In December 2023, Plaintiffs sued General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”) under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act ("Song-Beverly Act") for asserted breaches of express and implied warranties that Plaintiff said came with Plaintiffs' purchase of a used motor vehicle that Defendant manufactured and distributed.  A year later, the California Supreme Court held in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 [“Rodriguez”] that used motor vehicles that are purchased with an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty do not qualify for the Song-Beverly Act’s remedies for asserted breach of express warranties unless a new car warranty was issued with the purchase of the used vehicle.  In the wake of Rodriguez, Plaintiffs moved for leave to amend her complaint to add a cause of action under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301-2312 [“MMWA”].  Defendant opposed Plaintiff’s motion.  The Court is granting it.  Plaintiffs are directed to file and serve their proposed amended complaint within 7 days of the hearing on the motion for leave to amend.

Trial courts have “discretion, after notice to the adverse party, [to] allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars…” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) Permissible amendments include the addition of new causes of action . (Ibid.)  [T]he court’s discretion will usually be exercised liberally to permit amendment of the pleadings.”  (Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.)  “The policy favoring amendment is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified.”  (Ibid.)  “If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend . . . .”   (Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; see also (Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163.)  “Leave to amend may be denied where permitting an amendment would be futile . . . e.g., where the amendment does not state a cause of action.” (Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 828.)  Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b), a declaration must accompany a motion for leave to amend specifying (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b).)

Defendant argues that (1) Plaintiffs unreasonably delayed seeking to add the new cause of action; (2) allowing Plaintiffs to add a new cause of action at this juncture of the case would unfairly prejudice Defendant; and (3) Plaintiffs' pursuit of the new cause of action would be futile.  The Court disagrees with these arguments.

As to Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs unreasonably delayed in seeking leave to amend, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a declaration explaining that Plaintiffs did not seek leave to amend earlier than they  did because, until Rodriguez came down,  they believed that they had a viable claim under long-standing Court of Appeal precedent, which Rodriguez overruled, for breach of an express warranty under the Song-Beverly Act.  The declaration further states that Rodriguez prompted Plaintiffs to add a claim under the MMWA for breach of an express warranty.  The record indicates that the Plaintiffs sought to leave amend fairly soon after the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez was issued.  In sum, there was no unjustifiable delay here.

As to Defendant’s contention that it will be prejudiced if leave to amend to add the MMWA claim is granted, the Court does not discern prejudice here.  Defendant’s prejudice contention is based on the current trial of September 30, 2025, which is over four months away.  The MMWA claim is based on essentially the same set of facts as Plaintiffs' claim under the Song-Beverly Act for breach of the express warranty.  Defendant does not adequately explain what additional discovery it will need to propound on Plaintiffs so that it can sufficiently prepare for trial on the MMWA claim.  In any event, there will be time before the discovery cut-off date for the Defendant to propound the discovery that it says it needs to conduct. 

Defendant’s futility argument is unavailing.   Defendant offers no adequate explanation as to why the proposed new claim under the MMWA, which strikes the Court as overlapping with the claims under the Song-Beverly Act for breach of the express warranty, fails as a matter of law.  Prior to Rodriguez, Defendant did not demur to the Song-Beverly Act claim on the ground of legal deficiency.  If Defendant believes that the MMWA claim is somehow legally deficient in ways that the Song-Beverly Act claim was not before Rodriguez, Defendant can act on this belief through a demurrer to the MMWA claim.

One final word.  In preparing this ruling, the Court noticed that Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint still includes claims under the Song-Beverly Act, notwithstanding Rodriguez.  Defendant can take steps to address this seeming defect, such as by filing a demurrer or a motion for summary adjudication, and, if necessary, by seeking a further continuance of the trial date.