SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 

 

 

I. Background 

Plaintiff Brenton Davis (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Cristian Crocker, Cristia Crocker, Johnny George, John George, and Does 1 to 50 for damages arising from a motor vehicle collision.  

On November 13, 2023, John Georges (“Georges”) filed a Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement, providing that Plaintiff and the John Georges entered into a settlement agreement for the total amount of $50,000, which represents Georges’ automobile liability insurance policy limit with Permanent General Assurance Corporation/Serenity Insurance Group.  

On January 22, 2024, Defendants Cristian Crocker (“Crocker”) filed an opposition to the motion for good faith determination.  

There is no precise yardstick for measuring the “good faith” of a settlement with one of several tortfeasors, but it must harmonize the public policy favoring settlements with the competing public policy favoring equitable sharing of costs among tortfeasors.  (See Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) 

 

“A more appropriate definition of ‘good faith,’ in keeping with the policies of American Motorcycle and the statute, would enable the trial court to inquire, among other things, whether the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries.  This is not to say that bad faith is ‘established by a showing that a settling defendant paid less than his theoretical proportionate or fair share.’ [Citation.]  Such a rule would unduly discourage settlements.  ‘For the damages are often speculative, and the probability of legal liability therefor is often uncertain or remote.  And even where the claimant's damages are obviously great, and the liability therefor certain, a disproportionately low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint tortfeasor.’ [Citation.]  Moreover, such a rule would tend to convert the pretrial settlement approval procedure into a full scale mini trial [citation]. 

 

“But these considerations do not lead to the conclusion that the amount of the settlement is irrelevant in determining good faith.  Rather, the intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of factors be taken into account including a rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial.  Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants. [Citation.]  Finally, practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.  ‘[A] defendant's settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant's liability to be.’ [Citation.]  The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§877.6(d)), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.  Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.   

(Tech-Bilt, Inc., 38 Cal.3d at 499-500.)   

 

Section 877.6 contemplates that the determination of good faith may be made by the court on the basis of affidavits (subd. (b)), and as the court observed in River Garden Farms, ‘The price levels are not as unpredictable as one might suppose.  Despite the uncertainties, generalized valuation criteria are recognized by the personal injury bar, insurance claims departments and pretrial settlement courts.  When testing the good faith of a settlement figure, a court may enlist the guidance of the judge's personal experience and of experts in the field.  Represented by knowledgeable counsel, settlement negotiators can predict with some assurance whether a settlement is within the reasonable range permitted by the criterion of good faith.  The danger that a low settlement violates the good faith clause will not impart uncertainty so long as the parties behave fairly and the courts maintain a realistic awareness of settlement imponderables.’ [Citation.] 

(Id. at 500-01.)   

 

The Tech-Bilt factors can be summarized as follows: 

 

(1) A rough approximation of plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; 

(2) The amount paid in settlement; 

(3) The allocation of settlement proceeds among defendants; 

(4) A recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial; 

(5) The financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and 

(6) The existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the nonsettling defendants. 

 

Accordingly, if the party contesting the settlement can show, with admissible evidence, that the settlement is “so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to [the above-referenced factors] as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute,” then the court should find the settlement to be lacking in good faith.  (Id. at 499-500.)  If no such showing is made, the settlement should be deemed to be in good faith and the settlor is entitled to an order barring any further claims by any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor for “equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity” and/or an order dismissing any such claims.  (CCP §877.6(c).)  Additionally, “[w]hen testing the good faith of a settlement figure, a court may enlist the guidance of the judge’s personal experience and of experts in the field. Represented by knowledgeable counsel, settlement negotiators can predict with some assurance whether a settlement is within the reasonable range permitted by the criterion of good faith.”  (Tech-Bilt,, 38 Cal.3d at 500.) 

I. First and Second Factors – Plaintiff's Total Recovery and Amount Paid in Settlement 

The settling defendant's proportionate liability is a critical factor: “The ultimate determinant of good faith is whether the settlement is grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person at the time of settlement would estimate the settlor's liability to be.” (City of Grand Terrace v. Sup.Ct. (Boyter) (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1262; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at 968—settlement of 1/2 of 1% of potential damages was within ballpark based on facts known at the time of settlement.) The court must consider the settlor's potential liability to the plaintiff and its proportionate share of culpability as among all parties alleged to be liable for the same injury. (TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (Geocon) (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166.)  

 Substantial evidence (e.g., factual declarations) showing the nature and extent of the settling defendant's liability is required. Without such evidence, a “good faith” determination is an abuse of discretion. (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1348— “questionable assumptions" in moving party's memorandum of points and authorities insufficient to show the settlement was reasonable; Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834—attorney's declaration resettling defendant's liability insufficient where he failed to provide specific supporting facts or expert opinion.) 

Georges contends the lawsuit arises from a motor vehicle incident arising from Crocker’s vehicle impacting Georges’ vehicle, in which Plaintiff was a passenger. Georges avers both he and Plaintiff testified at deposition that the collision occurred when Georges was slowly backing out of the driveway while Crocker was passing a large garbage truck on the wrong side of the road. (Mot. Exhs. I and G.) Georges argues Crocker’s act of driving into the opposing lane of traffic to maneuver around the garbage truck, instead of waiting, constitutes negligence and that Crocker bears much of the fault in causing the subject accident. Georges also challenges the credibility of witness Callan, arguing Callan gave conflicting and speculative testimony of the incident. In terms of Plaintiff’s injuries, Plaintiff alleged $210,135 in lien treatment medical bills and confirmed at deposition that he is not making a loss of earnings claim. Plaintiff submitted to an independent medical examination with spine surgeon Dr. Russell Nelson (“Dr. Nelson”) on March 23, 2023, who noted Plaintiff had complaints of low-grade constant back pain, and diagnosed with cervical and lumbar strain, L4-L5 degenerated disc, and status post left-sided L4-L5 discectomy. Plaintiff underwent three epidural injections and continues to receive injections without significant improvement. Georges argues Plaintiff was referred to two surgeons who are eager to surgically treat his minimal degenerated disc, when it is Dr. Nelson’s opinion that there is no other treatment or surgery required on Plaintiff’s minimal degenerated disc. (Mot. Exh. F.) Dr. Nelson also opined that much of Plaintiff’s treatment was excessive. The settlement agreement reached between Plaintiff and Georges for $50,000 represents Georges’ insurance policy limit. (Mot. Exhs. C and D.)  

In opposition, Crocker agrees with Georges’ statement of Plaintiff’s medical bills. However, Crocker contends she expects Plaintiff will request future medical specials of at least $500,000 based upon a need for a spinal cord stimulator, and that Plaintiff “will presumably” request non-economic damages and that “it is easy to see” that Davis will ask the jury for at least $1 million for past and future medical specials and non-economic damages. Crocker also contends that witness Callan testified that Georges was responsible for the subject incident and that she was driving properly in her lane at the time of the incident. 

In reply, Georges contends Crocker has not met her burden of proof through admissible evidence that the settlement was not made in good faith, and that Crocker’s counsel instead submits merely his own unsubstantiated opinions regarding liability and damages. Further, Georges argues the case law cited by Crocker are not applicable to the facts of this case. The Court agrees.  

The party asserting a lack of good faith bears the burden, not the party seeking determination of good faith settlement. Plaintiff provides in his responses to form interrogatories that he sought treatment with a number of providers, which the Court totaled as $67,690. (Mot. Exh. G.) It is unclear where the figure of $210,135 in medical specials came from or how this was calculated by Georges; however, because Croker agrees that this range accurately represents Plaintiff’s medical specials, the Court will accept this figure as Plaintiff’s current known damages. Crocker’s contention that Plaintiff will seek a greater sum in damages constitutes pure conjecture, because no evidence was proffered in support thereof. Crocker also challenges the opinion of Dr. Nelson concerning the necessity of future medical care without offering any other evidence or opposing expert witness in rebuttal. Lastly, Crocker contests liability by referring generally to Callan’s testimony, but provides no substantial evidence of the proportionate share of liability between Crocker and Georges such that the settlement for the policy limits of $50,000, which represents approximately 23.80% of Plaintiff’s known medical specials, is so “far out of the ballpark” to be considered not in good faith. Thus, Crocker has failed to meet the shifted burden with any substantial evidence.  

Accordingly, the Tech-Bilt factors balance in favor of finding a good faith settlement.   

 

 

 III. Conclusion  

Based on the foregoing, Georges settlement with Plaintiff appears reasonable and there is insufficient evidence showing otherwise. Georges’ motion for good faith determination pursuant to CCP § 877.6 is GRANTED.   

 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.   

 

 

Dated this 1st day of February 2024