Judge: Michael Small, Case: 23STCV18177, Date: 2023-11-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV18177    Hearing Date: November 30, 2023    Dept: 57

Plaintiff Adrian Enrique Renteria formerly was employed by Defendant C&J Construction Solutions, LLC (“CJCS”) as a delivery truck driver.  After CJCS terminated his employment, Renteria sued CJCS, as well his former supervisor at CJCS, Roberto Milli.  Renteria’s complaint asserts fourteen causes of action.  In the main, those causes of action can be broken down into two categories.  One category -- the first through fifth and twelfth through fourteenth causes of action -- asserts violations of the wage and hour and meal and rest break provisions of the California Labor Code.  The other category --- the sixth through tenth causes of action -- asserts discrimination and retaliation in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”).  The complaint’s eleventh cause of action, which fits in neither of those categories, asserts a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.  The California Labor Code causes of action are asserted against both CJCS and Milli.  The FEHA and wrongful termination causes of action are asserted against CJCS alone.

Renteria filed his suit in Los Angeles County Superior Court.   Pending before the Court is the motion of CJCS and Milli (collectively, “the Defendants”) to transfer the venue in this action from Los Angeles County to Riverside County.   For the reasons set forth below, the Court is denying the Defendants’ motion.  Venue is proper in Los Angeles County.

The Defendants’ motion to transfer venue relies primarily on Code of Civil Procedure Section 395(a), which is the general venue provision for actions that are “transitory” in nature.  (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 482 [“Brown”].)  For venue purposes, the term “transitory” refers to actions that seek to vindicate personal rights, as opposed to “local” actions, which seek to vindicate property rights.  (Id. at p. 482 fn.5.)  Renteria’s causes of action are transitory.  Thus, the general venue rule of Section 395(a) is in play.  Section 395(a) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law and subject to the power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided in this title, the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.”   Defendants contend in their motion to transfer venue that, under Section 395(a), the venue of the action should be Riverside County because that is where Milli resides and where CJCS has its principal place of business, which is thus CJCS’s residence as well.

Defendants’ motion overlooks the phrase “except as otherwise provided by law” that leads off Section 395(a) and makes the general venue rule subject to exceptions.  In this case, two separate exceptions setting forth special venue rules apply.  These special venue rules override Section 395(a)’s general venue rule.

First, FEHA has a special venue rule.  In pertinent part, it authorizes the plaintiff to file an action under FEHA “in any county in the state in which the unlawful [employment] practice is alleged to have been committed . . . .”  Renteria alleges in his complaint and then again in his opposition to the Defendants’ motion to transfer venue that his work day as a delivery driver for CJCS began and ended at his home in Los Angeles County and that he made deliveries throughout the work day at locations in Los Angeles County. 

Defendants do not dispute that Renteria lived in Los Angeles County and conducted work for CJCS in Los Aneles County.  Indeed, none of the declarations that Defendants submitted in support of their motion to transfer makes reference to any deliveries made by Renteria in Riverside County.  Defendants contend, however, that any unlawful employment practice that was committed against Renteria occurred in Riverside County at CJCS’s place of business.   This contention runs counter to the holding of Malloy v. Superior Court (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 543.  That FEHA case involved an employee who worked for the defendant remotely from her home, which was in a different county from the defendant’s place of business.  The Court of Appeal held that for FEHA venue purposes, the alleged unlawful employment practice on which the plaintiff’s FEHA claims were based occurred at the plaintiff’s home where she worked, not the defendant’s place of business.   (Id. at. pp. 555-557.)  Under Malloy, the unlawful employment practices that are the subject of Renteria’s FEHA claims occurred in Los Angeles County, where he conducted his delivery work for CJCS, even if the decisions that led to the alleged unlawful employment practices were made by CJCS in Riverside County.

To be sure, Renteria’s complaint contains a mixture of causes of action: this is not just a FEHA case.  As a general principle, “[i]n cases with mixed causes of action, a motion for change of venue must be granted on the entire complaint if the defendant is entitled to a change of venue on any one cause of action.” (Brown, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 488.)    That principle gives way, however, in FEHA cases.  “[FEHA’s] special provision . . . controls in cases involving FEHA claims joined with non-FEHA claims arising from the same facts.”  (Id. at p.487.)

Second, even if one were to disregard the proposition that FEHA’s venue provision trumps in cases involving mixed causes of action, venue would still be proper in Los Angeles County for Renteria’s non-FEHA claims.   All but one of Renteria’s non-FEHA claims are brought under the Labor Code.  In those claims, Renteria seeks penalties for violations of the wage and hour and meal and rest break provisions of the Labor Code.  Venue for Renteria’s Labor Code claims are governed by the special venue rule in Section 393(a), not the general rule of Section 395(a).   Section 393(a) provides that “[s]ubject to the power of the court to transfer actions and proceedings as provided in this title, the county in which the cause, or some of the cause, arose, is the proper county for the trial of [an action] [f]or the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture imposed by statute . . . .”  Under Section 393(a), a cause of action for the recovery of a penalty imposed by the Labor Code occurs where the plaintiff worked, not where the employer is based.  (Crestwood  Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1077.)  As discussed above, the evidence here is that Renteria worked for CJCS in Los Angeles County.  Thus, that is where his causes of action under the Labor Code arose.

Finally, Defendants’ motion also argues that venue should be transferred to Riverside County under Section 397(c) for the convenience of witnesses in this case.  Section 397(c)’s concern to have the case heard in a venue that is convenient for witnesses applies even where special venue rules, such as FEHA’s, are implicated.  (Richfield Hotel Mgmt., Inc. v. Sup.Ct.  (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 222, 225.)

The problem for the Defendants, however, is that the witnesses whose convenience matters for Section 397(c) purposes are non-party witnesses, not party witnesses.  (Wrin v. Ohlandt (1931) 213 Cal. 158, 160.)  And here, Defendants’ argument under Section 397(c) is based primarily on the asserted convenience for party witnesses, namely Milli and his mother, whom Defendants identify as the owner of CJCS.  Their convenience does not count.   That is also true for other witnesses who are employees of CJCS.  (Stute v. Burinda (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d Supp. 11, 17.)

Renteria requested that the Court sanction Defendants for filing their motion to transfer.  The Court is declining that request.  Sanctions against the Defendants are unwarranted here.