Judge Michelle C. Kim, Case 19STCV18848 2023-03-22 Tentative Ruling

On May 30, 2019, Plaintiffs Eugene Hill (“Hill”) and Shawn Miller (“Miller”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Defendant Devora Kay Seay (“Defendant”) for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. Trial is currently set for April 28, 2023.

At this time, Defendant moves for an order to reclassify this action as a limited jurisdiction case. Alternatively, Defendant moves to continue the current trial date for six months. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, and Defendant filed a reply.

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that their claims exceed the limited jurisdictional requirement. Further, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs Hill and Miller have already agreed to settle their claims for $11,000 and $15,000, respectively. Defendant asserts that given the settlement amounts, the matter should be reclassified as a limited jurisdiction action. Defendant requests that in the alternative, the trial date be continued six months to allow the parties to finalize the settlement.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the value of their claims collectively exceed $25,000, and that the settlement negotiations are not determinative of the amount in controversy in this action for purposes of reclassifying this matter to a limited jurisdiction courtroom. Plaintiffs assert that they however do not oppose a trial continuance.

In reply, Defendant provides that Hill has agreed to settle his claim with Defendant, so only Miller remains in the case. Defendant states she will withdraw her request to reclassify the action if the trial date is continued.

It is unclear what the status of the case is as Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs have agreed to settle their claims against Defendant in the moving papers. Defendant then states in her reply that only Hill has agreed to settle with Defendant and Miller remains in the case. The Court will thus address both the request to reclassify this action as a limited jurisdiction case and to continue the trial date.

(a) The plaintiff, cross-complainant, or petitioner may file a motion for reclassification within the time allowed for that party to amend the initial pleading. The defendant or cross-defendant may file a motion for reclassification within the time allowed for that party to respond to the initial pleading. The court, on its own motion, may reclassify a case at any time. A motion for reclassification does not extend the moving party's time to amend or answer or otherwise respond. The court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification, regardless of any fault or lack of fault, if the case has been classified in an incorrect jurisdictional classification.

(b) If a party files a motion for reclassification after the time for that party to amend that party's initial pleading or to respond to a complaint, cross-complaint, or other initial pleading, the court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification only if both of the following conditions are satisfied:

The Walker court delineated the standard for ordering a case transferred, holding that a matter may be transferred when: (1) the absence of jurisdiction is apparent before trial from the complaint, petition, or related documents, or (2) during the course of pretrial litigation, it becomes clear that the matter will necessarily result in a verdict below the superior court jurisdictional amount and the court affords the parties an opportunity to contest the transfer. (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 262.)

The test is whether lack of jurisdiction is clear or virtually unattainable. (Id., at p. 269.) This standard involves an evaluation of the amount fairly in controversy, not an adjudication of the merits of the claim, and requires a “high level of certainty that [the] damage award will not exceed $25,000.” (Id.) The trial court may believe it highly unlikely that plaintiff will recover the amount demanded, but this is not enough to defeat jurisdiction, unless it appears to a legal certainty that plaintiff cannot recover the amount of the demand. (Id., at p. 270.)

In deciding whether a matter should be transferred, a trial court must look beyond the pleadings but not so far as to trespass into the province of the trier of fact. Pain and suffering are not subject to precise measurement by any scale, and their translation into money damages is peculiarly the function of the trier of the fact. (Walker, supra; Maldonado v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 397, 401.)

Here, Defendant seemingly contends this action should be reclassified as a limited jurisdiction case because Hill and Miller have agreed to settle their claims for $11,000 and $15,000, respectively. These amounts collectively total more than $25,000.00. Nevertheless, Defendant cites absolutely no authority suggesting that settlement amounts can be used to determine whether an action should be reclassified as a limited jurisdiction case. Rather, as Plaintiffs argue, Plaintiffs’ agreement to settle their claims is not a direct acknowledgement of the value of Plaintiffs’ case, which based on the settlement amounts is more than $25,000.00. Defendant fails to otherwise submit any evidence to establish that this case will necessarily result in a verdict below $25,000.00. (Singer v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321 [“ ‘… The unlikeliness of a judgment in excess of $25,000 is not the test. The trial court reviews the record to determine whether the result is obtainable. Simply stated, the trial court looks to the possibility of a jurisdictionally appropriate verdict, not to its probability.’ ” (emphasis in original).].)

The motion to transfer the case to limited jurisdiction court is, therefore, denied.

Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits. (CRC Rule 3.1332(c).) The Court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance. (CRC Rule 3.1332(c).) The Court may look to the following factors in determining whether a trial continuance is warranted: (1) proximity of the trial date; (2) whether there was any previous continuance of trial due to any party; (3) the length of the continuance requested; (4) the availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion; (5) the prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; and (6) whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial. (See generally, CRC Rule 3.1332(d)(1)-(11).) Additional factors for the Court to consider include: a party’s excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; and any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application. (CRC Rule 3.1332(c), (d).)

In this case, Defendant requests a six-month trial continuance “so that Defendant and Plaintiffs may resolve any remaining matters pertaining to settlement.” (Mot. Mueller Decl. ¶ 9.) In their opposition, Plaintiffs provide that the parties are in the process of resolving their differences without the need for trial and seemingly state that Plaintiffs are in the process of signing settlements. (See Opp. at p. 2:11-13 [“rather that [sic] patiently await Plaintiffs’ signatures on their respective settlement agreements, Defendant brings an illegitimate motion …”].) Thus, it is unclear why the trial date needs to be continued in this matter. Trial is currently more than one month away. If Plaintiffs have settled their claims with Defendant, it is not explained why the parties require six additional months to obtain Plaintiffs’ signatures or finalize the settlements. To the extent Defendant states the continuance is requested to allow Defendant to conclude discovery on Plaintiffs, Defendant does not identify what discovery additional time is needed to complete, nor does Defendant establish that she otherwise acted diligently in obtaining any such discovery. Furthermore, Defendant is incorrect that there has only been one trial continuance since Defendant appeared in this matter. Defendant answered the complaint on July 22, 2019, and the Court’s records show there have been three trial continuances in this matter. Given the fact that this case is nearly four years old, Defendant fails to establish good cause for the requested trial continuance at this time.

Hon. Michelle C. Kim

Judge of the Superior Court