Judge Michelle C. Kim, Case Number: 20STCV01174, Date: 2023-05-10 Tentative Ruling

At this time, Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and Defendant filed a reply.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s negligence and premises liability claims are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was previously involved in an unlawful detainer proceeding with Defendant, and that on July 17, 2018, the parties settled the unlawful detainer action through a stipulated judgment that included a general release and waiver of claims under CCP § 1542. Defendant avers that Plaintiff’s claims in this action were settled by the stipulated judgment, which provided that “both parties released each other from all known and unknown claims “pertaining to, in any way relating to and/or arising out of” Plaintiff’s tenancy—specifically including ‘waiver of any alleged… personal injury.’ ” (Mot. at p. 3:15-17.) Defendant avers that Plaintiff thus agreed to release Defendant from any future litigation.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that there was no lease between Plaintiff and Defendant concerning the underlying property, and Plaintiff contends that she was not afforded an opportunity to litigate her personal injury claims in the unlawful detainer action. Further, Plaintiff argues that the stipulated judgment in the unlawful detainer proceeding did not involve her, and that she did not sign any of the documents. Plaintiff attests she did not sign the July 17, 2018 release submitted by Defendant, and that she did not authorize anyone to sign it. Plaintiff argues that collateral estoppel and res judicata do not apply to her claims in this case.

In reply, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff mispresents the facts concerning the underlying unlawful detainer action, as Plaintiff and her counsel were present in court, the parties reached the settlement agreement, and the court entered the stipulated judgment in the unlawful detainer proceeding. Defendant avers that Plaintiff’s contentions that she did not have an opportunity to present her personal injury claims are disingenuous because Plaintiff’s alleged injuries were known to her at the time she entered into the stipulated judgment. Defendant asserts that the judicially noticeable evidence shows that Plaintiff and her counsel agreed to the terms of the settlement and entered into the stipulated judgment.

CCP § 439(a) provides that “Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.”

Defendant satisfied this requirement prior to the hearing on this matter. (Mot. Patterson Decl. ¶¶ 4-14.)

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (C.C.P. §438(b)(1) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).)

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself. [Citation.]” (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 877.) “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 (Citations Omitted).) The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).)

In connection with its motion, Defendant requests judicial notice be taken of (1) the Stipulation and Judgment entered on July 17, 2018, in the Unlawful Detainer Action of Olympus Real Estate Properties, LLC v. Niloufar Lahijani; Flora Mostadim, et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 18SMUD01107, and (2) Plaintiff’s complaint filed in this action.

Additionally, with its reply, Defendant filed a Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice requesting judicial notice of: (1) the July 17, 2018, Minute Order in the Unlawful Detainer Action, Case No. 18SMUD01107; (2) the July 17, 2018, Statement of Policies and Procedures for Mandatory Settlement Conferences; Acknowledgment of Receipt and Stipulation, in the Unlawful Detainer Action; and (3) the July 17, 2018, Stipulation to Seal Court Record, in the Unlawful Detainer Action.

The request as to the complaint filed in this action is granted; however, the Court does not take judicial notice of the truth of any matters alleged therein. (Evid. Code § 452(d).)

As to the request concerning the stipulated judgment allegedly entered into in the unlawful detainer action, and the three requests filed with the reply, Defendant is relying on these documents to establish that the parties stipulated to, among other terms, mutually releasing each other from all claims regarding Plaintiff’s tenancy and a waiver of all known or unknown claims. Defendant argues that this included any and all personal injuries arising from Plaintiff’s tenancy. Further, Defendant contends that the stipulated judgment was signed by Plaintiff and agreed to by Plaintiff’s counsel, who is also counsel of record for Plaintiff in this action. Plaintiff, in opposition, attests that she did not sign the stipulated judgment and did not authorize anyone to sign it on her behalf. Therefore, whether Plaintiff was a party to the stipulated judgment, and whether it applies to Plaintiff’s claims in this action, is disputed between the parties.

Because the parties dispute whether Plaintiff was actually a signatory to the stipulated judgment, and thus whether she agreed to the stipulated judgment, the Court does not take judicial notice of the stipulated judgment at this time. (See Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corporation (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 660 [“A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts. The hearing on demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness or proper interpretation are disputable.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)]; see also Freemont Indem. Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-115 [“Although the existence of a document may be judicially noticeable, the truth of statements contained in the document and its proper interpretation are not subject to judicial notice if those matters are reasonably disputable.”].)

Additionally, Plaintiff requests judicial notice be taken of a lease agreement attached to the opposition. Plaintiff does not provide any authority showing it is proper to take judicial notice of the lease agreement. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request is denied. Lastly, the Court notes Plaintiff submitted a declaration from an alleged expert witness with the opposition. Plaintiff does not request, or establish it is proper to take, judicial notice of the declaration. The Court therefore does not consider the declaration in ruling on this motion.

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was injured due to an unsafe condition at the property located at 265 S. Doheny Drive, Beverly Hills, California 90211. (Compl. at p. 4.) Defendant contends that per the terms of the stipulated judgment, Plaintiff’s claims for injuries occurring at the subject property are barred. Defendant asserts that the stipulated judgment contained a clause releasing any and all claims relating to Plaintiff’s tenancy, including any personal injury claims, which Plaintiff agreed to. However, as analyzed above, Defendant’s request for judical notice of the stipulated judgment is denied. Consequently, the Court is limited to reviewing the four corners of the complaint. The complaint on its face does not include any allegations showing the instant action is related to the underlying unlawful detainer action. The Court cannot consider other evidence as it might in the context of a different motion, and Defendant does not otherwise show that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel or res judicata without the stipulated judgment. Similarly, the Court cannot determine that Plaintiff’s contentions that she did not sign or agree to the stipulated judgment in the unlawful detainer action are disingenuous at this stage of the proceedings.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.

Hon. Michelle C. Kim

Judge of the Superior Court