SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 

 

 

I. Background 

Plaintiff Bianca Alvarado (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants City of Los Angeles (“City”) and Tyler Patrick Whiteman (“Whiteman”) for damages arising from an automobile incident. Plaintiff alleges that on January 22, 2020, Whiteman lost control of his vehicle and collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff sets forth a cause of action for liability of public entities and public employees pursuant to Gov. Code section 815.2 and 820.   

At this time, Plaintiff moves to compel the City to produce medical employment records of Whiteman related to prior syncopal episodes, who was an in the course and scope of his employment with the Los Angeles Police Department at the time of the incident. 

 The City and Whiteman (collectively, “Defendants”) oppose the motion.   

 

II. Pitchess Motion  

In general, the personnel records of peace officers are protected from discovery pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7. The exclusive means for obtaining these materials is through a Pitchess motion. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1990) 219 Cal. App. 3d 1605, 1611.)  

Penal Code section 832.5 applies to “complaints by members of the public against the personnel of these departments or agencies.” (Penal Code section 832.5(a)(1).) “Complaints and any reports or findings relating to these complaints shall be retained for a period of at least five years.” (Id. section 832.5(b).) They “may be maintained either in the peace or custodial officer’s general personnel file or in a separate file designated by the department or agency.” (Ibid.)¿¿ 

The term “personnel records” is defined as follows:¿¿ 

Under Evidence Code section 1043, a party may seek disclosure of these records by filing a regularly noticed motion with the appropriate court. (Evid. Code section 1043(a).)¿ A Pitchess motion shall (1) identify the proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is sought, the party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace or custodial officer whose records are sought, the governmental agency which has custody and control of the record, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or disclosure shall be heard, (2) describe the type of records or information sought, and (3) present affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought.  (Evid. Code § 1043(b).)  

The “good cause” declaration must be sufficiently specific “to preclude the possibility of [the movant] simply casting about for any helpful information.” (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226 (Mooc).) However, an attorney declaration based upon information and belief may be used to evidence good cause in support of a Pitchess motion. (Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1086.) The moving party need show only a “plausible factual foundation” for discovery—that is, a scenario of officer misconduct that might occur or could have occurred. (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1025-1026.) All that is required is the presentation of a scenario that might have or could have occurred, which is a “relatively low threshold.” (Uybungco v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048.)¿ 

Turning to the second step, if the court finds good cause, then an in camera hearing must be held. (Slayton v. Superior Court (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 55, 60.) After personally examining the records in camera, the court shall order disclosure of peace officer personnel records that are “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.” (See Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (a); Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1226.) If disclosure is ordered, the court must also order that the disclosed information may not be used “for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1045, subd. (e).)¿ 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate good cause for the City to “produce all employment records that pertain to defendant, Tyler Patrick Whiteman’s medical condition as it pertains to syncopal episodes, more particularly, fainting, passing out, blackouts or otherwise temporarily losing consciousness prior to, and during his employment with the Los Angeles Police Department.” Here, Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration provides the factual circumstances of the incident, the deposition excerpts of both Whiteman and Saenz, the Prehospital Care Report Summary prepared by the Los Angeles Fire Department, and four pages of medical records from California Hospital Medical Center for care and treatment rendered to Whiteman on the day of the incident. Good cause for discovery exists when the party shows (1) materiality to the subject matter of the pending litigation and (2) a reasonable belief that the agency has the type of information sought.  (Becerrada v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 409, 413.) Whiteman testified that it was the first time the medical emergency had manifested. Sergeant Melissa Saenz also testified that it was the first time she had witnessed Whiteman being under this condition. The records of Whiteman’s medical history recorded by an admitting M.D. is hearsay. Nonetheless, even if the Court were to consider these inadmissible documents, the statement that Whiteman reportedly coughed at a café and lost consciousness for a few seconds (on the same day as the incident) falls short of implying there exists a history of syncopal episodes, nor establishes a reasonable belief that the City has the type of medical information sought. Plaintiff has not established a plausible factual foundation for discovery, and thus fails to meet her moving burden to show good cause for the documents she seeks to discover.  

 

Based on the foregoing, the motion is DENIED.