I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Seyedeh Masoumeh Razavian (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants West Valley Occupational Center and Does 1 through 100 for injuries arising from a slip and fall on slippery yellow traction plates. The operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) sets forth three causes of action for (1) negligence – against Does 1 through 100, (2) premises liability against Does 1-100, and (3) dangerous condition of public property pursuant to Gov. Code § 835 against West Valley Occupational Center – Los Angeles Unified School District.  

Los Angeles Unified School District, erroneously sued as West Valley Occupational Center, (“LAUSD”) moves for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and LAUSD filed a reply. 

This motion was initially set to be heard on March 22, 2024. However, the Court was unavailable to hear oral argument on that date, and pursuant to oral stipulation, the hearing was continued to March 28, 2024. (Min. Order, March 22, 2024.) On March 28, 2024, the Court continued the hearing to allow the parties to file supplemental declarations regarding the mailing of the government tort claim. (Min. Order, March 28, 2024.) 

Thereafter, on April 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a supplemental declaration. On April 12, 2024, LAUSD filed a reply to the supplemental declaration.  

II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE & EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

LAUSD requests the Court take judicial notice of (1) LAUSD is a public entity school district, (2) Plaintiff’s Complaint, (3) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, (4) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, and (5) the Declaration of Toni Tosello (“Tosello”) stating that LAUSD records do not contain a claim for money or damages form by Plaintiff.  

Request 1 is denied, Requests 2-4 are granted, and Request 5 is denied.  

Plaintiff submits 9 evidentiary objections to LAUSD’s evidence. Objections 1-2 to the declaration of Daniel Barrientos are overruled. Objections 2-9 to the declaration of Tosello are overruled. 

LAUSD submits 7 objections to the declaration of Plaintiff’s expert, Eris J. Barillas (“Barillas”). The objections are sustained on the grounds of relevance and lack of foundation. 

III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT  

A. Burdens on Summary Judgment 

A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment.  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)    

The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if the party does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) 

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).) 

B. Analysis: Presentment of Tort Claim 

LAUSD contends it is entitled to summary judgment, because Plaintiff is barred from asserting a claim against it for failure to comply with the claim presentation requirements of the California Government Tort Claims Act. 

California Government Code § 911.2(a) states, “[a] claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person or to personal property or growing crops shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” 

A tort claim for money damages against a public entity must be filed with the public entity within six months of the accrual of the cause of action.  (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) “A claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person or to personal property or growing crops shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) “The timeliness of such actions is governed by the specific statute of limitations set forth in the Government Code, not the statute of limitations applicable to private defendants.” (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1267.)  

Gov. Code, § 915.2 also provides in relevant part: 

… 

(Gov. Code, § 915.2 (a), (c).)   

Here, the undisputed material facts are as follows. Plaintiff slipped and fell on October 23, 2019 on the campus of LAUSD’s West Valley Occupational Center. (UMF 1.) LAUSD is a public entity school district. (UMF 28.) Plaintiff alleges a claim was properly presented via U.S. mail on her behalf on November 25, 2019 via certified mail-return receipt requested. (UMFs 29-30.) At all times relevant, Tosello has been the Liability Claims Coordinator for LAUSD. (UMF 31.) LAUSD’s Executive Officer of the Board of Education is located at 333 South Beaudry, 24th floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017. (UMF 32.) Tosello is responsible for maintaining records with respect to persons or entities that present claims for damages to LAUSD. (UMF 33.) Tosello conducted a diligent search for records or documents related to a claim presented by Plaintiff, or persons acting on her behalf, and did not find any claim. (UMFs 34-35.) It is further undisputed that Plaintiff does not have proof that the Certified Mail return receipt was attached to the claim for damages, and that it was deposited for mailing by the United States Post Office (“USPS”), or that the claim for damages was delivered by USPS. (UMFs 36-37.) Plaintiff has no proof that the certified mail was postmarked by USPS. (UMF 28.) 

LAUSD has met its prima facie burden that Plaintiff failed to timely present a claim to LAUSD prior to bringing suit, and that she is therefore barred from asserting a claim against LAUSD for the incident. The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the claim for damages was placed in the building mailbox on November 25, 2019 by Plaintiff’s counsel’s secretary, Maria Magallanes (“Magallanes”). Plaintiff cites to the “Mailbox Rule” Cal. Civ. Code § 684.120, which is a statute drawn in part from Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1005 and 1013. Here, Gov. Code § 915.2¿states that “proof of mailing¿may be made¿in the manner prescribed § 1013a of the Code of Civil Procedure.”  

Cal. Civ. Code § 1013a, subd. (1), provides that proof of service by mail may be made by:  

“An affidavit setting forth the exact title of the document served and filed in the case, showing the name and residence or business address of the person making the service, showing that he or she is a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing occurs, that he or she is over the age of 18 years and not a party to the cause, and¿showing the¿date and¿place of deposit in the mail,¿the name and address of the person served as shown on the envelope, and also showing that the envelope was sealed and deposited in the mail with the postage thereon fully prepaid.”  

To hold a public entity liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the property was a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, (2) that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, (3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and (4) that either a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition or the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. (Gov. Code § 835.)  Consequently, a public entity is only liable for a dangerous condition of property if it either creates the condition or has actual or constructive notice of the condition. (Gov Code §835(b).)   

LAUSD argues that the WBOC main office did not receive any complaints about the condition of the walkway, nor have there been any prior incidents of falls due to dirt, debris, or other substances where Plaintiff fell. LAUSD avers the walkway area is swept every morning to clear the area of any debris, dirt, or substance that could be a slip hazard, and that Plaintiff did not see anything on the yellow tactile warning plates when she walked through the area in the morning. LAUSD argues Plaintiff has no evidence of how long the alleged dangerous condition existed prior to her fall. 

LAUSD has met its burden that it had neither actual or constructive notice of the condition, such that it would have had sufficient time to remedy it. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.  

Plaintiff argues that LAUSD’s inspection protocol was insufficient, and that a more frequent inspection protocol would have caused LAUSD to become aware of the dangerous condition. As framed by the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that she slipped and fell on “slippery yellow traction plates.” (SAC at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff’s responses to written discovery clarifies that she slipped on a “slippery substance on the floor” (Beckles Decl; Exh. D), and her deposition testimony provides that the specific slippery substance was greenish mud. Plaintiff relies upon her expert, Barillas, who conducted a slip test of the walking surface and the slip resistance with dry leaves. However, at issue is not the material of the walking surface itself nor did Plaintiff slip and fall on leaves. At issue was the alleged presence of mud on the surface of the traction plates, which Plaintiff contends caused her to fall. For this reason, Barillas’ declaration is not relevant. Further, Barillas provides no support for her conclusory opinion that LAUSD’s daily morning inspection and sweep is not enough to keep the walkway clear.  

Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that the slippery condition existed for such a period of time, and was of such an obvious nature, that LAUSD should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character. (Gov. Code § 835.2 (b).) Further, on the issue of due care, Plaintiff provides no admissible evidence that LAUSD’s daily inspection system was not reasonably adequate. (Gov. Code § 835.2 (b)(1)-(2).) “Whether the dangerous condition was obvious and whether it existed for a sufficient period of time are threshold elements to establish a claim of constructive notice.” (Heskel v. City of San Diego (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 313, 317.) Plaintiff completely fails to address either element in both its opposing papers and separate statement with admissible evidence. Plaintiff unsupported contention that a “more frequent proactive inspection protocol” would have caused LAUSD to be aware of the dangerous condition is insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact regarding notice. “Where the plaintiff fails to present direct or circumstantial evidence as to either element, his claim is deficient as a matter of law.” (Ibid.) 

IV. CONCLUSION  

Based on the foregoing, LAUSD’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.   

Moving party is ordered to give notice.   

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

Dated this 18th day of April 2024