SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 

 

 

I. Background 

Plaintiff Maria Delalo Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Ruben De Arcos Gama (“Gama”), Maribel De Arcos, and Sara Anguiano, erroneously sued as served as Sara Angivano (“Anguiano”) for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.   

On October 20, 2023, Gama filed an Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement providing Plaintiff and Gama entered into a settlement agreement for the total amount of $15,000. On November 1, 2023, rather than filing a Motion to Contest Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement, Defendant Anguiano filed an opposition to the application. On November 8, 2023, Gama filed a reply to Anguiano opposition for determination of good faith settlement.   

Preliminary, it appears that counsel for Gama is also bringing the motion on behalf of Defendant Maribel De Arcos. However, the Court notes there is no counsel of record for Maribel De Arcos. It is unclear to the Court whether Gama’s counsel has the authority to file an application on behalf of another defendant, and therefore, the Court declines to rule on the application and opposition as it relates to Maribel De Arcos.   

 

II. Evidentiary Objections 

Gama objects to the Traffic Collision Report submitted by Anguino in opposition to the motion for good faith settlement. The objection is sustained. 

 

III. Motion to Contest the Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement  

 

“A more appropriate definition of ‘good faith,’ in keeping with the policies of American Motorcycle and the statute, would enable the trial court to inquire, among other things, whether the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries.  This is not to say that bad faith is ‘established by a showing that a settling defendant paid less than his theoretical proportionate or fair share.’ [Citation.]  Such a rule would unduly discourage settlements.  ‘For the damages are often speculative, and the probability of legal liability therefor is often uncertain or remote.  And even where the claimant's damages are obviously great, and the liability therefor certain, a disproportionately low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint tortfeasor.’ [Citation.]  Moreover, such a rule would tend to convert the pretrial settlement approval procedure into a full scale mini trial [citation]. 

 

“But these considerations do not lead to the conclusion that the amount of the settlement is irrelevant in determining good faith.  Rather, the intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of factors be taken into account including a rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial.  Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants. [Citation.]  Finally, practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.  ‘[A] defendant's settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant's liability to be.’ [Citation.]  The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§877.6(d)), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.  Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.   

(Tech-Bilt, Inc., 38 Cal.3d at 499-500.)   

 

Section 877.6 contemplates that the determination of good faith may be made by the court on the basis of affidavits (subd. (b)), and as the court observed in River Garden Farms, ‘The price levels are not as unpredictable as one might suppose.  Despite the uncertainties, generalized valuation criteria are recognized by the personal injury bar, insurance claims departments and pretrial settlement courts.  When testing the good faith of a settlement figure, a court may enlist the guidance of the judge's personal experience and of experts in the field.  Represented by knowledgeable counsel, settlement negotiators can predict with some assurance whether a settlement is within the reasonable range permitted by the criterion of good faith.  The danger that a low settlement violates the good faith clause will not impart uncertainty so long as the parties behave fairly and the courts maintain a realistic awareness of settlement imponderables.’ [Citation.] 

(Id. at 500-01.)   

 

The Tech-Bilt factors can be summarized as follows: 

(1) A rough approximation of plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; 

(2) The amount paid in settlement; 

(3) The allocation of settlement proceeds among defendants; 

(4) A recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial; 

(5) The financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and 

Here, Gama’s burden in moving for good faith determination is to prove there has been a settlement.  (See Franklin Mint Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1558; see also Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Company (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1350 n.6.)  Gama provides he reached a settlement with Plaintiff for $15,000.  Because Gama met his moving burden, the burden shifts to Anguino to show the settlement was not in good faith. (Mattco, 38 Cal.App.4th at 1350 n.6; CCP 877.6. [“The party asserting lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.”].)    

Here, Anguino challenges in particular the first, second, fourth, fifth, and sixth Tech-Bilt factors.  

 

I. First, Second, and Fourth Tech-Bilt Factors – Plaintiff's Total Recovery, Settlor’s Proportionate Liability, Amount Paid in Settlement, and Recognition Settlor Should Pay Less 

The settling defendant's proportionate liability is a critical factor: “The ultimate determinant of good faith is whether the settlement is grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person at the time of settlement would estimate the settlor's liability to be.” (City of Grand Terrace v. Sup.Ct. (Boyter) (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1262; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at 968—settlement of 1/2 of 1% of potential damages was within ballpark based on facts known at the time of settlement.) The court must consider the settlor's potential liability to the plaintiff and its proportionate share of culpability as among all parties alleged to be liable for the same injury. (TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (Geocon) (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166.)  

 Substantial evidence (e.g., factual declarations) showing the nature and extent of the settling defendant's liability is required. Without such evidence, a “good faith” determination is an abuse of discretion. (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1348— “questionable assumptions" in moving party's memorandum of points and authorities insufficient to show the settlement was reasonable; Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834—attorney's declaration resettling defendant's liability insufficient where he failed to provide specific supporting facts or expert opinion.) 

Gama contends the lawsuit arises from a three-vehicle collision, wherein Plaintiff was the first vehicle, Anguino the second vehicle, and Gama the third vehicle. Gama avers Plaintiff was driving when another driver travelling at about 50 mph made an abrupt lane change in front of Plaintiff. Plaintiff stopped her vehicle to avoid the collision, and felt an impact to the rear of Plaintiff’s vehicle. Within seconds of the first impact, Plaintiff claims to have felt a second impact to her rear vehicle. As a result of the collision, Plaintiff claimed physical injuries to her neck, shoulders, and mid-back, and has incurred medical expenses of around $60,000. With the addition of a subsequent left shoulder surgery Plaintiff testified as costing about $180 out-of-pocket, Plaintiff’s rough approximated total recovery is about $100,000. Gama contends his policy limit of $15,000 reflects his full insurance policy, that he has no other assets or additional insurance to satisfy any potential excess judgment against him, and that the amount is within the ballpark of Gama’s potential liability as the second impactor in the chain of events. In support thereof, Gama provides excerpts of Plaintiff’s deposition regarding the two impacts to her vehicle, Plaintiff’s testimony of the cost of her subsequent shoulder surgery, the proposed settlement and release agreement, and Gama’s signed declaration of no additional insurance.  

In opposition, Anguino’s argument against each Tech-Bilt factor is that Gama has presented no evidence in support of the proposed settlement. However, Anguino is mistaken about who bears the burden. The party asserting a lack of good faith bears the burden, not the party seeking determination of good faith settlement. Anguino provides no substantial evidence demonstrating that Anguino bore 0% of the responsibility for the incident, or that the potential medical specials are at least $100,000 to $200,000, and that the proposed settlement does not accurate reflect Gama’s proportionate share of fault. Anguino  provides only inadmissible evidence of the Traffic Collision Report. Accordingly, Gama’s evidence, compared to Anguino’s lack of evidence, does not defeat the contention that Anguino bears some proportionate share of fault in this multi-vehicle accident, such that the settlement figure of $15,000 representing 25% of Plaintiff’s known medical expenses of approximately $60,000 is grossly disproportionate. Even if Plaintiff’s potential recovery is actually between $100,000 to $200,000 as Anguino contends, Anguino has not met her burden demonstrating Gama’s potential liability is grossly disproportionate to the Plaintiff’s approximate total recovery. 

  Accordingly, the first, second and fourth factors balance in favor of finding a good faith settlement.   

 

II. Fifth Tech-Bilt Factor – Settling Party’s Financial Condition 

As analyzed above, the only evidence of the Plaintiff’s damages at this time are Plaintiff’s medical expenses totaling approximately $60,000. Settlements have been upheld as being in good faith in cases with a $25,000 settlement in a $5 million case, a $30,000 settlement in a $1 million case, a $65,000 settlement in a $7 million case, and a $50,000 settlement in a $1.425 million case. (See Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 968 [citing Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012; Wysong & Miles Co. v. Western Industrial Movers (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 278; Wilshire Ins. Co. v. Tuff Boy Holding, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 627].)  Other damages are speculative or uncertain at this time.  Anguino provides no evidence showing the settlement amount is disproportionately low.   

The party asserting the lack of good faith of a settlement agreement, for purposes of determining the good faith of a settlement with alleged joint tortfeasors or co-obligors, has the burden of proof to demonstrate that the settlement is so far “out of the ballpark” in relation to the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor’s proportionate share of comparative liability for the plaintiff’s injuries as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute absolving from further liability for equitable indemnity a tort defendant who has entered into a good-faith settlement.  (Nutrition Now, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 209, 213-214.)  In this case, Anguino has not shown that Gama’s settlement agreement with Plaintiff for is so far out of the ballpark in relation to his proportionate share of Plaintiff’s known damages at the time of settlement, because the proposed settlement represents approximately 25% of Plaintiff’s known medical specials. Even if the Court were to consider Anguiano’s contention that Plaintiff’s total recovery is, at upmost, $200,000, the Court would still find $15,000 to be in good faith. If other courts have found a $25,000 settlement in a $5 million dollar case and a $30,000 settlement in a $1 million dollar case to be in good faith, then a $15,000 settlement in an upward to $200,000 case cannot be said to be so far out of the ballpark.  

Therefore, the fifth factor weighs in favor of finding good faith settlement. 

 

III. Sixth Tech-Bilt Factor – Existence of Collusion, Fraud, Or Tortious Conduct 

As to the sixth factor, Anguiano contends Gama has not demonstrated the proposed settlement was negotiated at arm’s length. Again, the burden is Anguino as the party opposing the good faith settlement. Anguino’s conclusory contention and misplaced burden is not sufficient to determine the settlement was the result of fraud, collusion, or other tortious conduct. This is in addition to the Court having not found, with the evidence provided, that the settlement is so low as to establish that it is aimed at making the non-settling defendants pay more than their fair share.  

Consequently, the sixth factor balances in favor of finding a good faith settlement.   

  

IV. Conclusion  

Based on the foregoing, Gama’s settlement with Plaintiff appears reasonable.  There is insufficient evidence showing otherwise. Gama’s application for good faith determination pursuant to CCP § 877.6 is GRANTED.   

 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.   

 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

Dated this 15th day of November 2023