Judge: Michael Small, Case: 24STCV05208, Date: 2025-05-08 Tentative Ruling

Inform the clerk if you submit on the tentative ruling. If moving and opposing parties submit, no appearance is necessary.

Case Number: 24STCV05208    Hearing Date: May 8, 2025    Dept: 57

Pending before the Court is the Defendant’s demurrer to all of the causes of action in the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”).  The Court is overruling the demurrer.  Within the demurrer, Defendant argued that the Court should strike portions of the SAC.  Defendant did not, however, file a separate motion to strike.  Accordingly, the Court is denying Defendant’s request to strike portions of the SAC.   Defendant shall file and serve and answer to the SAC by May 22, 2025.

First Cause of Action: Breach of Contract

Defendant argues that Plaintiff “is not clear about what was breached when it was breached who who [sic] breached it.” (Demurrer, p. 5.)  Defendant further argues that the SAC “is not plead [sic] with sufficient clarity that would constitute an action for contract. This could be time barred and should be struck.” (Id.)    The Court disagrees.

As an initial matter, the claim for breach of contract is not barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations for written contracts.  Based on the allegations in the SAC itself and the attachments to the SAC, Plaintiff has pled within the statute of limitations.

Plaintiff’s allegations also state a claim for breach of contract.   “To establish a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the existence of the contract, (2) the plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s breach, and (4) resulting damages to the plaintiff.”  (Maxwell v. Dolezal (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 93, 97-98 [internal citation omitted].) 

Here, the SAC pleads that on March 24, 2013, Plaintiff entered into a written lease agreement with Defendant for tenancy at the property located at 1058 Simmons Ave., including exclusive use of a garage with two parking spaces. (SAC, ¶¶ 6, 13.) It is not necessary that Plaintiff attach the lease: “a plaintiff may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.” (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 199.) Plaintiff has done so here, by alleging a lease agreement for real property between the parties. Furthermore, Plaintiff pleads that Defendant refused to provide a copy of the original lease agreement. (SAC, ¶ 14.)  Plaintiff also adequately pleads his own performance and Defendant’s breach: Plaintiff alleges that he fulfilled obligations under the lease by paying rent on time and adhering to the lease terms. (Id., ¶ 13.) Defendant is alleged to have breached the lease in a number of ways, including revoking access to two parking spaces provided by the lease, increasing rent without registering the property with the Rent Stabilization Program, and failing to maintain the property in a habitable condition. (Id., ¶ 14.)  Finally, Plaintiff adequately pleads damages: the SAC states that Plaintiff suffered financial loss and  loss of the full value of the housing guaranteed under the lease. (Id., ¶ 15.)

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Second Cause of Action: Negligence

Defendant argues that Plaintiff “is not clear about what duty was owed. That defendant owed that duty and that defendant breached that duty. He is not clear enough to properly state a cause of action for negligence. This could be time barred and should be struck.” (Demurrer, p. 5.)  The Court disagrees.

First, from the face of the SAC and the attachments to it, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that the negligence claim is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations for negligence claims.  It might be. But that will have to be determined after discovery and at the summary judgment/summary adjudication stage, not at the pleading stage. 

Second, the SAC adequately pleads negligence. “Actionable negligence generally involves five elements: (a) a defendant's legal duty to exercise due care; (b) defendant's breach of that duty; (c) the breach as the actual (“but for”) cause of plaintiff's injury; (d) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of plaintiff's injury; and (e) damages to plaintiff.” (Bearuchene v. Synanon Foundation Inc. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 342, 346.)  Here, Plaintiff alleges several common law and statutory duties that landlords owe to tenants, including maintaining rental properties in habitable condition (Civ. Code, § 1941) and not collecting rent while knowingly violating habitability standards (Civ. Code, § 1942.4). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached these duties by, inter alia, allowing unauthorized individuals to reside in the garage, failing to comply with local building and safety codes, and neglecting to maintain the property in a habitable condition. (SAC, ¶ 19.) The SAC alleges that these breaches led to safety hazards, emotional distress, and financial losses for Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 21.)  All told, Plaintiff has adequately pled a cause of action for negligence.

Third Cause of Action: Violation of Tenant Rights

Defendant argues that Plaintiff “does not properly state facts to constitute a cause of action for tenants tights [sic]. He does not state what right this is and what cause of action this is and who and when and where this was allegedly violated. This could be time barred. There is no cause of action known by the name tenants rights. The court must sustain the demurrer and strike this portion of the complaint.” (Demurrer, p. 5.)

The Court is sympathetic to Defendant’s cause.  The SAC merges different possible claims into a claim called “tenant’s rights,” and there is no such thing. 

That said, California law employs a “primary right” theory of code pleading, and determines the causes of action alleged in the complaint based on a plaintiff’s injury, not on the legal theories advanced to characterize it. (Choi v. Sagemark Consulting (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 308, 335.)  Here, Plaintiff provides several legal theories to allege violation of his primary right: to enjoy the premises he leased. Though Plaintiff could have brought separate causes of action and more specifically alleged the violations by Defendant and particular harms to Plaintiff, each claimed injury traces to Defendant denying Plaintiff access to the garage  and parking spaces on the leased premises.

In particular, the SAC states that this cause of action is brought under Civil Code sections 1942.5, 1940-1954, and the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance, which collectively protect tenants from unlawful rent increases, harassment, and retaliatory conduct by landlords. (SAC, ¶ 24.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant breached the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, the implied warranty of habitability, and the retaliatory eviction doctrine. (Id., ¶ 25.)  Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant unlawfully increased rent, denied Plaintiff access to the garage and parking spots included in the lease agreement, and harassed Plaintiff and his family. (Id.)  These are all appropriate theories under which Plaintiff can seek relief.   All told, Plaintiff adequately pleads that Defendant violated his rights as a tenant.

Fourth Cause of Action: Discrimination in Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act

Plaintiff brings this cause of action pursuant to Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”).

“Title III of the ADA provides, ‘No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.’ (42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).) ‘To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant because of her disability.’ [Citation.]”  (Martin v. Thi E-Commerce, LLC (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 521, 527-528.) Plaintiff cannot pursue recovery under the ADA because he has not alleged that purported disability discrimination happened at a place of public accommodation.  

Plaintiff has, however, stated a claim for disability discrimination under FEHA. Unlawful housing discrimination under FEHA includes the “refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when those accommodations may be necessary to afford a disabled person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” (Gov. Code, § 12927, subd. (c)(1).) “Mental disabilities fall within the purview of this provision and, at the time of this litigation, included ‘[a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities.’” (Auburn Woods I Homeowners Assn. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1592.) “In order to establish discrimination based on a refusal to provide reasonable accommodations, a party must establish that he or she (1) suffers from a disability as defined in FEHA, (2) the discriminating party knew of, or should have known of, the disability, (3) accommodation is necessary to afford an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling, and (4) the discriminating party refused to make this accommodation.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff satisfies these standards.  He alleges that he has “documented mental health conditions that require a stable, accessible living environment”.” (SAC, ¶ 33.) Plaintiff alleges that he “requested reasonable accommodation to ensure access to the designated parking spaces and the garage at the property, citing the needs of himself. (Id., ¶ 34.) However, Defendant refused to grant or consider these requests, failing to engage in the interactive process. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result, Plaintiff suffers from increased safety risks and compromised ability to commute to and from his school, disrupting his academic responsibilities and family care. (Id., ¶ 39.) Through these allegations, Plaintiff has established that he suffers from a disability, informed Defendant of the disability and his need for accommodations, and that Defendant refused to make this accommodation. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the elements of discrimination based on a refusal to provide reasonable accommodations under the FEHA.

Plaintiff refers in the SAC to the disabilities of his elderly disabilities and states that Defendant has failed to accommodate his parents.  Plaintiff’s parents are not parties to this action, however. Therefore, Plaintiff’s FEHA claim cannot rest on the status of his parents.  Plaintiff has, however, adequately alleged a FEHA claim based on his own asserted disability.