I. BACKGROUND 

On March 20, 2020, plaintiff Telicia Powell (“Plaintiff”) filed a verified complaint against defendants Sababa Properties, Inc., Ashley Saba, Justin Saba, and Does 1 to 50 for allegations arising from breach of contract of a lease agreement. Plaintiff was a tenant at defendants’ property, commonly known as 738 East 94th St., Los Angeles, CA 90002 (“Subject Property”), since 2012 pursuant to a written lease agreement. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3.) Plaintiff alleges that the building was subject to numerous building code and safety violations (leaks, rodent infestation, pest, other vermin, carbon monoxide and smoke alarms, failure to make necessary repairs), and that defendants breached the lease agreement by illegally evicting Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 9.) 

The complaint sets forth four causes of action for (1) breach of contract (wrongful eviction), (2) breach of implied covenant of habitability/quiet enjoyment, (4) declaratory and injunction relief, and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”)/negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”). 

On April 23, 2024, defendants Sababa Properties, Inc., Ashley Saba and Justin Saba (collectively, “Defendants”) filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings. Defendants argue that  this action is barred by res judicata or claim preclusion, and that the causes of action fail to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against Defendants. 

On May 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed her opposition to the motion. 

Any reply was due on or before July 16, 2024; none has been filed. 

II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of: (1) the Grant Deed for the Subject Property, recorded on August 20, 2022, (2) the Quitclaim Deed for the Subject Property, dated January 28, 2020, (3) Sababa Properties, Inc.’s corporate statement of information from the Secretary of State, (4) Sale Deed, recorded on October 16, 2020, (5) February 25, 2020 Proof of Service filed in the unlawful detainer action 20CMUD00282, (6) March 6, 2020 Proof of Service in the unlawful detainer action, (7) Request for entry of default against Plaintiff on February 25, 2020, (8) Judgment-Unlawful Detainer entered on March 6, 2020, (9) unlawful detainer Minute Order on March 5, 2020, (10) unlawful detainer Minute Order on March 13, 2020, (11) appellate opinion dated February 16, 2022, and (12) remittitur dated April 19, 2022. 

Requests 1-4 are GRANTED. (Cal. Evid. Code § 452(h).) The court “may take judicial notice of the fact of a document’s recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document’s legally operative language….  From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face.” (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 265, disapproved on other grounds by Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 939.) 

Requests 5-12 are DENIED. They are not relevant to the issues raised on this motion. (Gbur v. Cohen (1979) 93 Cal. App. 3d 296, 301 [Judicial notice “is always confined to those matters which are relevant to the issue at hand.”]. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.”  (C.C.P. §438(b)(1) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).) 

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself. [Citation.]”  (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 877.)  “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 (Citations).)  The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).) 

IV. DISCUSSION 

Defendants argue the first cause of action is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. “Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) “Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.” (Ibid.) “California’s res judicata doctrine is based upon the primary right theory.” (Id. at 904.) Thus whether a cause of action is the same in both proceedings depends on whether the causes of action pertain to the same primary right. (Ibid.) The party asserting issue preclusion bears the burden of establishing the requirements. (Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co. (2015) 239 Cal. App. 4th 750, 757.) 

Here, Defendants’ argument of res judicata is entirely based upon the unlawful detainer default judgment obtained against Plaintiff. Defendants’ arguments are conclusory. Aside from failing to show that any of Plaintiff’s claims were fully and fairly litigated in a hearing, the Court notes that an unlawful detainer judgment has a very limited res judicata effect, because an unlawful detainer is a summary procedure involving only claims bearing directly upon the right of immediate possession. (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 255–257.) 

Plaintiff’s claims are based on conduct beyond the scope of the issue raised in an unlawful detainer action. (Moriarty v. Laramar Mgmt. Corp. (2014) 224 Cal. App. 4th 125, 141 [The sole issue in an unlawful detainer action is possession of the premises.].) Plaintiff’s claims arise from allegations of a failure to give proper 3-day notice, habitability issues during her tenancy, and intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress are far wider than the narrow issue of the right of possession. (e.g. Zimmerman v. Stotter (1984) 160 Cal. App. 3d 1067, 1074 [Previous unlawful detainer action did not bar from relitigation under doctrine of res judicata former tenant's causes of action for abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful eviction, which relate to landlord's action pursuant to issuance of the writ of possession, since it is not the right to possession, but the abuse of that right, which tenant seeks to litigate.].) 

In other words, judgment in an unlawful detainer “will not prevent one who is dispossessed from bringing a subsequent action to resolve questions of title [citations], or to adjudicate other legal and equitable claims between the parties.” (Vella v. Hudgins (1997) 20 Cal. 3d 251, 255.) Defendants have not met their burden that Plaintiff’s first cause of action for breach of contract premised on wrongful eviction is barred on its face. Plaintiff’s unsuccessful attempt to appeal the unlawful detainer default judgment, due to the issue of timeliness of the appeal, has no relevance to the analysis or foregoing authority on this issue. Additionally, the Court will not consider Defendants’ contention that there was no privity between the parties on the breach of contract claim because Sababa Properties, Inc. purchased the property days before notifying Plaintiff of the new ownership. This singular argument is entirely unsupported, and also not subject to dispute on the instant motion, which has the same limitations as a general demurrer. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion on the grounds of res judicata/collateral estoppel/claim preclusion, whether it be to just the first cause of action or in addition to “the other three Causes of Action” (Mot. 5:18.) is DENIED. 

Plaintiff names two separate causes of actions into one. Defendants address only the breach of implied covenant of habitability, and thus this Court limits its assessment to that which was argued.  

There¿is an implied warranty of habitability in all¿residential¿leases in California.¿¿This mean that a landlord must ensure that a leased¿premises¿is maintained in a habitable condition- that is, the landlord will maintain “bare living requirements.”¿(Green v. Superior Court¿(1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 637.) 

The¿elements¿of a claim to recover damages based on a breach of the implied warranty of habitability are: (1) the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises' habitability, (2) notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant's discovery of the condition, (3) the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency,¿and (4) resulting damages. (Erlach¿v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC¿(2014) 226¿Cal.App.4th¿1281, 1297.) 

A dwelling is deemed untenantable if it lacks certain affirmative standard characteristics. (Civ. Code, § 1941.1(a).) Health and Safety Code §17920.3 provides that a building or dwelling unit is declared to be a substandard building if there is an infestation of insects, vermin, or rodents as determined by a health officer; visible mold growth; general dilapidation or improper maintenance; and structural hazards including deteriorated foundation, flooring, or walls.   

Defendants argue that the second cause of action fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against them because Plaintiff does not allege that she communicated with Defendants, does not allege that she informed them of the purported uninhabitable conditions, and that there is no evidence Defendants viewed the property before evicting Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges, in pertinent part, as follows. Defendants “failed to comply with the statutory rules for a valid eviction”, “failed to comply or give the required notice to cure the alleged “squatter allegation””, and “failed to serve Plaintiff resulting in a fraudulent default judgment against Plaintiff.” (Compl. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff further alleges Defendants subjected Plaintiff to conditions such as “rodent infestation, pests, vermin, leaks, defective plumbing, and unsafe common areas shared with others, which rendered the premises uninhabitable” in which “Defendants were cited but failed to correct for years.” (Ibid.) Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that there was only one meter service for two dwelling units, which subjected “Plaintiff to pay for the other tenant’s use of gas and DWP services all to her further damage” and “[t]he other one bedroom unit was converted without proper permit and is an illegal unit.” (Ibid.) 

There is no requirement that Plaintiff provide evidence that Defendants viewed the property. The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) The Court will not consider Defendants’ extrinsic facts to contest the truth of the allegations. However, the Court agrees that, on its face, Plaintiff has not pled all the elements of breach of implied warranty of habitability. There are no factual allegations that she gave notice to the landlord of the condition, and that the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency. 

The motion as to the second cause of action for breach of implied covenant of habitability is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

Defendants argue they sold the property in October 2020, and therefore there can be no restitution of the premises to Plaintiff.  

In opposition, Plaintiff agrees to dismiss the third cause of action for declaratory/injunctive relief. 

Therefore, the motion as to the third cause of action is GRANTED without leave to amend.  

Defendants argue the IIED claim fails to allege outrageous conduct, that Defendants directed any extreme and outrageous conduct at Plaintiff, and that the present allegations are not sufficient to rise to the level of outrageous conduct. The Court agrees. 

The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering, and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. Conduct is extreme and outrageous when it exceeds all bounds of decency usually tolerated by a decent society, and is of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress. Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590.) 

The California Supreme Court held that a defendant’s actions could be characterized as "outrageous" for purposes of tort liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress, if he “(1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress.” (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 946 [overruled on other grounds].) A defendant’s conduct is “outrageous” when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community, and the defendant must either intend his or her conduct to inflict injury or engaged in it with the realization that injury will result. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051 [citations and quotations omitted].) 

Here, the fourth cause of action incorporates the general factual allegations that Plaintiff was subject to a wrongful eviction due to a defective 3-day notice to vacate, and that there were habitability issues during her tenancy. The fourth cause of action alleges, “Defendant acted with reckless disregard of the probability that [Plaintiff] would suffer emotional distress, knowing that [Plaintiff] relied on their promises that she would have a safe housing and a peaceful and quiet enjoyment of her housing” and that “[Plaintiff] suffered severe mental and emotional distress when she was given an illegal 3-day Notice to vacate; failed to serve the summons and complaint resulting in a default judgment; subjected her to such conditions, as rodent infestations, vermins, leaks, in addition to the conditions cited by Housing.” (Compl. ¶¶ 36-37.) The recitation of the elements for IIED and the general factual allegations are insufficient to maintain a claim for IIED. In terms of Plaintiff’s argument that IIED may be an available remedy for breach of implied warranty of habitability, this Court does not disagree. However, just because it is available does not mean Plaintiff is excused from pleading enough factual allegations to meet the standard. 

Plaintiff, in opposition, argues Defendants instigated LAPD to arrest Plaintiff and that Defendants violated an automatic bankruptcy stay, damaged and stole Plaintiff’s personal property after having Plaintiff arrested, locked Plaintiff out of the property, and that Plaintiff suffered severe emotional pain and suffering of headaches, sleeplessness, anxiety, depression, and had to send her daughter to Texas because Plaintiff could not cope with her false arrest and subsequent damage and theft of her personal properties. However, these factual allegations are absent from the complaint. 

The motion as to the fourth cause of action for IIED is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

Defendants argue that the prayer for punitive damages is not supported by the factual allegations. Plaintiff does not address Defendants’ arguments in her opposition. 

Nonetheless, the Court denies Defendants’ request to strike the prayer for three reasons. First, Defendants brought a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which functions the same as a general demurrer, and did not bring an accompanying motion to strike punitive damages. Second, Defendants did not state in their Notice to the motion that they would seek to strike punitive damages. Third, because there is a possibility of Plaintiff curing her claim for IIED, punitive damages may potentially be available. 

Defendants’ request to strike punitive damages is therefore DENIED.  

V. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED IN PART as follows: 

The first cause of action is DENIED. 

The improper request to strike punitive damages is DENIED. 

The second cause of action is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

The third cause of action is GRANTED without leave to amend. 

The fourth cause of action is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff is given leave to amend as to the second and fourth causes of action only. Plaintiff is given twenty (20) days leave to amend for this purpose. 

Moving Party is ordered to give notice.