SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 

 

 

I. Background 

On November 2, 2021, Plaintiff Jonathan Ascencio (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier LLC, Rasier-CA-LLC, Charter Communications, Inc., and John E. Roche for injuries arising from a motor vehicle incident. Trial is currently set for January 17, 2024. 

At this time, Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier LLC, Rasier-CA-LLC (“Uber”) move to disqualify Los Angeles City Law, APLC (“LACL”) from their representation of Plaintiff due to a conflict of interest concerning LACL attorney Nanette Reed, Esq. (“Reed”), who Uber asserts Reed had previously defended Uber in 93 personal automobile liability and/or personal injury matters.  

Defendant John E. Roche (“Roche”) joins Uber’s motion.  

Plaintiff opposes the motion, and Uber filed a reply. 

 

II. Evidentiary Objection 

Uber submits 8 objections to the Declaration of Deborah Wolfe (“Wolfe”). The Court sustains objection 1 as to the entirety of Wolfe’s declaration, and therefore need not rule on objections 2-8. 

 

III. Motion to Disqualify Counsel (Successive Representation) 

The court has inherent power to control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every manner pertaining thereto.  (CCP § 128(a)(5).)  This includes the power to disqualify counsel in appropriate cases.  (In re Complex Asbestos Litig. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 572, 575; In re Marriage of Zimmerman (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 556, 562 [“Disqualification of counsel may be ordered ‘when necessary in furtherance of justice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(5).)’”].)  “… The paramount concern must be to preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar. The important right to counsel of one's choice must yield to ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our judicial process.”  (Kirk v. First American Title Ins. Co. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 776, 791-792.)   

“Motions to disqualify counsel are especially prone to tactical abuse because disqualification imposes heavy burdens on both the clients and courts: clients are deprived of their chosen counsel, litigation costs inevitably increase and delays inevitably occur. As a result, these motions must be examined ‘carefully to ensure that literalism does not deny the parties substantial justice.’ [Citation] At the same time, we recognize that disqualification of counsel is necessary under certain circumstances, to protect the integrity of our judicial process by enforcing counsel's duties of confidentiality and loyalty. [Citations.]”  (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 17, 23 fn. omitted.)   

In ruling on a motion to disqualify, the court should weigh: (1) the party's right to counsel of choice; (2) the attorney's interest in representing a client; (3) the financial burden on a client of change of counsel; (4) any tactical abuse underlying a disqualification motion; and (5) the principal that the fair resolution of disputes requires vigorous representation of parties by independent counsel. (Mills Land & Water Co. v. Golden West Refining Co. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 116, 126.)  Whether an attorney should be disqualified is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (Henriksen v. Great American Savings & Loan (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 109, 113.) 

Concerning an attorney’s ethical duties to a former client, California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.9 provides in part:  

 

(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's* interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed written consent.* 

 

(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly* represent a person* in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm* with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client 

 

(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person;* and 

 

(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; 

unless the former client gives informed written consent.* 

 

(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm* has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: 

 

(1) use information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6 acquired by virtue of the representation of the former client to the disadvantage of the former client except as these rules or the State Bar Act would permit with respect to a current client, or when the information has become generally known;* or 

 

(2) reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6 acquired by virtue of the representation of the former client except as these rules or the State Bar Act permit with respect to a current client. 

 

“‘It is well settled that an attorney is prohibited from doing either of two things after severing a relationship with a former client. . . . He may not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any manner in which he formerly represented him nor may he at any time use against his former client knowledge or information acquired by virtue of the previous relationship.’”  (In re Marriage of Zimmerman (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 556, 562 (quoting People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 150, 155) (internal quotation marks omitted).)  “The purpose of the rule is to protect both confidential communications and the enduring confidential relationship between attorney and client.”  (Id.)   

“In successive representation cases, disqualification of counsel is warranted under two situations: (1) the attorney in fact has adverse confidential information or (2) the attorney's acquisition of confidential information is presumed because the prior and present cases are substantially related.”  (Beltran v. Aven Products, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2012) 867 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1077, citing H.F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Salomon Bros., Inc. (1991)229 Cal.App.3d 1445, 1452, and Faughn v. Perez (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 592, 603.)   

The law states that “[d]isqualification in cases of successive representation is based on the prohibition against ‘employment adverse to a…former client where, by reason of the representation of the…former client, the [attorney] has obtained confidential information material to the employment.’”  (See H.F. Ahmanson & Company v. Salomon Brothers, Inc. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1445, 1451.)  Furthermore, “[w]here … the potential conflict arises from an attorney's successive representation of clients with potentially adverse interests, and the primary value at stake is therefore client confidentiality, the correct legal standard generally requires disqualification of the attorney if “the [former] client demonstrate[s] a “substantial relationship” between the subjects of the antecedent and current representations.’ [Citation.]”  (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 161 [emphasis in original]; see also Flatt v. Superior Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275, 283 [“[W]here a former client seeks to have a previous attorney disqualified from serving as counsel to a successive client in litigation adverse to the interests of the first client, the governing test requires that the client demonstrate a ‘substantial relationship’ between the subjects of the antecedent and current representations.”].)  Concerning confidential information, the attorney's possession of confidential information “will be presumed only when ‘a substantial relationship has been shown to exist between the former representation and the current representation, and when it appears by virtue of the nature of the former representation or the relationship of the attorney to his former client confidential information material to the current dispute would normally have been imparted to the attorney.’”  (Id. at 1452.) 

In applying the “substantial relationship” test, the court should consider three factors: “(1) factual similarities between the two representations, (2) similarities in legal issues, and (3) the nature and extent of the attorney's involvement with the case and whether he was in a position to learn of the client's policy or strategy.”  (Adams v. Aerojet-General Corp. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1332.)  “The subject of a current representation is substantially related to the subject of a prior representation only if the issues are sufficiently similar to support a reasonable inference that the attorney in the course of the prior representation was likely to have obtained confidential information material to the current representation.”  (See Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 50, 67 [court concluded that disqualification “based on the prior representation of a party in a substantially related matter is not warranted”].) 

“Where the requisite substantial relationship between the subjects of the prior and the current representations can be demonstrated, access to confidential information by the attorney in the course of the first representation (relevant, by definition, to the second representation) is presumed and disqualification of the attorney's representation of the second client is mandatory; indeed, the disqualification extends vicariously to the entire firm.”  (Flatt v. Superior Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275, 283; see also In re Charlisse C., 45 Cal.4th at 161 [Through the rule of “vicarious disqualification,” this rule has been extended to require disqualification of a disqualified attorney's entire law firm].)   

“However … in the proper circumstances, the presumption is a rebuttable one, which can be refuted by evidence that ethical screening will effectively prevent the sharing of confidences in a particular case.”  (California Self-Insurers’ Security Fund v. Superior Court (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1065, 1076.)  “ ‘We do not doubt that vicarious disqualification is the general rule, and that we should presume knowledge is imputed to all members of a tainted attorney's law firm. However, we conclude that, in the proper circumstances, the presumption is a rebuttable one, which can be refuted by evidence that ethical screening will effectively prevent the sharing of confidences in a particular case.’ [Citation.]”  (Ibid.)   

Thus, although it is “firmly established that where the attorney is disqualified from representation due to an ethical conflict, the disqualification extends to the entire firm,” there is a “recognized ‘limited exception to this conclusive presumption in the rare instance where the lawyer can show that there was no opportunity for confidential information to be divulged.’ … ‘[T]o apply the remedy of disqualification ‘when there is no realistic chance that confidences were disclosed would go far beyond the purpose’ of the substantial relationship test.’ ”  (Goldberg v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 752, 760.)   

 

IV. Discussion 

Here, Uber asserts that Reed is an attorney who formerly represented Uber and obtained confidential and privileged information by virtue of her prior representation of Uber. Uber avers Reed became the handling attorney for this matter on behalf of LACL on or about May 23, 2023. Reed was formerly a partner at Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman and Dicker, wherein Reed directly represented Uber for a period of three years in personal injury motor vehicle accident claims. Uber attests that Reed served as Uber’s defense counsel on 93 personal automobile liability and/or personal injury matters, which Uber contends was significant, detailed, and substantial. Reed had previously billed 3,182 hours over the course of her representation of Uber for similar claims now brought against Uber. Reed had also represented Uber on cases wherein LACL, Plaintiff’s current counsel, was on the opposing side, and Reed now stands in an adverse position against her former client Uber with no ethical screening. Uber contends Reed has knowledge of Uber’s privileged and confidential information, including strategies concerning defense of vicarious liability claims. In support thereof, Uber submits the declarations of Tracey Angelopoulos (“Angelopoulos”), Peter Schulz (“Schulz”), and David Eisen (“Eisen”), 

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that Reed never represented Uber in this matter and that, at most, Reed may have obsolete “playbook” information because it has been more than 2 years since Reed has represented Uber. Plaintiff argues Reed’s previous representation of Uber in personal injury motor vehicle cases is not substantially related to the present case because it is a superficial similarity. On May 10, 2023, Reed appeared at mediation on behalf of LACL against Uber, and Plaintiff avers Uber had no objection to Reed’s participation at the time and therefore waived its right to object to Reed’s representation of clients against Uber. Further, Plaintiff contends that Uber waited six weeks after to raise the issue in a June 20, 2023 letter regarding Reed, and allege Uber seeks to force Plaintiff to obtain new counsel on the eve of trial. In support thereof, Plaintiff submits the declaration of Reed. Plaintiff also submits the declaration of Ryan S. Little (“Little”), who makes no statements, and instead refers to two exhibits of letters dated June 20, 2023, and June 30, 2023, none of which were attached to his declaration. Lastly, Plaintiff submits the declaration of Wolfe, which the Court sustained Uber’s objections to in its entirety; the Court will not consider Wolfe’s declaration. 

Uber, in reply, argues Reed extensively represented Uber in numerous automobile accident cases exactly like the matter here, and that it is impossible for Reed to not have had access to confidential and attorney-client privileged information when she had over 3,100 hours of billing on Uber cases. Uber contends Reed should be presumed to have gained confidential information during her representation of Uber, and that Uber is unable to specifically identify the specific confidential policies, records, or communications because due to confidentiality obligations. Uber submits the declarations of Beth Golub and Michael Rogaski; the Court will not consider new information on reply.   

Uber submits one copy of the complaint for Holly Hesketh v. Uber Techs. Inc., Case No. 30-2017-00903976-CU-PA-CJC, wherein Reed represented Uber as defense counsel and Plaintiff’s counsel on this matter was the same as on the Hesketh matter. (Decl. Angelopoulos, ¶5, ¶7; Exh. 2.) No copy of the complaint on Cheyenne Petrich, et al. v. Uber Technologies. Inc. et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-02133-CJC-SK was submitted. Nevertheless, the Hesketh matter involved an automobile incident, whereas the Hesketh plaintiffs set forth a single cause of action for negligence, alleging the driver in the underlying incident was employed by Uber. By comparison, Plaintiff in this current matter before the Court sets forth two causes of action for negligence and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, alleging Defendant Roche was working under the direct supervision and control of Uber at the time of the incident. 

 

According to Flatt, a “substantial relationship” exists whenever the “subjects” of the prior and the current representations are linked in some rational manner. (Ibid.) In the lexicon of the law, the words “subject” and “subject matter” mean more than the strict facts, claims, and issues involved in a particular action.  

 

. . . 

 

We therefore ascribe to the word “subjects” (Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 283, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 885 P.2d 950) a broader definition than the discrete legal and factual issues involved in the compared representations. We consider the “subject” of a representation as including information material to the evaluation, prosecution, settlement or accomplishment of the litigation or transaction given its specific legal and factual issues. Thus, successive representations will be “substantially related” when the evidence before the trial court supports a rational conclusion that information material to the evaluation, prosecution, settlement or accomplishment of the former representation given its factual and legal issues is also material to the evaluation, prosecution, settlement or accomplishment of the current representation given its factual and legal issues.) 

 

(Jessen v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at 711-13.) 

 

Uber contends that Reed represented it in matters relating to personal injuries substantially similar to the claims made by Plaintiff in this action. The Court reviewed the evidence submitted by Uber, namely the single complaint submitted for the Hesketh matter. Other than being a personal injury case involving Uber to the extent that Uber is alleged to have employed or negligently hired or supervised the driver involved in the collision, Uber does not show this matter is similar to matter currently pending in this department.  Thus, while Defendant’s evidence shows there may be similar legal issues between this matter and the previous cases Reed was involved in handling, Uber does not point to specific factual allegations, other than the broad allegations in the one other complaint, showing that this case is substantially related to the subject of any of Reed’s prior representations of Uber. (Adams, 86 Cal.App.4th at 1332.)   

Although Uber has not submitted enough evidence to demonstrate there is a substantial factual relationship between this case and Reed’s prior representations of Uber, Uber may still demonstrate that the nature and extent of Reed’s prior representation of Uber put her in a position to learn of Uber’s relevant policies or strategy, and moreover, if relevant confidential information was actually provided from Uber to Reed.  (See Jessen v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at 711 [“[T]he court must assess whether the attorney was positioned during the first representation so as to make it likely the attorney acquired confidential information relevant to the current representation, given the similarities or lack of similarities between the two.”]; see also Adams, 86 Cal.App.4th at 1332.)  

However, “Possession of confidential information will not be presumed from the mere fact counsel once represented the opposing party.”  (Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 301 [footnote omitted].)  An attorney, generally, may act adversely to a former client in an unrelated matter, and without the use of confidential information acquired while representing the former client, (Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey (1932) 216 Cal. 564, 573-74), and thus nothing prohibits an attorney “from accepting employment adverse to a former client if the matter has no relationship to confidential information acquired by reason of or in the course of employment by the former client.”  (Goldstein v. Lees (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 614, 619.)  To create a conflict requiring disqualification, “the information acquired during the first representation [must] be ‘material’ to the second; that is, it must be found to be directly at issue in, or have some critical importance to, the second representation.”  (Farris v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 671, 680.)   

Plaintiff does not dispute that Reed represented Uber in 93 cases from July 2018 to July 2020, or that Reed billed 3,182.1 hours of time working on Uber matters during this period. Regarding whether Reed learned any confidential information pertaining to Uber during her representations, Angelopoulos, who was Uber’s Senior Counsel for Safety & Insurance Litigation, attests that since Angelopoulos began working at Uber from July 2018 to July 2020, Reed was a Partner at Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman and Dicker and Reed represented Uber and its subsidiaries as lead counsel in personal injury lawsuits. (Angelopoulos Decl. ¶ 4.) Reed represented Uber in approximately 93 personal injury matters, all of which involved claims that Uber was vicariously liable for the alleged conduct of independent drivers using the Uber platform. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.)  

Schulz attests that on March 16, 2021, the District Court on the Cheyenne Petrich, et al. v. Uber Technologies. Inc. et al (Case No. 2:20-cv-02133-CJC-SK) matter issued an order granting Uber’s request to substitute Schulz as counsel on behalf of Uber instead of Reed, who withdrew from the matter. (Schulz Decl. ¶¶3-4.) Schulz requested Reed to transfer the full and complete copy of the entire Petrich matter. Schulz declares the file materials received from Reed demonstrate that Reed personally authored almost all the email correspondence and communications with Uber on issues related to pleadings, strategies for dispositive motions, discovery, jurisdictional questions raised by the pleadings, analysis and evaluation of settlement demands, strategies relating to settlement negotiations, pleading and theories of defense. (Id. at ¶6.) 

Lastly, Eisen, a partner and Western Regional Managing Partner with Reed’s former firm Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman and Dicker attests he personally reviewed the business records maintained by Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman and Dicker of all Uber legal matters for which Reed entered billable hours from the years 2018-2022, amounting to 3,182.1 hours. (Eisen Decl. ¶4; Exh. 1.) 

 Plaintiff, however, argues Reed’s prior representations are not substantially related just because it involved claims of the same type of motor vehicle accidents against Uber, and that at most, Reed may have been exposed to Uber’s “playbook” information, which does not warrant disqualification. An attorney’s “exposure to playbook information in prior … cases” is insufficient to disqualify the attorney without any showing of the information’s materiality to current representation.  (See Khain v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 916, 922.)  “To create a conflict requiring disqualification, … the information acquired during the first representation [must] be “material” to the second; that is, it must be found to be directly at issue in, or have some critical importance to, the second representation.”  (Farris, 119 Cal.App.4th at 680.)  “Thus, for example, the attorney's acquisition during the first representation of general information about the first client's ‘overall structure and practices’ would not of itself require disqualification unless it were found to be ‘material’—i.e., directly in issue or of critical importance—in the second representation. [Citation] The same is true about information such as the first client's ‘litigation philosophy’ or ‘key decision makers.’”  (Ibid.)  Consequently, general playbook information can warrant disqualification if the information is material to the second representation.   

Uber specifically contends that Reed’s prior Uber cases provided Reed access to, and provided intimate knowledge, of Uber’s internal policies, procedures, litigation strategies, and highly confidential records and business information because Reed directly participated in countless written and verbal communications protected by the attorney-client privilege. (Angelopoulos Decl. ¶7.) Moreover, Reed’s representation of Uber on the Petrich matter involved work-product on issues related to pleadings, strategies for dispositive motions, discovery, jurisdictional questions raised by the pleadings, analysis and evaluation of settlement demands, strategies relating to settlement negotiations, pleading and theories of defense. (Schulz Decl. ¶6.) The Court is not persuaded by Reed’s declaration that no conflict exists just because she never defended Uber at trial or any Uber employee for any PMQ/PMK deposition (Reed Decl. ¶6), when it is undisputed that she has worked extensively on Uber related cases involving claims against Uber for motor vehicle personal injury amounting to 3,182.1 hours. The Court is also not persuaded that Uber has waived objections to Reed’s involvement, when Reed attests she began working for LACL on February 13, 2023, and concedes that on May 10, 2023, she appeared at a mediation adverse to Uber. Even if Uber’s in-house counsel did not make any objections to Reed’s participation in the matter, Uber met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel promptly thereafter, upon learning of Reed’s involvement.  

 

Although Plaintiff argues that Reed has only playbook information concerning Uber, if at all, Uber’s evidence shows that the information is directly relevant to the current case. Reed’s knowledge of Uber’s policies, procedures, in addition to Uber’s strategies relating to its settlement negotiations, pleading and theories of defense are confidential and material to this litigation. (See Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.9 comment 1 [“The lawyer may not (i) do anything that will injuriously affect the former client in any matter in which the lawyer represented the former client, or (ii) at any time use against the former client knowledge or information acquired by virtue of the previous relationship.”].) 

The Court must next address whether Reed’s conflicts are imputed to LACL.  Although disqualification is generally extended vicariously to the entire law firm, disqualification is not absolute and may be rebutted if the evidence shows that an ethical wall can prevent the sharing of confidential information.  (See Kirk, 183 Cal.App.4th at 809-10; see also Goldberg v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 752, 755 [“an attorney's presumed possession of confidential information concerning a former client should not automatically cause the attorney's former firm to be vicariously disqualified where the evidence establishes that no one other than the departed attorney had any dealings with the client or obtained confidential information…”].)  “Once the moving party in a motion for disqualification has established that an attorney is tainted with confidential information, a rebuttable presumption arises that the attorney shared that information with the attorney's law firm. The burden then shifts to the challenged law firm to establish ‘that the practical effect of formal screening has been achieved.’ ”  (Kirk, 183 Cal.App.4th at 809-10, footnote omitted.)   

 

The specific elements of an effective screen will vary from case to case, although two elements are necessary: First, the screen must be timely imposed; a firm must impose screening measures when the conflict first arises. It is not sufficient to wait until the trial court imposes screening measures as part of its order on the disqualification motion. (Klein v. Superior Court, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at pp. 906, 913–914, 244 Cal.Rptr. 226; see also Hitachi, Ltd. v. Tatung Co. (N.D.Cal.2006) 419 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1165 [“The time to have moved the matter [to another office] would have been when the ethical conflict was discovered, not after losing a motion to disqualify.”].) Second, it is not sufficient to simply produce declarations stating that confidential information was not conveyed or that the disqualified attorney did not work on the case; an effective wall involves the imposition of preventive measures to guarantee that information will not be conveyed. (SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 1142, 1151–1152 & fn. 5, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 980 P.2d 371.) “To avoid inadvertent disclosures and establish an evidentiary record, a memorandum should be circulated warning the legal staff to isolate the [tainted] individual from communications on the matter and to prevent access to the relevant files.” 

 

“The typical elements of an ethical wall are: [1] physical, geographic, and departmental separation of attorneys; [2] prohibitions against and sanctions for discussing confidential matters; [3] established rules and procedures preventing access to confidential information and files; [4] procedures preventing a disqualified attorney from sharing in the profits from the representation; and [5] continuing education in professional responsibility.” … 

 

(Id. at 810-11, footnote omitted.)   

 

In this case, the information Reed obtained from Uber is material to this litigation.  In arguing that Reed’s knowledge of that information should not be imputed to LACL, Plaintiff contends that disqualification of Reed would mean that LACL could never sue Uber again as long as it employs Reed. This argument is without merit. Reed’s employment by LACL does not instantly disqualify LACL from ever representing clients with adverse interests to Uber – this is the purpose of a formal screening to create an ethical wall preventing the sharing of confidential information. There is no demonstration that LACL attempted to implement any stringent firewalls concerning the sharing of its files in its law firm from attorneys who are conflicted from participating in certain cases, nor is there any argument that Reed did not have access to the file for this action. Further, Plaintiff does not describe any ethical walls in place at LACL or additional preventative measures that establish that Reed was timely screened from disclosing confidential information to other attorneys at LACL.  (See Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rue 1.10(a)(2).)   

Plaintiff does not rebut the presumption that all knowledge is imputed to all members of a tainted attorney’s law firm.  Again, Plaintiff’s argument that Reed’s employment with LACL would effectively be a lifetime ban on LACL from suing Uber ever again is unavailing. Had LACL timely instituted ethical walls and the imposition of prophylactic measures, the Court’s analysis in this respect might possibly differ.  Moreover, “[a] motion to disqualify a party's counsel raises several important interests. … ‘The paramount concern must be to preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar.’ ”  (California Self-Insurers’ Security Fund, 19 Cal.App.5th at 1071.)  Under the circumstances presented in this case, disqualification is appropriate.    

 

Based on the foregoing, Uber’s motion to disqualify LACL is GRANTED.  LACL is disqualified from representing Plaintiff in this action.  Discovery remains stayed pending Plaintiff’s retention of new counsel. The Court vacates the Final Status Conference and Trial dates, and sets an OSC re: status of Plaintiff’s representation on _________________.