to file an action under FEHA “in any county in the state in which
the unlawful [employment] practice is alleged to have been committed . . . .” Renteria alleges in his complaint and then
again in his opposition to the Defendants’ motion to transfer venue that his work
day as a delivery driver for CJCS began and ended at his home in Los Angeles County
and that he made deliveries throughout the work day at locations in Los Angeles
County.
Defendants do not dispute that
Renteria lived in Los Angeles County and conducted work for CJCS in Los Aneles
County. Indeed, none of the declarations
that Defendants submitted in support of their motion to transfer makes
reference to any deliveries made by Renteria in Riverside County. Defendants contend, however, that any unlawful
employment practice that was committed against Renteria occurred in Riverside
County at CJCS’s place of business. This
contention runs counter to the holding of Malloy v. Superior Court (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 543. That FEHA case
involved an employee who worked for the defendant remotely from her home, which
was in a different county from the defendant’s place of business. The Court of Appeal held that for FEHA venue
purposes, the alleged unlawful employment practice on which the plaintiff’s
FEHA claims were based occurred at the plaintiff’s home where she worked, not
the defendant’s place of business. (Id.
at. pp. 555-557.) Under Malloy, the
unlawful employment practices that are the subject of Renteria’s FEHA claims
occurred in Los Angeles County, where he conducted his delivery work for CJCS,
even if the decisions that led to the alleged unlawful employment practices
were made by CJCS in Riverside County.
To be sure, Renteria’s complaint contains
a mixture of causes of action: this is not just a FEHA case. As a general principle, “[i]n cases with
mixed causes of action, a motion for change of venue must be granted on the
entire complaint if the defendant is entitled to a change of venue on any one
cause of action.” (Brown, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 488.) That
principle gives way, however, in FEHA cases.
“[FEHA’s] special provision . . . controls in cases involving FEHA
claims joined with non-FEHA claims arising from the same facts.” (Id. at p.487.)
Second, even if one were to disregard
the proposition that FEHA’s venue provision trumps in cases involving mixed
causes of action, venue would still be proper in Los Angeles County for
Renteria’s non-FEHA claims. All but one of Renteria’s non-FEHA claims are brought
under the Labor Code. In those claims,
Renteria seeks penalties for violations of the wage and hour and meal and rest
break provisions of the Labor Code. Venue
for Renteria’s Labor Code claims are governed by the special venue rule in
Section 393(a), not the general rule of Section 395(a). Section 393(a) provides that “[s]ubject to the
power of the court to transfer actions and proceedings as provided in this
title, the county in which the cause, or some of the cause, arose, is the
proper county for the trial of [an action] [f]or the recovery of a penalty or
forfeiture imposed by statute . . . .”
Under Section 393(a), a cause of action for the recovery of a penalty
imposed by the Labor Code occurs where the plaintiff worked, not where the
employer is based. (Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1077.) As
discussed above, the evidence here is that Renteria worked for CJCS in Los Angeles
County. Thus, that is where his causes
of action under the Labor Code arose.
Finally, Defendants’ motion also argues
that venue should be transferred to Riverside County under Section 397(c) for
the convenience of witnesses in this case.
Section 397(c)’s concern to have the case heard in a venue that is convenient
for witnesses applies even where special venue rules, such as FEHA’s, are
implicated. (Richfield Hotel Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th
222, 225.)
The problem for the Defendants,
however, is that the witnesses whose convenience matters for Section 397(c)
purposes are non-party witnesses, not party witnesses. (Wrin v. Ohlandt (1931) 213 Cal. 158,
160.) And here, Defendants’ argument
under Section 397(c) is based primarily on the asserted convenience for party
witnesses, namely Milli and his mother, whom Defendants identify as the owner
of CJCS. Their convenience does not
count. That is also true for other witnesses
who are employees of CJCS. (Stute v.
Burinda (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d Supp. 11, 17.)
Renteria requested that the Court sanction
Defendants for filing their motion to transfer.
The Court is declining that request.
Sanctions against the Defendants are unwarranted here.