Judge Michelle C. Kim, Case 21STCV21874 2023-03-21 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs Luna Kurdy (“Kurdy”) and Abigail Bostadjian (“Bostadjian”), a minor by and through her Guardian ad Litem, Petitioner, filed this action against Defendants Tanner John Haynes and Alan Douglas Haynes (collectively, “Defendants”) for damages arising from a motor vehicle.

On February 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement of Entire Case providing that the parties had entered into a conditional settlement and a request for dismissal would be filed no later than August 11, 2022.

On January 30, 2023, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Enforce Settlement seeking an order compelling Plaintiffs to file a petition to confirm minor’s compromise. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, and Defendants filed a reply.

Defendants assert that the parties reached a settlement where $10,000 was to be apportioned to Plaintiff, but after a petition to confirm minor’s compromise pertaining to Bostadjian was denied, Plaintiffs refuse to re-file the petition and cure the deficiencies. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs intend to dismiss this action as to Bostadjian with the intention of filing a new lawsuit and renegotiating the settlement when Bostadjian turns 18. Defendants argue that all issues were resolved under the settlement agreement, so Defendants are entitled to an order entering a judgment enforcing the agreement. Defendants further request sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel and Kurdy.

In opposition, Plaintiffs provide that Kurdy is repudiating the settlement agreement, so it is not enforceable under CCP § 664.6. Plaintiffs further assert that the tentative settlement is not in Bostadjian’s best interests. Plaintiffs claim that after the petition to confirm minor’s compromise pertaining to Bostadjian was denied, Bostadjian injuries worsened.

In reply, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not repudiated the previous settlement. Defendants argue that Kurdy signed the petition to confirm minor’s compromise and appeared at the hearing contending that the amount was appropriate. Additionally, Defendants contend that there is evidence showing that the settlement is in Bostadjian’s best interest.

CCP § 664.6 states: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

Strict compliance with the statutory requirements is necessary before a court can enforce a settlement agreement under this statute. (Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Construction, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 37.) To enforce a written settlement agreement under CCP section 664.6, the following three elements must be met: (1) the parties must have come to a meeting of the minds on all material points; (2) there must be a writing that contains the material terms of the agreement; and (3) the writing must be signed by the parties. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 797-98.)

CCP § 664.6 “require[s] the signatures of the parties seeking to enforce the agreement under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 664.6 and against whom the agreement is sought to be enforced.” (J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 985.) CCP § 664.6’s “requirement of a ‘writing signed by the parties’ must be read to apply to all parties bringing the section 664.6 motion and against whom the motion is directed.” (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 306; see Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Const., Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 35-37 [“A written settlement agreement is not enforceable under section 664.6 unless it is signed by all of the parties to the agreement, not merely the parties against whom the agreement is sought to be enforced.”].) “A procedure in which a settlement is evidenced by one writing signed by both sides minimizes the possibility of … dispute[s] and legitimizes the summary nature of the section 664.6 procedure.” (Robertson v. Chen (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1293.)

Here, in seeking an order enforcing the purported settlement between Plaintiffs and Defendants, Defendants submit a copy of the petition to confirm minor’s compromise previously filed in this matter, the order denying the petition without prejudice, and of emails between Plaintiffs’ and defense counsel. (Mot. Exhs. A-C.) This evidence is insufficient to satisfy the strict requirements of CCP § 664.6. While the petition indicates that a settlement may have been reached between Plaintiffs and Defendants, the petition is not signed by Defendants, and the petition does not contain any of the terms of the settlement. Defendants cite no authority holding it can enforce the petition to confirm minor’s compromise under CCP § 664.6.

Moreover, as Plaintiffs argue, the petition to confirm minor’s compromise pertaining to Bostadjian was denied. (Min. Order, Aug. 1, 2022.) “[T]he guardian may negotiate a proposed compromise, but the agreement must be referred to the court because the duties of the guardian ad litem are ‘essentially ministerial.’ (Ibid.) Thus, ‘[i]t is the court's order approving the settlement that vests the guardian ad litem with the legal power to enforce the agreement. [Citation.]’ ” (Scruton v. Korean Air Lines Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1605.) “As with any other contract where one party lacks capacity, or a necessary contractual formality has been ignored, the contract is voidable until the defect is remedied.” (Id.) “Therefore, a proposed compromise is always voidable at the election of the minor through his guardian ad litem unless and until ‘the court's imprimatur has been placed on it.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at 1606.) The settlement negotiated between Plaintiffs and Defendants was thus not final or binding until approval. (Id. at 1608.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs assert that Kurdy, Bostadjian’s guardian ad litem, is repudiating the settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendants. The Court must grant Kurdy deference in this regard; “... the decision of the guardian deserves some deference. Consequently, ... the court has limited power to direct a settlement unilaterally, but to do so, the court must first find that the guardian ad litem has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in the sense that his conduct is inimical to the best interests of the court's ward.” (Id. at 1607-08, emphasis in original.) There is no evidence presented to suggest that Kurdy’s repudiation is adverse or contrary to the best interests of Bostadjian. Accordingly, Defendants do not satisfy CCP § 664.6’s requirements.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion is denied. Because the motion is denied, Defendants’ request for sanctions, for which Defendants provide no authority, is also denied.

Hon. Michelle C. Kim

Judge of the Superior Court