SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 

 

 

I. Background 

Plaintiff Tiffany Quynh Nhi Vu (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Helena Minye DDS (“Dr. Minye”) and Beautiful Smile Dental Group (“BSDG”) (collectively “Defendants”) for medical negligence. Plaintiff alleges she sought dental treatment from Defendants, wherein Defendants performed treatment for a root canal. Plaintiff sets forth three causes of action for (1) Dental Malpractice, (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), and (3) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED). 

On March 4, 2021, Plaintiff dismissed the second cause of action for IIED. On May 6, 2021, the Court sustained BSDG’s demurrer to the third cause of action for NIED without leave to amend.  

Isaac J. Chen D.D.S., Inc. dba BSDG, erroneously sued and served as BSDG, now moves for summary judgment on the remaining sole cause of action against it for dental malpractice.  

The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if the party does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)   

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).) 

 

B. Discussion  

As framed by the complaint, Plaintiff alleges she underwent a root canal treatment on April 18, 2020, which was performed by Dr. Minye at BSDG. (Compl. at ¶ 9.) After treatment, Plaintiff experienced pain in her teeth, and returned to Dr. Minye at BSDG for a subsequent crown appointment. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.) Plaintiff alleges that an endodontist thereafter revealed the root canal treatment was incomplete, and that the filling extruded into furcation. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to provide appropriate dental treatment. (Id. at ¶ 25.) 

BSDG’s sole argument is that it had an Independent Contractor Agreement (“Agreement”), with Dr. Minye, and therefore cannot be held liable for Dr. Minye’s root canal treatment on Plaintiff. BSDG argues it and Dr. Minye entered into the Agreement on May 5, 2018 to perform dental services at BSDG’s office. The Agreement provides that Dr. Minye was solely responsible for the professional services she rendered. BSDG contends no other dentist associated with it had supervised the work of Dr. Minye, and that Dr. Minye was fully responsible for her own transportation, taxes, professional liability insurance, and scheduling. In support, BSDG cites to S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Indus. Rels. (1989) 48 Cal. 3d 341, arguing the majority of the factors demonstrate that Dr. Minye was, at all times, an independent contractor of BSDG.  

At common law, a person who hires an independent contractor is generally not liable to third parties for injuries caused by the contractor’s negligence in performing work. (Johnson v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2012), 204 Cal. App. 4th 1097, 1107.) Central to this is the recognition of no right of control over the work contracted for. (Privette v. Superior Ct. (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 689, 693.) BSDG has met its prima facie burden that Dr. Minye was an independent contractor, and not an employee. 

The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff to present evidence of a triable issue of material fact. However, because Plaintiff did not oppose the motion, she necessarily fails to meet her burden.  

 

Based on the foregoing, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.