I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiffs Noe Carachure (“Carachure”) and Leslie Cortes (“Cortes”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendants Tiffany Sot, Sam Sot, and Does 1 to 30 for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on November 24, 2019 on the 405 Freeway in Long Beach. Plaintiffs allege that defendants Tiffany Sot and Sam Or (sued as Sot) (collectively, “Defendants”) abandoned their vehicle on the highway, which caused the collision between Plaintiffs’ and Defendant’s vehicle. The complaint sets forth two causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence.  

Defendants now move for summary judgment, or in the alternative adjudication, against Plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, and Defendants filed a reply.  

Defendants contend their vehicle was stolen the evening before the incident, on November 23, 2019, and that they reported the vehicle as missing the following morning at around 8:30 a.m. on November 24, 2019. Defendants argue there is no evidence that they were involved in the incident, nor did Defendants give permission to any other person to operate the subject vehicle. Thus, Defendants assert they are entitled to summary judgment because they owed no duty to Plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs argue the veracity of Defendants’ claim that their vehicle was stolen on the grounds that Defendants did not return the police officer’s calls regarding the vehicle, and did not submit a report to the police regarding a stolen vehicle until January 22, 2020. Plaintiffs contend the evidence supports suspicious behavior, which should be resolved by a jury.  

Defendants argue that there was no suspicious behavior on their part. Defendants refer to Sam Or’s own declaration in support that he reported the vehicle as stolen. 

II. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of (1) the Traffic Collision Report, (2) Plaintiffs’ complaint, and (3) Defendants’ Answer to the complaint. The requests are unopposed. 

Request 1 is granted. Both parties rely upon the Traffic Collision Report and have therefore waived any hearsay objections. Further, neither party disputes the truth or accuracy of the report.  

Requests 2 and 3 are granted. (Evid. Code §¿452(d).)   

III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

A. Burdens on Summary Judgment 

A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment.  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)    

The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if the party does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) 

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 0159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).) 

B. Analysis 

 “The elements of negligence are (1) a legal duty to use due care, (2) the breach of such legal duty, and (3) the breach was the proximate or legal cause of injury.” (Orey v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1255.)  As in any negligence action, whether a duty was owed under the facts is a question of law for the court. (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213.)  As framed by the pleading, the causes of action allege Defendants entrusted and/or operated the motor vehicle, such that the vehicle was abandoned on the highway without proper warning equipment, thereby causing the subject accident. (Compl. at p. 5.) 

Preliminary, the parties agree on the separate statement that the subject vehicle incident occurred on September 23, 2021. The Court presumes this fact recitation to be erroneous, considering both the Traffic Collision Report (“TCR”) relied upon and the operative complaint date the vehicle accident as occurring on November 24, 2019. (Mot. Exh. A; Compl. at p. 4-5.) It is undisputed that Carachure was driving with Cortes in the front right passenger seat, when their Honda Civic struck Defendants’ unoccupied 2004 Nissan parked in the HOV lane with no active lights. (UMFs 2-3.) Defendants aver the vehicle was stolen.   

In support thereof, Defendants refer to Sam Or’s affidavit. Sam Or declares that he reported his Nissan as stolen on the morning of November 24, 2019, and that when he returned to both the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) and California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) to obtain a theft report, he was informed there were no reports available. (Or Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.) Sam Or further declares he did not drive the vehicle at the time of the subject incident, did not abandon his vehicle on the freeway, and did not entrust or permit anyone to use the vehicle on November 23-24 of 2022. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-8.) The Court notes that the incident occurred in 2019, according to the evidence, and not in 2022. Further, Sam Or’s declaration is notably vague as to when he returned to LAPD and CHP regarding the theft report. Defendants acknowledge that there is no evidence that any theft report was made in or around the time of the incident aside from Sam Or’s own self-serving declaration. Further, the copy of a TCR in Defendants’ supporting evidence does not demonstrate or otherwise reference that the vehicle was determined to be stolen. The Court finds that Defendants have not met their prima facie burden that they owed no duty to Plaintiff, because there is insufficient support that the vehicle was in fact stolen. 

Even if Defendants did meet their prima facie burden, there exists triable issues of material fact regarding Defendants’ credibility in this matter. The TCR contained in Defendants’ exhibit memorializes the collision between Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ vehicle, whereas the TCR provided in Plaintiffs’ exhibits memorializes the initial hit and run regarding Defendants’ vehicle. The TCR provided by Plaintiff states that on November 25, 2019, Officers Ruiz and Salcedo contacted Dylan Sot, the stepson of Sam Sot, at the address 11955 Molette St. in Norwalk. (Plf. Exh. 3, at p. 6.) Dylan Sot reported that neither Sam nor Tiffany were home, and Dylan Sot provided Sam Sot’s phone number. (Ibid.) The officers then left a collision card with Dylan Sot. (Ibid.) On November 27, 2019, an officer called Sam Sot at the number provided by Dylan Sot, and left a voicemail to inform him of the traffic collision. (Ibid.) The officer could not reach Sot after multiple attempts. (Ibid.) Further, Plaintiff provides evidence that the vehicle was not reported stolen until January 22, 2020, nearly two months after the incident. (Plf. Exh., 3.)  

A triable issue of fact is created when the evidence reasonably permits the trier of fact, under the applicable standard of proof, to find the purportedly contested fact in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) All doubts as to whether there are any triable issues of material fact are to be resolved in favor of the opposing party. (Zelda, Inc. v. Northland Ins. Co. (1997) 56 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1259.) In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court focuses on finding issues of fact, but does not resolve them; the court seeks to find contradictions in the evidence or inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence that raise a triable issue of material fact. (Trop v. Sony Pictures Ent., Inc. (2005) 129 Cal. App. 4th 1133, 1143.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the notable time gap of the theft report, and Defendants failure to follow-up with CHP officers’ multiple attempts to reach them, presents a triable issue of material fact as to the veracity of Defendants’ contention that the vehicle was stolen. Sam Or’s argument on reply to explain why he did not return the phone calls is vague and ambiguous, and does not defeat the fact that there exists a triable issue of Defendants’ credibility for a jury’s determination. (R. D. Reeder Lathing Co. v. Allen (1967) 66 Cal. 2d 373, 376 [The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to discover whether parties have evidence requiring assessment at a trial, and should not become a substitute for trial.].) 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative adjudication, is DENIED.  

Moving party is ordered to give notice.   

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: