Judge: Michelle C. Kim, Case: 20STCV42293, Date: 2023-11-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV42293 Hearing Date: November 21, 2023 Dept: 31
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
PRISMA VARELA, Plaintiff(s), vs.
SO CAL PF, LLC, dba PLANET FITNESS, ET AL.,
Defendant(s). | ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) | CASE NO: 20STCV42293
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION
Dept. 31 1:30 p.m. November 21, 2023 |
I. Background
Plaintiff Prisma Varela (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants So Cal PF, LLC, dba Planet Fitness (“So Cal LLC”) and So Cal PF Huntington Park, LLC dba Planet Fitness (“So Cal Huntington Park”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for damages relating to a railing, which allegedly became loose and broke free, causing Plaintiff to fall. The complaint alleges causes of action for negligence and premises liability against Defendants.
Defendants now move for summary judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication, against Plaintiff. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and Defendants filed a reply.
Moving Argument
Defendants provide the incident occurred at Planet Fitness, where Defendants provide fitness facilities. Plaintiff signed an agreement to work-out at Planet Fitness gyms in Southern California, including at the Planet Fitness gym where the incident occurred. Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s action is subject to the waiver and release provisions contained within the membership agreement, and therefore negates the element of duty necessary to bring causes of action for negligence and premises liability.
Opposing Argument
Plaintiff argues the release clause is void because it does not comply with the law governing waiver provisions, and also does not cover the location of the accident. Plaintiff further contends the release is not applicable because Defendants are not parties to the agreement, and is a triable issue as to whether Defendants’ conduct constituted gross negligence such that it is outside the scope of the waiver provision.
Reply Argument
Defendants contend the release of liability clause was conspicuously placed in the membership agreement, the agreement applied to any Planet Fitness location in the Los Angeles metro area, and the loose railing was not gross negligence.
II. Evidentiary Objections
Plaintiff submits two objections to Defendant’s evidence:
Objection 1 to the entirety of the Declaration of Sam Segnere (“Segnere”) is overruled.
Objection 2 to the Defendants’ Exhibit A - Membership Agreement (“Agreement”) is overruled.
Plaintiff disputes the validity of the Agreement provided in support of Defendants’ motion, contending it is substantially different from the Agreement produced in written discovery (Plaintiff’s Opp; Exhibit 3.). The Court compares the two agreements side-by-side. Aside from a formatting difference, all identifying information and provisions of the Agreement are identical, including the portions in bold font. The only difference is that the Agreement is signed in Defendants’ Exhibit A, whereas the copy provided in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 is an unsigned version.
III. Motion for Summary Judgment
Burdens on Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(c).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A defendant moving for summary judgment must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Id. at §437c(p).) A defendant may discharge this burden by furnishing either (1) affirmative evidence of the required facts or (2) discovery responses conceding that the plaintiff lacks evidence to establish an essential element of the plaintiff's case. If a defendant chooses the latter option, he or she must present evidence “and not simply point out that plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence….” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 865-66.)
[A] defendant may simply show the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action “by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at p. 854.) Thus, rather than affirmatively disproving or negating an element (e.g., causation), a defendant moving for summary judgment has the option of presenting evidence reflecting the plaintiff does not possess evidence to prove that element. “The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff's cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing” to support an essential element of his case. (Aguilar, supra, at p. 855.) Under the latter approach, a defendant's initial evidentiary showing may “consist of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses, or admissions by the plaintiff in deposition or in response to requests for admission that he or she has not discovered anything that supports an essential element of the cause of action.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 110.) In other words, a defendant may show the plaintiff does not possess evidence to support an element of the cause of action by means of presenting the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses from which an absence of evidence may be reasonably inferred. (Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)
Thus, a moving defendant has two means by which to shift the burden of proof under the summary judgment statute: “The defendant may rely upon factually insufficient discovery responses by the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action sued upon. [Citation.] [Or a]lternatively, the defendant may utilize the tried and true technique of negating (‘disproving’) an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action.” (Brantly v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1598.)
(Leyva v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103.)
Until the moving defendant has discharged its burden of proof, the opposing plaintiff has no burden to come forward with any evidence. Once the moving defendant has discharged its burden as to a particular cause of action, however, the plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence showing that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action. (Id. at §437c(p)(2).) On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party's supporting documents are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21.)
Analysis Re: Release Agreement
The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.¿¿(Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp¿(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)¿¿Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property¿to¿avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.¿¿(Annocki¿v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC¿(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.)¿¿The existence and scope of duty are legal questions for the court.¿¿(Id.¿at¿36.)¿¿
In this matter, Defendants move for summary judgment based on the waiver of liability contained in the membership agreement. (See Cohen v. Five Brooks Stable (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1476, 1484 [“With respect to the question of express waiver, the legal issue is not whether the particular risk of injury appellant suffered is inherent in the recreational activity to which the Release applies [Citations], but simply the scope of the Release.”].) “A release may negate the duty element of a negligence action.” (Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1356.)
“A written release may exculpate a tortfeasor from future negligence or misconduct. [Citation.] To be effective, such a release ‘must be clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the intent of the subscribing parties.’ (Ibid.) The release need not achieve perfection.” (Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica, LLC (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1356.) A defendant may require parties to sign a release of any and all liability. (Id. 1358-1359.) “A release of all premises liability in consideration for permission to enter recreational and social facilities for any purpose does not violate public policy.” (Id. at 1359.) Private parties may enter into voluntary transactions in which one party “agrees to shoulder a risk which the law would otherwise have placed upon the other party.” (Ibid.) Further, “A waiver of liability in a health or fitness club membership agreement necessarily releases the health club from liability for its negligence, since there is no other liability to release.” (Id. at n. 1 [citing Sanchez v. Bally's Total Fitness Corp. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 62, 69].)
“[T]he defendant bears the burden of raising the defense and establishing the validity of a release as applied to the case at hand.” (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 780 n. 58 (citations omitted); see also Eriksson v. Nunnink (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 708, 733-34 [Defendant bears the burden of establishing that the liability waiver is “binding and enforceable.”].) For an express release of liability to be enforceable against a plaintiff (1) the release agreement “must be clear, unambiguous and explicit in expressing the intent of the parties (citation omitted);” (2) the injury-producing act “must be reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release is given (citation omitted); and (3) the release cannot contravene public policy.” (Sweat v. Big Time Auto Racing, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1304-05.) “The cases consistently have held that ‘[e]xculpatory agreements in the recreational sports context do not implicate the public interest and therefore are not void as against public policy.” (Capri v. L.A. Fitness International, LLC (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1084 (citations omitted).)
Here, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging injury due to a loose railing that caused her to fall to the floor. (UMF 1.) Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiff’s complaint includes an affirmative defense based on waiver and release. (UMF 2.) On or about August 24, 2017, Plaintiff entered into a Membership Agreement ("Agreement") with Defendant for access to the workout facilities located at the Planet Fitness location at 1000 East Washington Blvd., Ste. 120, Los Angeles, California, 90021 as well as other locations in the Greater Los Angeles area, including the location at 7010 S. Alameda St., Huntington Beach, California, 90255. (UMF 3.) The Agreement signed by Plaintiff includes a "Release of Liability Indemnification Assumption of Risk" clause.1 (UMF 4.) The Agreement signed by Plaintiff states:
I understand my release of liability, assumption of risk and agreement to indemnify, defend and hold harmless and I have been given the opportunity to review and ask questions related to my use of the facilities, exercise equipment, tanning, massage beds/chairs and other equipment, as well as my participation in exercise programs or other services and/or programs offered to members. (UMF 6.)
The signed Agreement further contains the following, in bold print, above a list of the terms of the Agreement: "PLEASE READ AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT BEFORE SIGNING." (UMF 7.) The Agreement provides, above where Plaintiff signed the Agreement, in bold print, "I have read and accept the Terms and Conditions above." (UMF 8.)2 Defendant So Cal LLC is a service entity whose sole purpose is to provide back-office support to the Planet Fitness gyms in Southern California, and So Cal LLC did not own, operate or manage the Planet Fitness gym where this incident occurred. (UMF 9.) Defendant So Cal Huntington Park is an independently owned franchisee that solely owns, operates, and manages the Planet Fitness location at 7010 S. Alameda St., Huntington Park, where the incident occurred. (UMF 10.)
The exculpatory clause provides in pertinent part:
“Accordingly, to the fullest extent permitted by law, I do hereby forever release, waive and discharge Planet Fitness and PF Corporate from any and all claims, demands, injuries, damages, actions or causes of action related to my use or my guest's use of the facility (collectively, "Claims") against Planet Fitness, PF Corporate, or anyone acting on their behalf, and hereby agree to defend, indemnify and hold harmless Planet Fitness and PF Corporate from and against any such Claims, including Claims made by my guests. I further understand and acknowledge that neither Planet Fitness nor PF Corporate manufactures fitness or other equipment or products available in its facilities and therefore Planet Fitness and PF Corporate will not be held liable for defective equipment or products.”
(Def. Exh. A at p. 4.)
Here, the Agreement specifically defines “Planet Fitness” as “So Cal PF LA Washington, LLC, d/b/a Planet Fitness.” (Id. at p. 3.) and “PF Corporate” is defined as “Pla-Fit Franchise, LLC, its parents, subsidiaries and affiliates.” (Ibid.) In dispute is whether Plaintiff’s “Black Card” membership extends the Agreement signed with So Cal PF LA Washington, LLC (“So Cal Washington”) to the Planet Fitness Huntington Park gym location. It is undisputed that each Planet Fitness is each its own independently operated and managed franchisee. Defendants argue Plaintiff’s “Black Card” membership gave Plaintiff access to equipment, facilities, and services at all Planet Fitness franchised locations, and therefore as “Black Card” member, the release of liability clause signed with the Washington location extends to So Cal Huntington Park. However, the declaration of Segnere, the Director of Operations for So Cal LLC, attesting that this release of liability clause is applicable to Planet Fitness Huntington Park gym by proxy of Plaintiff being a “Black Card” member is without foundation and without any supporting evidence. “To be effective, such a release ‘must be clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the intent of the subscribing parties.’ [Citation] The release need not achieve perfection.” (Ibid. (citations omitted).) “In the absence of extrinsic evidence, the scope of a release is determined by the express language of the release.” (Id. at p. 1357 (citation omitted).)¿The express language of membership agreement itself does not cover the details of what it means to be a “Black Card” member, nor does the express language provide the rights and amenities provided to a “Black Card” member specific to other locations. Defendants further provide no extrinsic evidence that So Cal Huntington Park participated in any “Black Card” membership program for the release of liability clause signed with So Cal Washington to extend to So Cal Huntington Park. The same issue applies with So Cal LLC. Additionally, although the express language of the Agreement provides a broader exculpatory provision for “PF Corporate,” there is no evidence that So Cal LLC, a service entity providing back-office support to the Planet Fitness gyms in Southern California, or So Cal Huntington Park, was intended to be part of the definition of “PF Corporate” in the signed Agreement.
Outside of the exculpatory clause, Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted as to So Cal LLC, because So Cal LLC did not own, manage, or operate the Planet Fitness gym where the incident occurred. As framed by the complaint, the basis of Plaintiff’s theories of liability against Defendants is that Plaintiff was a business invitee of Planet Fitness on 7010 S. Alameda St., Huntington Park, CA 90255 that was owned and operated by Defendants, and that Defendants breached a duty of care by failing to inspect and properly maintain an interior railing, which caused Plaintiff injury. (Compl. at p. 4.) Plaintiff does not dispute So Cal Huntington Park solely owns, operates, and manages the Planet Fitness location where the incident occurred, and not So Cal LLC. Therefore, summary judgment is granted as to So Cal LLC only.
In sum, Defendants do not meet their prima facie burden establishing the applicability of the exculpatory clause Plaintiff signed with non-party So Cal Washington, and there remains triable issues of material fact as to whether Plaintiff’s “Black Card” membership extends the scope of the release of liability clause to Defendants. So Cal Huntington Park has not demonstrated the element of duty has been negated by an applicable exculpatory clause. However, because it is undisputed that So Cal LLC does not own, manage, or operate Planet Fitness, summary judgment is appropriate as to So Cal LLC regardless of any exculpatory clause.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART as to Defendant So Cal PF, LLC, dba Planet Fitness only.
Defendants are ordered to give notice.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement.
If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling,¿the party must send an email to the court at¿sscdept31@lacourt.org¿with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number.¿ The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting.¿¿
Unless¿all¿parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument.¿ You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue.¿¿
If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.¿ After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.¿
Dated this 20th day of November 2023
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| Hon. Michelle C. Kim Judge of the Superior Court
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