Pending before the Court is the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Vini Francis, the administrator of the Estate of Sherri Conway, as to the Second Amended Complaint of Collen Sartinsky.  The Court's tentative rulings on the motion are as follows.

When the Court's judgment on Sartinsky's claims under Probate Code Sections 850 and 859 in the Estate of Keith Conway becomes final,  Sartinsky's first claim in her Second Amended Complaint against Sherri Conway (now being defended by Francis as administrator of Sherri's estate) for breach of fiduciary duty would be barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  That is because the claim is predicated on the proposition that, at the time of his death in 1985, Keith owned 50% of the real property located at 116 North Gale Drive in Beverly Hills, California.    The Court's judgment in the Estate of Keith Conway renders that proposition invalid.  Rather, the Court determined in that case that Keith had transferred his 50% share of the Gale Property to Sherri in 1984.  The Court's judgment in the Estate of Keith Conway is not yet final, however.  That is because, for purposes of application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a judgment does not become final until an appeal from the judgment has been unsuccessful or the time to appeal has expired.  Finality has yet to attach to the judgment in the Estate of Keith Conway.   Under these circumstances,  the proper course of action is to stay the civil action pending a possible appeal from the judgment in the Estate of Keith Conway and the results of any such appeal.  For that reason, the Court is declining at this time to rule on the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the breach of fiduciary claim.

Sartinsky's third claim against Sherri in the Second Amended Complaint for fraudulent transfer of the Gale Property to the Bouldin Trust would also be barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel when the judgment in the Estate of Keith Conway becomes final to the extent the claim rests on the proposition that Sherri had no interest at all in the Gale Property that could be transferred to the Bouldin Trust.  Because the judgment in Keith's Estate is not final, the Court is declining at this time to rule on the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the fraudulent transfer claim. To be sure, the judgment states that Keith's Estate is entitled to 50% of the Gale Property as an equitable matter by dint of the Court's application of the sham pleading doctrine against Sherri.    But that part of the judgment does not render Sherri's transfer of her 50% interest in the Gale Property to the Bouldin Trust fraudulent.  Sartinsky may have a claim if the 50% share of the Gale Property that belongs to Keith's Estate as a result of the sham pleading portion of the judgment is not transferred to Keith's Estate by the Trustee of the Bouldin Trust.  No such claim is before the Court at this time.   

The Court is denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the fourth claim in the Second Amended Complaint for declaratory relief.  Even if judgment in the Estate of Keith Conway were final now, that would not dispose of the fourth claim, which, unlike the first and third claims, does not stand or fall on the proposition that Keith owned 50% of the Gale Property at the time of his death.  There are other aspects of the fourth claim.