Judge: Michael Small, Case: 24STCV25261, Date: 2025-01-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV25261 Hearing Date: January 23, 2025 Dept: 57
In this employment action, Plaintiff Jorge
Reyes (“Plaintiff”) sued Defendant Flying Food Group for allegedly
discriminating and retaliating against him in violation of the Fair Employment
and Housing and Act (“FEHA”) and the Labor Code and for allegedly wrongfully
terminating him in violation of public policy.
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s
complaint. Defendant demurs to every one
of the nine causes of action in the complaint.
The Court’s tentative decision is to sustain he demurrer in its
entirety, albeit with leave to amend.
Plaintiff is directed to file and serve a First Amended Complaint by
February 20, 2025. The case management
conference that is scheduled for March 18, 2025 will be moved to a different
date at the demurrer hearing.
1. First Through Fifth Causes of Action: FEHA Claims
Defendant contends in the demurrer that
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege facts that support Plaintiff’s claims for
discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and failure to prevent harassment and
discrimination in violation of FEHA. The
Court agrees.
To state a prima facie case for
discrimination in violation of FEHA, an employee must show (1) membership in a
protected class; (2) competent performance in the position held; (3) they
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) some other circumstance suggests
discriminatory motive. (Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Association (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 568, 577.)
To state a cause of action for harassment under FEHA, a
plaintiff must show that he or she (1) was a member of a protected class; (2)
was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on his
protected status; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with his work
performance by creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment;
and (5) the defendant is liable for the harassment. (Ortiz v. Dameron
Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, 581.)
An actionable claim for failure to prevent
discrimination or harassment is dependent on a claim of actual discrimination
or harassment. (Martin v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 149, 173.)
To state a claim for retaliation in violation of FEHA
(Government Code Section 12940, subdivision (h), the plaintiff must allege:
“(1) the employee's engagement in a protected activity ...; (2) retaliatory
animus on the part of the employer; (3) an adverse action by the employer; (4)
a causal link between the retaliatory animus and the adverse action; (5)
damages; and (6) causation.” (Brown v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1105.) Protected activity includes opposing practices
forbidden under FEHA or filing a complaint, testifying, or assisting in a
proceeding under FEHA. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subdivision (h).)
In the Court’s view, the Plaintiff has not
alleged facts that can support any of his FEHA causes of action. The Complaint states in a conclusory manner
that “Defendants subjected Plaintiff to discrimination/harassment/retaliation
on the basis of race, color, national origin, ancestry, opposition to
discrimination/harassment/retaliation, opposition/refusal to perform/disclosure
of violation of the law…” (Complaint, ¶ 6.) However, these allegations do not
contain the specific facts necessary to state a cause of action for violation
of FEHA. Plaintiff does not
identify that he is a member of a protected class—Plaintiff makes no
allegations as to his personal characteristics that may be protected under the
FEHA, such as, inter alia, his race, religion, national origin, sex,
gender. He also does not allege he
engaged in any specific protected activity. Without allegations of Plaintiff’s
specific opposition to the discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, or his
opposition or refusal to perform or his disclosure of violation of the law,
Defendant is not on sufficient notice of the claim to produce discovery or
further investigate the events that gave rise to Plaintiff’s claim. Indeed,
Plaintiff does not even allege he was employed by Defendant.
Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to allege facts
showing discriminatory or retaliatory animus and a causal link between that
animus and an adverse employment action. Though Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant subjected him to discrimination/harassment/retaliation (Complaint, ¶
6), and offensive comments, stereotypes, tropes, yelling, among other behaviors
(Complaint, ¶ 7), Plaintiff does not plead facts that evince Defendant’s
discriminatory or retaliatory animus toward members of an alleged protected
class. Plaintiff simply states that
Defendant engaged in these behaviors “on the bases of race, color, national
origin, and so on. Plaintiff does not provide any occurrences or specific
statements or actions which could give rise to an inference of discriminatory
or retaliatory animus.
2. Sixth Through Eighth Causes of Action: Labor Code Claims
Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to
allege facts to support his claims under Labor Code Sections 98.6, 1102.5, and
6310. The Court agrees.
The Complaint alleges that “Defendants’
actions constitute retaliation in violation of Labor Code s. 98.6.” (Complaint,
¶ 37.) Labor Code Section 98.6 sets forth that an employer “shall not discharge
an employee or in any manner discriminate, retaliate, or take any adverse
action against any employee or applicant for employment because the employee or
applicant engaged in any conduct delineated in this chapter,” which includes
exercising rights under the Labor code, such as filing a complaint with the
Labor Commissioner, testifying, or cooperating with an investigation under the
Labor Code. (Lab. Code, § 98.6, subd. (a).) Plaintiff does not allege he
exercised any rights under the Labor Code. Plaintiff also does not allege that
Defendant retaliated against him for exercising rights under the Labor Code.
The Complaint alleges that “Defendants’
actions constitute retaliation in violation of Labor Code s. 1102.5.”
(Complaint, ¶ 42.) Labor Code section 1102.5 sets forth that an employer shall
not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information to a government or
law enforcement agency, or another who has the authority to investigate,
discovery, or correct the violation or noncompliance, or for providing
information tom or testifying before any public body conducting an
investigation, hearing, or inquiry. (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).) An
employer shall not retaliate against an employee for refusing to participate in
an activity that would result in a violation of federal or state laws or
regulations. (Id., subd. (c).) Plaintiff does not allege that he
reported a violation of federal or state law or regulations, nor that he
refused to participate in an activity that would violate federal or state law
or regulations. He also does not allege that Defendant took an adverse action
against him in response to his report, complaint, or refusal to participate.
The Complaint alleges that “Defendants’
actions constitute retaliation in violation of Labor Code s. 6310.” (Complaint,
¶ 47.) Labor Code section 6310 states that an employer shall not discharge or
in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee made an
oral or written complaint to the Division of Occupational Safety and Health or
other governmental agency, instituted or cause any proceeding under or relating
to their rights, testified or is about to testify in the proceeding,
participated in an occupational health and safety committee, reported a
work-related fatality, injury, or illness, and requested access to occupational
injury or illness reports and records. (Lab.
Code, § 6310, subd. (a).) Plaintiff does not allege that he engaged in any of
these activities: simply put, it fails to state that Plaintiff complained of a
safety violation.
3. Ninth Cause of Action: Wrongful Termination in Violation
of Public Policy
"The elements of a claim for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy are (1) an employer-employee
relationship, (2) the employer terminated the plaintiff's employment, (3) the
termination was substantially motivated by a violation of public policy, and
(4) the discharge caused the plaintiff harm.” (Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford,
Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 154.) As discussed above, Plaintiff does not even
allege he was an employee of Defendant. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not plead
any facts from which motivation behind his termination may be inferred.