I. Background 

Plaintiffs Romero Brigarde and Benjamin Wilson (“Plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendants Felix Trinidad (“Trinidad), Mike’s Performance Exhaust (“MPE”), Miguel A. Vaca (“Miguel”), and Does 1 through 50 for damages arising from a motor vehicle v. pedestrian collision on August 24, 2021. Plaintiff filed amendments to complaint naming Team MPE, Inc. as Doe 1 and Candelaria Vaca as Doe 2.  

Plaintiffs allege they were customers of MPE and were waiting in the seating area designated for customers, when Trinidad rammed his car into the seating area, causing injury to both Plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-9.) MPE, a muffler shop, is alleged to be owned and operated by Miguel as a dba, and that it is not incorporated in any state. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs set forth three causes of action for (1) Negligence against all defendants, (2) Battery against Trinidad, and (3) Assault against Trinidad. 

 Defendants Miguel and Candelaria Vaca (collectively, “the Vacas”) now move for summary judgment against Plaintiffs’ sole cause of action against them for negligence.  

Plaintiffs oppose the motion, and the Vacas filed a reply.  

The Vacas aver they have been landlords of the property since 2001, and that the Vacas also operated MPE from 2001 to 2020. The Vacas assert that, in their 22 years as landlords of the property, Trinidad ramming his car into the property is the first time anyone has driven or rammed their car into the property. The Vacas argue they did not breach any duty to Plaintiffs, because Trinidad’s intentional assault and battery was an unforeseeable criminal/intentional act, and a superseding cause. The Vacas contend they are entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of lack of foreseeability. 

Plaintiffs argue they were required to sit in a fixed area designated for customers adjacent to the parking lot, and that it was foreseeable that a car may jump the curb and drive into the seating area. Plaintiffs contend the Vacas did not discuss the lack of curbs or wheel stops on the property, and that the purported lack of prior incidents alone is insufficient.  

The Vacas focus on the allegation that Trinidad intentionally rammed his vehicle into the property, and that a random act of violence is not foreseeable. The Vacas argue that there is no evidence that wheel stops would have prevented the intentional act of Trinidad, and that there were no prior incidents to place the Vacas on notice that additional measures may be necessary to protect invitees. 

II. Request for Judicial Notice 

The Vacas request the Court to take judicial notice of (1) the March 1, 2023 Stipulation and Order to continue trial, and (2) Plaintiff’s complaint filed in this action.  

Request 1 is denied because it is not relevant to any material issue. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422 fn. 2.)   

Request 2 is granted. (Evid. Code § 452(d).) 

Plaintiffs request the Corut to take judicial notice of the purchase price of concrete parking stop blocks. The request is denied.  

III. Evidentiary Objections 

The Vacas object to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s declaration. The Vacas did not number the objections. The Court will address each objection in the order presented. 

Objections 1-2 are overruled. Objections 3-5 are not material to the disposition of the motion, and thus the Court declines to rule on them. 

IV. Motion for Summary Judgment 

A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment.  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)    

The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if the party does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) 

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).) 

The Vacas move for summary judgment on the grounds that they had no duty to Plaintiff because of the wrongful acts of Trinidad, who intentionally rammed his vehicle into the building.  

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence:¿duty, breach, causation, and damages.¿ (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)¿Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.¿ (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.)¿If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for [customers’] their use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.”¿(Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.)¿The existence and scope of a property owner’s duty are legal questions for the court.¿(Annocki, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th¿ at p. 36.)¿ 

A landowner’s liability for injuries to person on the property depends on the balancing of a number of factors, particularly the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant, and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.¿ (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1145.)¿ “‘[A] duty to take affirmative action to control the wrongful acts of a third party will be imposed only where such conduct can be reasonably anticipated.’”¿ (Sakai v. Massco Investments, LLC (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1187-88.)¿ 

Here, it is undisputed that the Vacas were the landlords of the property on August 24, 2021, and that Plaintiffs were customers of MPE on that day. It is also undisputed that Trinidad intentionally ran his vehicle into the property. Miguel Vaca declares that there have been no prior incidents of a person driving or ramming their vehicle into the property in the 22 years the Vacas have been landlords and/or tenants of the property. (Vaca Decl. ¶ 7.) 

The Vacas have met their prima facie burden that it had no duty to Plaintiffs to prevent the intentional conduct of Trinidad ramming his car into the property. The burden thus shifts to Plaintiffs to demonstrate an issue of material fact.  

Among the cases cited by Plaintiffs, the Court finds Jefferson v. Qwik Korner Mkt., Inc. (1994) 28 Cal. App. 4th 990 to be the most relevant. The Jefferson court analyzed California law pertaining to cars negligently coming onto sidewalks of businesses and identified three distinct categories. In the first category, “[t]he majority have concluded there is no liability because such accidents are insufficiently likely as a matter of law.” (Id. at 993.) In the second category, “the defendants had knowledge of prior similar incidents, and therefore the accidents were deemed foreseeable even when there was some type of barrier.” (Id. at 994.) Lastly, the third category “consists of cases where the building design required customers to await service by standing adjacent to a parking lot or driveway. In effect, if a car jumped the curb, there was a high likelihood that a pedestrian would be at the location.” (Id. at 995.)  

Here, the third category in Jefferson is imputed because Plaintiffs argue they were required to wait for service at a fixed area adjacent to the parking lot, which increased the likelihood of being hit by a car. It is well-established policy that a landlord is not the insurer of public safety and cannot protect a customer from every imaginable incident. (Id. at 996.) However, there may be a question of fact as to whether the business was required to provide a more substantial barrier if the plaintiff was directed to await service at a fixed location adjacent to a parking area. (Barker v. Wah Low (1971) 19 Cal. App. 3d 710.) On this rationale, the Jefferson court concluded no liability under the factual circumstances of that matter, because the business there provided both curb and wheel stops, the parking lot design was typical and met all city standards and regulations, there were no prior similar incidents, and nothing required customers to remain in a fixed location adjacent to the parking area.  (Jefferson, supra, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 996.) However, as argued by Plaintiffs, the Jefferson case is distinguishable from the facts presented here, because Plaintiffs contend there were neither wheel stops nor curbs, and that they were required to remain in a fixed location adjacent to the parking lot. Regardless of whether the conduct of the third party was intentional or negligent, the potential act of a person running their vehicle into the customer waiting area must be “sufficiently likely before it may be foreseeable in the legal sense.” (Ibid. [emphasis original].) Under the factual circumstances, whether the incident was “sufficiently likely” to occur regardless of no history of prior incidents, is a question for a trier of fact to determine. Drawing inferences in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court is unable to conclude that the Vacas here are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the grounds of lack of foreseeability.  

V. Conclusion  

Based on the foregoing, the Vacas’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.   

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

Dated this 23rd day of February 2024