Judge: Michael Small, Case: 24STCV02230, Date: 2024-04-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV02230    Hearing Date: April 25, 2024    Dept: 57

Plaintiffs Carolyn Comick, Ebony Franklin and Fred Stewart (collectively, “the Plaintiffs”) were tenants at a residential property located at 649 Wall St., Los Angeles, CA 90014 (“the Subject Property”).  Contesting the habitability of the Subject Property, the Plaintiffs sued Defendants Joshua House Health Center (“Joshua”), 649 Lofts LP (“649 Lofts”), and SRHT Property Management Company (“SRHT”) (collectively, “Defendants”).  As alleged in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, at all relevant times, 649 Lofts and Joshua co-owned and operated the Subject Property, and SRHT was the property manager for Joshua and 649 Lofts.

Pending before the Court is the motion of 649 Lofts and SHRT (“the Moving Defendants”) to strike Paragraphs 51 and 67 from the Plaintiffs’ complaint, which are there to support Plaintiffs’ request for an award of exemplary and punitive damages against 649 Lofts and Joshua.  The Moving Defendants also seek to strike Paragraph 4 of the Complaint’s Prayer for Relief as to 649 Lofts and Joshua, which is the paragraph in which the Plaintiffs request an award of exemplary and punitive damages against those two Defendants.   The Moving Defendants contend that the Court should strike these Paragraphs because the Complaint contains insufficient allegations to support an award of exemplary and punitive damages.  The Court disagrees with the Moving Defendants and is denying their motion.  Moving Defendants shall file and serve an answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint within 14 days.[1]

California Code of Civil Procedure section 436 allows a court to “[s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” and “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.). The grounds for moving to strike must An “irrelevant matter” includes a demand for judgment “requesting relief not supported by the allegations” of the pleading. (Id. § 431.10(b).) A motion to strike can be used to attack improper claims for damages that are not supported by the cause of action pleaded. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 7:182.)

Civil Code section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294(a).)¿¿  “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(1).) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. (Id., § 3294(c)(2).) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to defendant with the intention on the part of defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Id., § 3294(c)(3).)¿  A motion to strike punitive damages may lie where the facts alleged do not rise to the level of “malice, fraud or oppression” required to support a punitive damages award.  (See Turman v. Turning Point of Central Calif., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)  Specific facts alleging malice, oppression, or fraud must be pleaded in support of a request for punitive damages. (See Hillard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-92.)  The mere fact that a tort may have been committed is insufficient.  (See Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-95.)   

Here, Plaintiffs seek an award of exemplary and punitive damages against 649 Lofts and Joshua in connection with the second cause of action in Plaintiffs’ complaint, which asserts a violation of the breach of implied warranty of habitability of leased residential property, and the fourth cause of action, which asserts a violation of Civil Code section 1942.4’s statutory guarantee of habitability of leased residential property.  (Complaint, ¶¶ 51, 67; Prayer for Relief, ¶ 4.)   In arguing that the allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to support an award of exemplary and punitive damages, Moving Defendants point to Paragraphs 44-50 of the Complaint, which are part of the second cause of action, and Paragraph 60, which is part of the fourth cause of action. (Motion, pp. 7-8.)  Standing alone, Paragraphs 44-50 and 60 may well be insufficient to support an award of exemplary or punitive damages.

The problem with the Moving Defendants’ argument is that the Paragraphs to which they point must be read together with all of the other allegations in the Complaint, not in isolation, for purposes of determining whether the Complaint contains sufficient allegations to support an award of exemplary or punitive damages.  (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6 [in considering a motion to strike allegations of entitlement to punitive damages, “[w]hat is important is that the complaint as a whole contain sufficient facts to apprise the defendant of the basis upon which plaintiff is seeking [that] relief.”  The language that is the subject of the motion to strike “must be read . . . in the context of the facts alleged in the rest of the [plaintiff’s] complaint.”; see also Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 [“In ruling on a motion to strike [a punitive damages claim, courts do not read allegations in isolation.”].)

Here, when the Complaint is read as a whole, it is evident to the Court that it contains sufficient allegations that would support a finding by the jury that 649 Lofts and Joshua acted with the requisite culpability to justify an award of exemplary or punitive damages against the Defendants.  In particular, Plaintiffs allege that they “constantly and consistently” for many years made the Defendants aware of the following substandard conditions: “inadequate weather protection, inadequate plumbing, dampness and mold, inadequate sanitation, vermin infestation, structural hazards, nuisance, inadequate mechanical equipment, failure to maintain premises in a good and safe condition and harassment. (Complaint, ¶ 19.)  Plaintiffs further allege that despite being alerted by Plaintiffs to these conditions, “[t]he Defendants consciously disregarded Plaintiffs’ welfare and tenancy rights by failing to make repairs or ordinary maintenance at the Subject Property.” (Id., ¶ 29.)  According to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants made matters worse when they “retaliated against the Plaintiffs [after they] protested the Subject Property’s deficient condition” by reducing services to the Plaintiffs. (Id., ¶ 30.)  Plaintiffs allege, moreover, that the Defendants were placed on further notice of the substandard conditions by the Los Angeles Housing Department’s inspections and order to repair. (Id., ¶¶ 21-22, 32.) Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs say, Defendants continued to ignore the Subject Property’s habitability problems, which Defendants knew “could lead to conditions that would seriously and materially affect Plaintiffs’ tenancies and their right to quietly enjoy their living space.” (Id., ¶ 33.) If these allegations regarding the Defendants’ actions and inactions are proven to be true at trial, the jury could from there find that Defendants acted maliciously, oppressively, and fraudulently by consciously disregarding for an extended period of time Plaintiffs’ rights to habitable premises and their basic well-being and safety. 

Penner v. Falk (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 858, is instructive.  In that case, the Court of Appeal affirmed denial of the defendants/landlords’ motion to strike punitive damages allegations when the tenants complaint “sufficiently allege[d]] facts setting forth long existing physical conditions of the premises which portend danger for the tenants,” and alleged that the landlords “knew of those conditions for up to two years, had power to make changes, but failed to take corrective and curative measures.”  (Id. at p. 867.)  Summing up its disposition, the Court of Appeal stated that “[i]f proven true, these allegations would support an award of punitive damages.”  (Id. at p. 867.)