Judge Michelle C. Kim, Case 21STCV14648 2023-04-25 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Jonathan Araujo (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Elio Roldan Contreras (“Defendant”) for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. The complaint alleges causes of action for motor vehicle, general negligence, and intentional tort. The complaint includes a prayer for punitive damages. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant drank alcohol and was intoxicated when he drove his vehicle and collided with five separate cars, including Plaintiff’s vehicle.

At this time, Plaintiff moves for an order allowing discovery regarding the financial condition of Defendant pursuant to Civil Code § 3295(c). Defendant opposes the motion, and Plaintiff filed a reply.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was driving while intoxicated when the accident occurred, and that Defendant admitted to an officer that he was intoxicated. Plaintiff provides Defendant pled no contest to a charge of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Plaintiff asserts that punitive damages are appropriate in cases involving drunk driving.

In opposition, Defendant argues that the motion should be denied because Plaintiff has not demonstrated a substantial probability that he will prevail on his claim for punitive damages. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s evidence does not meet the clear and convincing standard required to allow the invasive discovery.

In reply, Plaintiff contends that he has demonstrated a substantial probability that he will prevail on his claim for punitive damages because malice can be presumed in a drunk driving case. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant rear-ended multiple parked vehicles and admitted that alcohol impaired his driving. Plaintiff argues that the requested discovery is necessary, and that this motion is being timely made.

Civil Code § 3295(c) states, “No pretrial discovery by the plaintiff shall be permitted with respect to the [financial condition of the defendant] unless the court enters an order permitting such discovery pursuant to this subdivision.” “Upon motion by the plaintiff supported by appropriate affidavits and after a hearing, if the court deems a hearing to be necessary, the court may at any time enter an order permitting the discovery otherwise prohibited by this subdivision if the court finds, on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented, that the plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant to Section 3294.” (Id.)

Where a plaintiff’s cause of action includes a claim for punitive damages, the defendant’s financial condition is certainly relevant to the subject matter. However, unlimited discovery of the defendant’s finances encourages a situation where plaintiffs, by alleging punitive damages, could force defendants to settle simply in order to protect their financial privacy. In order to avoid this, special rules have been adopted to limit the “financial condition” evidence presented at trial and on pretrial discovery. (Civ. Code § 3295.)

A plaintiff may require a defendant to identify documents in his possession that are admissible on the issue of his profits or financial condition. (Civ. Code §3295(c).) Beyond that, no pretrial discovery by the plaintiff is permitted without a court order, which can only be granted if the court finds that there is a “substantial probability” that the plaintiff will prevail on his or her punitive damages claim. To obtain the order, the plaintiff must file a motion supported by a declaration stating facts sufficient to support a finding of oppression, fraud or malice under Civil Code §3294.

A “substantial probability” that a plaintiff will prevail requires a prima facie showing of malice, oppression or fraud, bearing in mind the clear and convincing standard required by § 3294 (i.e., enough evidence to avoid summary judgment or a nonsuit or directed verdict at trial). Even if discovery is ordered, the defendant is presumptively entitled to a protective order limiting disclosure of the evidence solely to opposing counsel and solely for the purposes of the lawsuit.

Punitive damages are never awarded as a matter of right, they are not favored by the law and they should be granted with the greatest of caution and only in the clearest of cases. To justify their award there must be proof of malice in fact; such malice will not be implied by law and such malice will never be established by “mere speculation.” The malice essential to an award of exemplary damages requires an evil motive or intent. It denotes ill will on the part of the defendant, or his desire to do harm for the mere satisfaction of doing it. Essential to any award of exemplary damages is a finding that the plaintiff was subjected to cruel and unjust hardship by the defendant. And in any case, the evil motive and desire to harm the plaintiff must be attended by "outrageous conduct." (Henderson v. Security Nat. Bank (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 764, 771-772 [citations & quotations omitted]; see also McAfee v. Ricker (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 630, 634.)

b. Law Governing Punitive Damages in the Context of Driving Under the Influence

Civil Code § 3294(a) states, “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

Allegations that a defendant exhibited a conscious disregard for the safety of others are sufficient to show malice. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-96.) The Taylor court concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of "malice" under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences. "One who willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others." (Id., at p. 897.)

To properly allege punitive damages in a motor vehicle accident action, a plaintiff needs to "establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences." (Id., at p. 896.) If the gravamen of the complaint is that "Defendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby" then this is sufficient to allege punitive damages. (Id.) While a history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the probability and foreseeability of an accident, we do not deem these aggravating factors essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases. (Id.)

Taylor justified imposing punitive damages upon the “deliberate” drunk driver for many reasons, including the high degree of foreseeability of injury and damage flowing from driving while intoxicated. The court stated that the essential allegation is that defendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby. The decision also discusses the grave havoc wrought by intoxicated drivers nationwide and equates the act of deliberately driving while under the influence with a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others which may be described as willful or wanton. Such conduct, the court said, has traditionally been a basis for awarding punitive damages. (Herrick v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 787, 790.)

“There is a very commonly understood risk which attends every motor vehicle driver who is intoxicated. [Citation.] One who willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 896-897.) “[T]he fact of common knowledge that the drinking driver is the cause of so many of the more serious automobile accidents is strong evidence in itself to support the need for all possible means of deterring persons from driving automobiles after drinking, including exposure to awards of punitive damages in the event of accidents.” (Id., at p. 897.)

Taylor fell short, however, of holding that punitive damages are always appropriate in cases involving driving while intoxicated. The Court noted, “we have concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under §3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” (Id. at 892.) Emphasis added.

Notably, a subsequent decision held that driving while intoxicated does not always give rise to a claim for punitive damages. “[W]e do not agree that the risk created generally by one who becomes intoxicated and decides nevertheless to drive a vehicle on the public streets is the same as the risk created by an intoxicated driver’s decision to zigzag in and out of traffic at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area at 1:30 in the afternoon on a Sunday in June. The risk of injury to others from ordinary driving while intoxicated is certainly foreseeable, but it is not necessarily probable. The risk of injury to others from Mardian's conduct under the circumstances alleged was probable.” (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82.)

The Court went on to note, “In contrast, in the case at bench, as previously noted, petitioners pleaded specific facts from which the conscious disregard of probable injury to others may reasonably be inferred. Justice Franson aptly noted the distinction in his article on punitive damages in vehicle accident cases: Allegations of intoxication, excessive speed, driving with defective equipment or the running of a stop signal, without more, do not state a cause of action for punitive damages. [Par.] On the other hand, if the facts show that the defendant intentionally drove his vehicle at a high speed into an intersection crowded with pedestrians, or if he drove at a high speed through a crowded residential area where children were playing in the street, a legitimate inference of actual malice perhaps could arise. This would be particularly true if the defendant had not been drinking, or, if drinking, he was not under the influence to the point where he was incapable of being aware of the situation confronting him. Under these circumstances, it reasonably might be said that the defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the jury could infer that he knowingly disregarded the substantial certainty of injury to others."

Further complicating the matter, in 1987, after all of the foregoing cases were decided, the legislature amended Civil Code § 3294 to include a requirement that conduct in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others be “despicable” in order to support imposition of punitive damages.

Plaintiff, in this case, submits a portion of his deposition transcript detailing his injuries, and submits a copy of his own responses to Defendant’s form interrogatories propounded on Plaintiff. (Mot. Exhs. 1-2.) Further, Plaintiff submits a Traffic Collision Report regarding the subject accident and the criminal docket from Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 9IN03075 showing Defendant’s conviction. (Id. at Exhs. 3-4.) The Traffic Collision Report, to which no objection has been made, provides that Defendant stated multiple times to the investigating officer that alcohol helped caused the accident. After the officer determined that Defendant operated his vehicle under the influence of alcohol, Defendant was arrested. (Id. at Exh. 3 at p. 13.) The criminal docket submitted by Plaintiff shows that Defendant pled “nolo contendere” to the charge against him. (Id. at Exh. 4 at p. 2.)

The evidence is not sufficient to establish a substantial probability that Plaintiff will prevail on his claim for punitive damages against Defendant. The allegation that Defendant drove under the influence of alcohol alone is not sufficient to meet Plaintiff’s burden. If it were, it would essentially mean anyone driving under the influence would be subject to punitive damages, which is contrary to current case law, and this Court’s reading of Civil Code § 3294. Moreover, merely causing a collision with Plaintiff’s vehicle is a common element in any automobile accident. Similarly, Plaintiff’s evidence regarding the criminal case against Defendant does not show that Defendant acted with malice. It shows only that Defendant faced criminal charges for driving under the influence. Accordingly, Plaintiff does not show with clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial probability Plaintiff will prevail on the claim for punitive damages.

Hon. Michelle C. Kim

Judge of the Superior Court