Judge: Michelle C. Kim, Case: 20STCP02105, Date: 2023-08-07 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 20STCP02105    Hearing Date: August 7, 2023    Dept: 31

TENTATIVE

 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen is DENIED.  

 

Legal Standard

 

              Motion to Set Aside Dismissal

 

California Code of Civil Procedure section 473 subdivision (b) provides for both discretionary and mandatory relief. (See Pagnini v. Union Bank, N.A. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 298, 302.) Mandatory relief from default, default judgment, or dismissal is available based on an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. (Minick v. City of Petaluma (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 15, 25-26.) Discretionary relief is available based on the party’s own declaration or other evidence showing mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Id.)¿¿¿ 

 

              Reconsideration

 

Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008(a) provides that “[w]hen an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order . . . [may] make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008(a).) A trial court has discretion with respect to granting a motion for reconsideration.  (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212.) 

 

Section 1008, subdivision (e) states: “No application to reconsider any order ... may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008(e).) Section 1008 is the exclusive means for modifying, amending or revoking an order.  That limitation is expressly jurisdictional.”  (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1499.)   

 

“A motion for reconsideration may only be brought if the party moving for reconsideration can offer ‘new or different facts, circumstances, or law which it could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the time of the prior motion. (Citations.) A motion for reconsideration will be denied absent a strong showing of diligence.” (Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690; Forrest v. State Of California Dept. Of Corporations (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 183, 202 disapproved of and overruled on unrelated grounds in Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1172 (footnote 3); New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212–213; Baldwin v. Home Sav. of America. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1199.) There is a strict requirement of diligence on the moving party; the moving party must present a satisfactory explanation for failing to provide the evidence or different facts earlier.  (Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690.)

 

Discussion

  

As an initial matter, Defendants California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board and J. Paul Getty Trust assert that they were never served with notice of the Motion and only discovered the motion after they received Notice of the Continuance.

 

However, by filing opposing papers on the merits and appearing at the hearing, Defendants “waive any defects or irregularities in the notice of the motion. This rule applies even when no notice was given at all.” (Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1288.)

 

As to the merits, Plaintiff seeks to reopen her case. On May 31, 2023, the Court already ruled upon this motion, denying relief. The Court construed Plaintiff’s motion as one under Code of Civil Procedure section 437(b) and found Plaintiff’s motion was deficient in two ways. First, Plaintiff failed to offer an explanation for the delay in seeking relief. Secondly, and importantly, Plaintiff filed the motion to reopen more than six months after Plaintiff’s case was dismissed. The six-month limitation is jurisdictional, and the Court has no power to grant relief under section 473 once the time to seek relief has lapsed. (See Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 345; Rappleyea v. Campbell¿(1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980;¿Weitz v. Yankosky¿(1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, 855.) 

 

Additionally, Plaintiff has offered no basis for the Court to reconsider its May 31, 2023 ruling. Plaintiff’s motion does not offer new or different facts, circumstances, or law which it could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the time of the prior motion. Moreover, and more importantly, even if Plaintiff did, any motion for reconsideration would be untimely, as the Court mailed Plaintiff notice of the May 31, 2023 ruling on the same day, and Plaintiff filed this motion on July 3, 2023, well more than 10 days after notice of the May 31, 2023 ruling was served on Plaintiff. Thus, any motion for reconsideration would be untimely.

 

Lastly, the Court notes that Plaintiff argues Plaintiff was not given notice by the Court of the case management conference hearing which was held on July 2, 2021, or the OSC Re: Dismissal of August 2, 2021. It appears Plaintiff is arguing the August 2, 2021 dismissal was void for lack of notice.

 

“The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d). (“Section 473(d)”) 

 

“[I]nclusion of the word ‘may’ in the language of section 473, subdivision (d) makes it clear that a trial court retains discretion to grant or deny a motion to set aside a void judgment [or order].” (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495.) However, the trial court “has no statutory power under section 473, subdivision (d) to set aside a judgment [or order] that is not void…” (Id. at pp. 495-496.) Thus, the reviewing court “generally faces two separate determinations when considering an appeal based on section 473, subdivision (d): whether the order or judgment is void and, if so, whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in setting it aside.” (Nixon Peabody LLP v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 818, 822.) 

 

The judgment must be void, not merely voidable. A judge has no statutory authority under Section 473(d) to set aside a judgment that is not void. (Cruz v. Fagor Am., Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495-496.) When a court has jurisdiction over the defendant and the action but acts in excess of its defined power by failing to follow proper procedure, any resulting default judgment is voidable, not void. (Johnson v. E-Z Ins. Brokerage, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 86, 98-99 [by awarding terminating sanctions on ex parte basis, judge at most failed to follow proper procedure, and resulting default judgment was voidable, not void]; Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558, 564-566 [subsequent default judgment was voidable, not void, when judge imposed terminating sanction against defendant for failure to appear at case management conference as specified in court's local rules and judge had not given notice to defendant].) 

 

“An order is considered void on its face only when the invalidity is apparent from an inspection of the judgment roll or court record without consideration of extrinsic evidence. [] There is no time limit to attack a judgment void on its face.” (Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1021.) “If the invalidity can be shown only through consideration of extrinsic evidence, such as declarations or testimony, the order is not void on its face. Such an order must be challenged within the six-month time limit prescribed by section 473, subdivision (b), or by an independent action in equity.” (Ibid. 

 

Here, on 5/17/21 the Court scheduled a case management conference for July 2, 2021, and sent notice to plaintiff. (5/17/2021 Certificate of Mailing.) However, on July 2, 2021, Plaintiff failed to appear. The Court therefore scheduled an Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal on this same day, for August 2, 2021. (7/2/2021 minute order.) Attorney Kenneth Wang was ordered to give notice. (Id.) The record does not show that any notice of the OSC was served on Plaintiff.

 

In any event, the Court finds that the August 2, 2021 order dismissing the case is voidable, not void, and therefore, the Court has no statutory authority under Section 473(d) to set aside the judgment as it is not void. (Cruz v. Fagor Am., Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495-496.)

 

A judgment is ‘void’ only when the court entering that judgment ‘lack[ed] jurisdiction in [a] fundamental sense’ due to the ‘‘entire absence of power to hear or determine the case’ ‘resulting from the ‘‘absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties.’ ‘To be sure, a court that ‘‘‘acts contrary to [its] authority’’ ‘‘‘to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites’ ‘is often said to lack ‘jurisdiction.’ But such acts do not render the court's ensuing judgment or order void. That is because ‘jurisdictional errors can be of two types[:] A court can lack fundamental authority over the subject matter, question presented, or party, making its judgment void, or it can merely act in excess of its jurisdiction or defined power, rendering the judgment voidable.’ Only void judgments and orders may be set aside under section 473, subdivision (d); voidable judgments and orders may not.  

 

(People v. North River Insurance Co. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 226, 233-234 (citations omitted).)

 

Because the Court only acted without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites but did have jurisdiction in a fundamental sense due to its power to hear the case, the August 2, 2021 judgment is merely voidable. (See Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558, 564-566.) The Court has no authority under Section 473(d) to set aside the August 2, 2021 order of dismissal.

 

Conclusion

 

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen is DENIED.  

 

Court Clerk is ordered to give notice.