Judge Michelle C. Kim, Case 19STCV44775 2023-04-27 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs Adam Glick and Mary Glick filed this action against defendants Vista General Engineering Company, Inc. (“Vista”) and Arturo Orozco Torres (“Torres”) for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiffs allege that Torres was acting in the course and scope of his employment with Vista at the time of the accident.

Vista propounded its request for admissions (“RFAs”), set one, on Plaintiff Adam Glick (“Plaintiff”) on September 18, 2020. After Plaintiffs failed to respond to the RFAs, Vista moved for an order deeming the truth of the matters specified in the RFAs admitted, which was granted on August 16, 2021.

Plaintiff now moves for an order relieving him from the deemed admissions. Vista opposes the motion.

This matter was last heard on March 8, 2023, where it was continued to April 27, 2023. The parties were permitted to file supplemental declarations, with Plaintiff’s declaration being due nine court days before the hearing, and Vista’s declaration being due at least five court days before. Plaintiff has filed a supplemental declaration from his counsel, Matthew C. Stoll (“Stoll”), and Vista filed a supplemental declaration from defense counsel concerning its fees and costs related to Plaintiff seeking to withdraw his admissions.

Plaintiff asserts that his counsel’s office burned down in the beginning of 2020, which was followed by the Covid-19 pandemic and Plaintiff’s counsel’s office working remotely for most of 2020 and 2021. Plaintiff asserts that this caused certain items to fall through the cracks, including the subject RFAs. Further, Plaintiff adds that the attorney handling this matter, Gabriel Siniscal (“Siniscal”), left Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm in 2022 before he was able to file a motion for relief from the admissions or to oppose Vista’s currently pending motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff contends that this caused a delay in filing the instant motion. Plaintiff avers that Vista has now been in possession of Plaintiff’s full and complete responses to the RFAs for more than one year.

In opposition, Vista argues that Plaintiff does not establish that his failure to respond to Vista’s RFAs was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Vista argues that Plaintiff’s lead trial counsel, Matthew C. Stoll, has been Plaintiff’s lead trial attorney since the inception of this case and that Plaintiff’s counsel was properly electronically served with the RFAs but failed to respond. Vista contends that Plaintiff, however, inexplicably delayed in seeking relief from the admissions. Additionally, Vista asserts that it will be prejudiced if Plaintiff’s motion is granted.

Vista requests judicial notice be taken that Siniscal is an active California attorney employed by Hildebrand McLeod & Nelson LLP, as reflected by the California State Bar’s web site. (Mot. Request for Judicial Notice Exh. 1.)

The Court takes judicial notice that the State Bar’s website shows “Gabriel Arthur Siniscal’s” license status is active, and the address provided is Hildebrand McLeod & Nelson LLP, 600 S Spring St Unit 1808, Los Angeles, CA 90014-1990. (In re White (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1469 fn. 14.)

With its opposition, Vista submits two objections to Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration attached to the motion. Objection 1 is sustained to the extent that Plaintiff’s counsel asserts an improper legal conclusion. Objection 2 is overruled.

(a) A party may withdraw or amend an admission made in response to a request for admission only on leave of court granted after notice to all parties.

(b) The court may permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission only if it determines that the admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that the party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that party's action or defense on the merits.

(c) The court may impose conditions on the granting of the motion that are just, including, but not limited to, the following:

(1) An order that the party who obtained the admission be permitted to pursue additional discovery related to the matter involved in the withdrawn or amended admission.

(2) An order that the costs of any additional discovery be borne in whole or in part by the party withdrawing or amending the admission.

CCP § 2033.300 permits amendment or withdrawal of admissions expressly made by a party and also applies to “deemed admissions.” (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 979.)

“The court may permit withdrawal of an admission only if the admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect and the opposing party will not be substantially prejudiced.” (Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 30-31.) “Because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 2033.300 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief. “Accordingly, the court's discretion to deny a motion under the statute is limited to circumstances where it is clear that the mistake, inadvertence, or neglect was inexcusable, or where it is clear that the withdrawal or amendment would substantially prejudice the party who obtained the admission in maintaining that party's action or defense on the merits.” (New Albertsons v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1420-21.)

The words “mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect” have the same meaning in the discovery statutes as those terms have in CCP § 473(b). (New Albertsons v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1418-19; see also Carli v. Superior Court (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1095, 1099.) However, relief from a deemed admitted order cannot be granted under the general authority of CCP § 473(b). (St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 843, 852, [CCP § 2033.300 specifically sets out the conditions under which default relief from erroneous admissions can be given, that statute must control rather than the general default statute, section 473.”] disapproved on other grounds by Wilcox v. Birtwhistle, supra, 21 Cal.4th at 983.)

Vista argues that in order to obtain relief under Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.300(b), Plaintiff “must make a stronger showing than [for] relief under section 473(b). (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1205.)” (Opp. at p. 8.) However, review of the page cited yields no support for the proposition asserted. The Hearn case does not address Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.300(b); it addresses relief from a default or default judgment pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b). Vista also cites Gribin Von Dyl & Assoc. v. Kovalsky, (1986) 185 Cal. App. 3d 653, 660, and a secondary source reliant upon it, but review of the cited case does not provide support for Vista’s assertion. Gribin Von Dyl states that a court’s general equitable powers to grant relief may be more narrowly construed than statutory powers given to grant relief, but it does not discuss CCP § 2033.300(b) at all, as § 2033.300 was enacted in 2005, after the Gribin Von Dyl case was decided. The Gribin Von Dyl case does, however, discuss Elston v. City of Turlock, (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 238, superseded by statute on another basis as described in Tackett v. City of Huntington Beach (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 60, in which the California Supreme Court found that denying relief from a deemed admission can constitute reversable error where such denial defeats, rather than advances, the ends of justice. In Elston, the Supreme Court analyzed whether relief should be granted from deemed admissions where counsel generally stated that they misplaced the requests for admissions, and it concluded that it should be:

although counsel’s affidavit could have been more explicit, the excuse offered was well within the range of situations in which the courts have granted relief from default. The attorney’s failure to respond in a timely manner was inadvertent rather than dilatory, and defendants suffered no prejudice as a result of the delay. Nonetheless, all remaining defendants based their successful summary judgment motions on the deemed admissions, and plaintiffs were effectively left without a cause of action.

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel avers that their office burned down in the beginning of 2020, and that the pandemic caused their office to work remotely for most of 2020 and 2021. (Mot. Farrugia Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff asserts that this caused “certain items to fall through the cracks,” including the subject RFAs. (Id.) Further, Plaintiff provides that Siniscal was the attorney handling discovery in this case during 2020 and 2021, that Plaintiff served verified responses to the RFAs in August 2021, and that Siniscal left Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm in 2022 before he was able to file this motion. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 5, and 6.) Further, in his supplemental declaration, Plaintiff’s counsel, Stoll, provides that he was the handling partner for this matter and attests that it was his understanding that Siniscal had filed or would be filing a motion for relief from admissions. (Supp. Decl. Stoll ¶ 6.) Stoll again provides that full and complete responses to the RFAs were served in August 2021. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Additionally, Stoll states that Plaintiff’s counsel agrees to a trial continuance to allow Vista to pursue additional discovery, and that counsel agree to pay Vista’s reasonable costs for the filing of their summary judgment motion. While Vista raises legitimate concerns regarding Plaintiff’s delay in seeking relief from the deemed admissions, Plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to show the prior admissions were deemed admitted because of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. (New Albertsons, 168 Cal.App.4^th at 1418-19; see also Carli v. Superior Court (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1095, 1099 [in the context of deemed admissions § 473 should be applied liberally “so cases can be tried on the merits”].)

However, to minimize the prejudice to Vista, the Court will impose certain conditions. First, as Plaintiff’s counsel agrees to do, Plaintiff is to pay Vista’s costs for filing its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff is ordered to pay $1,950 in attorney fees (representing 10 hours at the rate of $195) for Vista’s attorney fees incurred on the motion for summary judgment and the $540 filing fee for the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff is ordered to pay the costs in the total amount of $2,490.00 to Vista, by and through Vista’s counsel, without twenty (20) days.[1] Second, the trial date will be continued to allow Vista to conduct further discovery, and if appropriate, to file a motion for summary judgment based upon the merits of the case. To the extent that Vista requests attorney fees adequate to cover the need for additional discovery, Vista does not provide any basis for calculating such fees.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for relief from the deemed RFAs is granted. The June 26, 2023 trial date is continued to ______________ at 8:30 a.m. in Department 31 of the Spring Street Courthouse. The June 12, 2023 Final Status Conference is continued to _______________ at 10:00 a.m. in Department 31. All discovery and expert cutoff dates are continued to reflect the new trial date. The parties must expect no further continuances. They must plan all motion and discovery practice accordingly.

The hearing on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment set for May 18, 2023, which relies almost exclusively on the RFAs being deemed admitted, is advanced to this date and vacated in light of the above ruling granting Plaintiff relief from the deemed admissions.

Hon. Michelle C. Kim

Judge of the Superior Court

[1] The remaining fees and costs requested in defense counsel’s supplemental declaration are not awarded. To the extent Vista requests fees and costs for its underlying motion to deem RFAs admitted, the Court notes that monetary sanctions were already awarded in Defendant’s favor for that motion. Further, although Vista requests $3,900 for expected fees relating to additional discovery, and $4,875 for expected fees associated with a motion for summary judgment, Vista provides no basis as to how these amounts were calculated.