SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 

 

B. Legal Standard - Workers’ Compensation as the Exclusive Remedy 

“ ‘The elements of a negligence cause of action are the existence of a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.  [Citation.] The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.’ [Citation.]”  (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)  As in any negligence action, whether a duty was owed under the facts is a question of law for the court.  (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213.)   

The Workers Compensation Act (“WCA”) governs compensation to employees for injuries incurred in the course and scope of their employment. (See Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4; Cal. Labor Code, § 3201; Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Compensation Insurance Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 810.) Compensation under the WCA is an employee’s exclusive remedy against an employer for injuries sustained out of and in the course of employment. (See Cal. Labor Code, §§ 3600(a), 3602(a).) Whether exclusivity bars a cause of action against an employer depends on whether the alleged injury falls within the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions. (Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at 811.) The exclusive remedy provisions apply only in cases of industrial personal injury or death. (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16.)  

Ordinarily, an employee's rights against his or her employer for on-the-job injuries lie solely under the workers' compensation law.  When the “conditions of compensation” are present (Lab.C. § 3600), the employer is immune from civil damages liability because workers' compensation is the injured employee's “exclusive remedy.”  (Lab.C. §§ 3600, 3601, 3602(a).)  “[T]he whole theory of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to put a burden in limited amounts upon employers for all industrially caused injuries and deaths regardless of fault, and concomitantly to take from employees ... the right of recovering any greater amounts even though the injury ... is tortiously caused by the employer. It is inherent in this system that the statutory recovery, whatever it may be, shall be allowed in every case to which the statute makes it applicable, and apparent hardship in individual cases to either employer, employee, or dependents ... must be disregarded in view of the social desirability of the system as a whole.”  (Blew v. Horner (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1380, 1389.)  

However, “it is important that “arising out of” and “in the course of” are two separate requirements. Even if it is conceded that an employee was injured while performing job tasks in the workplace during working hours, the exclusivity rule applies only if it also is shown that the work was a contributing cause of the injury.” (Cal. Lab. Code § 3600; Lee v. W. Kern Water Dist. (2016) 5 Cal. App. 5th 606, 625.) Although the two elements coexist concurrently, they are nonetheless often so intertwined that no valid line of demarcation can be drawn, so that in certain cases an injury has been considered to have occurred ‘in the course of employment’ because the employment was its cause. (Scott v. Pac. Coast Borax Co. (1956) 140 Cal. App. 2d 173, 178–79.) 

 

C.  Discussion 

Here, the undisputed material facts are as follows. Plaintiff worked for LAWA as an Information Systems Manager I, with the duty to manage and oversee all of the airport’s public safety and security systems. (UMF 5.) LAWA owns the Los Angeles World Airport, which is a department within the City. (UMF 4.) On March 2, 2021, Plaintiff was informed that the Los Angeles Airport Police was extending Covid-19 vaccinations to the IT Security & Public Safety Systems team directly responsible for the maintenance and support of Airport Police systems. (UMF 6.) Because Plaintiff’s work group supported the Airport Police, the vaccination shots were offered to Plaintiff and her group as Public Safety IT support employees. (Ibid.) On March 2, 2021, Plaintiff registered for an appointment to obtain a Covid-19 vaccination on March 4, 2021 at the Alverstone Trailers (“Trailers”). (UMF 7.) On March 4, 2021, after working from home in the morning, Plaintiff went to the Trailers. (UMF 8.) After she checked in, Plaintiff was directed to enter a trailer to obtain a vaccination, but tripped and fell on an object while on the way to the trailer entrance. (Ibid.) Defendants owned the Trailers and the walkway. (UMF 9.) The vaccination was provided for free and for the benefit of LAWA maintaining a functional employee base during the pandemic. (UMFs 11-12.) Plaintiff currently maintains a workers’ compensation action entitled Mandoyan v. City of Los Angeles, Workers' Compensation Appeals Board Action No. ADJ14376761. (UMF 13.) 

Defendants argue that workers’ compensation is Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy, because she was injured in the course of receiving a free vaccination supplied by her employer, and that Plaintiff is currently maintaining a worker’s compensation proceeding against Defendants. Because Plaintiff’s trip and fall arose on her employer’s premises and Plaintiff was there during business hours for a vaccine offered due to her employment, Defendants have met their prima facie burden that Plaintiff is barred from bringing a civil suit against them under the Workers Compensation Act. The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.  

Plaintiff contends that she received the vaccine on her free time, and that her vaccination was voluntary. Plaintiff avers she is not barred by the exclusivity doctrine because she was not obligated to get the vaccination as a condition of her employment, and that none of the cases cited by Defendants are applicable. Plaintiff avers that she was a business invitee, and not present on the grounds in an employee capacity.  

Even if Plaintiff was not directly injured by a vaccine, it is undisputed that the free vaccination was not offered to the general public as to make Plaintiff a general business invitee, but that she was only present on the premises because it was offered to her due to her employment. “Conduct is within the scope of employment if the injury is an outgrowth of the employment, the risk of injury is inherent in the workplace, or the injury is typical of or broadly incidental to the employer's enterprise.” (Robles v. Agreserves, Inc. (2016) 158 F. Supp. 3d 952, 974; Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Serv., Inc. (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 995, 1008.) Here, Plaintiff’s presence on the property was incidental to her employer’s enterprise of offering a free vaccination to certain employees due to the global pandemic. 

Plaintiff argues her injuries did not fall under the workers’ compensation scheme because the vaccination was not a condition precedent to her employment or a core duty, and distinguishes the facts of Maher v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 729 and Alander v. VacaValley Hosp. (1996) 49 Cal. App. 4th 1298 in this manner. However, this Court does not believe the holdings of Maher or Alander rest on the mandatory conditions of employment apparent in those cases. Plaintiff does not address Bell v. Macy’s California (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1141 as cited by the moving party, which involves voluntary medical treatment undergone by the plaintiff in that case. In fact, the case law in this area does not require anything other than the employment be a concurrent or contributory cause of the injury. (See Maher, 33 Cal.3d 729 at 736.) 

Here, Plaintiff tripped and fell on her way to receive the vaccination, not from the vaccination itself. "Though an injury to be compensable must arise out of the employment, that is, occur by reason of a condition or incident of employment, the injury need not be of a kind anticipated by the employer nor peculiar to the employment in the sense that it would not have occurred elsewhere." (Emp. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Acc. Comm'n (1953) 41 Cal. 2d 676, 679–80.) The relevant factor is that Plaintiff was not on her employer’s premises as a member of the public, but that it was incidental to her employment to take advantage of a health benefit offered exclusively to a class of employees. Workers’ compensation is an employee’s exclusive remedy when the employee obtains medical treatment from the employer under circumstances incidental to the employment relationship. (Jimenez v. Mrs. Gooch’s Natural Food Markets, Inc. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 645, 656.) “Where a reasonable doubt exists as to whether an act of an employee is contemplated by the employment, or as to whether an injury occurred in the course of the employment, section 3202 requires courts to resolve the doubt against the right of the employee to sue for civil damages and in favor of the applicability of the Compensation Act.” (Eckis v. Sea World Corp. (1976) 64 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7.) 

Plaintiff further argues Defendants have not developed their proposition that Plaintiff is estopped from bringing this civil action on the grounds that she had also filed a workers’ compensation action, and relies upon Lee v. West Kern Water Dist. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 606 in support thereof. Indeed, Plaintiff’s FAC does not plead any employment relationship, and there is no concession that Plaintiff was injured within the scope of the Workers’ Compensation Act. (Id. at 628 [“The pleading of one theory of recovery does not exclude another theory, even if the two are inconsistent.”].) However, Defendants provide in a footnote in reply that Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim has been resolved. [e.g. Busick v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 967, 972-973 [Under the doctrine of res judicata, a valid final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, if in favor of the plaintiff, merges the cause of action in the judgment. “ ‘Where the plaintiff obtains judgment for the payment of money against the defendant in an action to enforce one of two or more alternative remedies, he cannot thereafter maintain an action to enforce another of the remedies.’ “].) 

Defendants have met their prima facie burden that Plaintiff’s claim falls within the scope of workers’ compensation as her exclusive remedy. Plaintiff does not raise any triable issue of material fact.  

 

IV. CONCLUSION  

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.  

 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.