Judge: Michael Small, Case: 23STCV31323, Date: 2025-05-20 Tentative Ruling
Inform the clerk if you submit on the tentative ruling. If moving and opposing parties submit, no appearance is necessary.
Case Number: 23STCV31323 Hearing Date: May 20, 2025 Dept: 57
In
December 2023, Plaintiff Bernard Jimenez Cabanilla sued General Motors, LLC
(“Defendant”) under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act ("Song-Beverly
Act") for asserted breaches of express and implied warranties that
Plaintiff said came with Plaintiff's purchase of a used motor vehicle that
Defendant manufactured and distributed.
A year later, the California Supreme Court held in Rodriguez v. FCA
US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 [“Rodriguez”] that used motor vehicles that
are purchased with an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty do not qualify
for the Song-Beverly Act’s remedies for asserted breach of express warranties
unless a new car warranty was issued with the purchase of the used
vehicle. In the wake of Rodriguez,
Plaintiff moved for leave to amend her complaint to add a cause of action under
the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301-2312 [“MMWA”]. Defendant opposed Plaintiff’s motion. The Court is granting it. Plaintiff is directed to file and serve her
proposed amended complaint within 7 days of the hearing on the motion for leave
to amend.
Trial
courts have “discretion, after notice to the adverse party, [to] allow, upon
any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other
particulars…” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) Permissible amendments
include the addition of new causes of action . (Ibid.) [T]he court’s discretion will usually be
exercised liberally to permit amendment of the pleadings.” (Howard v. County of San Diego (2010)
184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) “The policy
favoring amendment is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave
to amend can be justified.” (Ibid.) “If the motion to amend is timely made and
the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error
to refuse permission to amend . . . .”
(Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; see
also (Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1154,
1163.) “Leave to amend may be denied
where permitting an amendment would be futile . . . e.g., where the amendment
does not state a cause of action.” (Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 813, 828.) Pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b), a declaration must accompany a
motion for leave to amend specifying (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why
the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the
amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for
amendment was not made earlier. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b).)
Defendant
argues that “(1) Plaintiff unjustifiably delayed seeking to add the new cause
of action; (2) allowing Plaintiff to add a new cause of action at this stage
would unfairly prejudice [Defendant]; and (3) any attempt to pursue the new
cause of action in Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint would be futile.”
(Opposition, p. 3.) The Court disagrees
with these arguments.
As
to Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff unreasonably delayed in seeking leave
to amend, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a declaration explaining that Plaintiff
did not seek leave to amend earlier than she did because, until Rodriguez
came down, she believed that she had a viable claim under long-standing Court
of Appeal precedent, which Rodriguez overruled, for breach of an express
warranty under the Song-Beverly Act. The
declaration further states that Rodriguez prompted Plaintiff to add a
claim under the MMWA for breach of an express warranty. The record indicates that the Plaintiff
sought to leave amend fairly soon after the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez
was issued. In sum, there was no
unjustifiable delay here.
As
to Defendant’s contention that it will be prejudiced if leave to amend to add
the MMWA claim is granted, the Court
does not discern prejudice here.
Defendant’s prejudice contention is based on the current trial of July
29, 2025, which is just over two months away.
As it turns out, the Court will be unavailable for trial that day. So,
the trial will have to be moved. The
trial continuance to be entered will be relatively short. That still does not add up to prejudice. That is because the MMWA claim is based on
essentially the same set of facts as Plaintiff’s claim under the Song-Beverly
Act for breach of the express warranty.
Defendant does not adequately explain what additional discovery it will
need to propound on Plaintiff so that it can sufficiently prepare for trial on
the MMWA claim. In any event, with the
trial continuance, there will be time before the discovery cut-off date for the
Defendant to propound the discovery that it says it needs to conduct.
Defendant’s futility argument is unavailing. Defendant offers no adequate explanation as to why Plaintiff’s proposed new claim under the MMWA, which strikes the Court as overlapping with Plaintiff’s claim under the Song-Beverly Act for breach of the express warranty, fails as a matter of law. Prior to Rodriguez, Defendant did not demur to the Song-Beverly Act claim on the ground of legal deficiency. If Defendant believes that the MMWA claim is somehow legally deficient in ways that the Song-Beverly Act claim was not before Rodriguez, Defendant can act on this belief through a demurrer to the MMWA claim.One final word. In preparing this ruling, the Court noticed that Plaintiff's amended complaint still includes claims under the Song-Beverly Act, notwithstanding Rodriguez. Defendant can take steps to address this seeming defect, such as by filing a demurrer or a motion for summary adjudication, and, if necessary, by seeking a further continuance of the trial date.