I. Background 

Plaintiff Martha A. Estrada (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendant Walmart Supercenter, Inc. for damages arising from allegations that it failed to provide consumers adequate care while on the premises. (Compl. at p. 5.) Plaintiff sets forth two causes of action for premises liability and general negligence. On September 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal of the premises liability claim only, which was entered on September 28, 2023.  

Defendant Walmart Inc., erroneously sued as Walmart Supercenter, Inc., (“Defendant”) now moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s sole cause of action for general negligence on the grounds that it owed Plaintiff no duty. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and Defendant filed a reply. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s verified response to written discovery clarified the basis of her complaint against it, which is premised on the lack of assistance when she had told Defendant’s employees that she was disabled and unable to stand for a long period of time. Defendant argues it had no legal duty to respond to Plaintiff’s request for a product or service within any set amount of time when Plaintiff entered Defendant’s store to purchase doggy pads. 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant had a duty to protect or aid Plaintiff, who had Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (“CRPS”). Plaintiff contends a special relationship existed because she asked for a chair to sit on due to her CRPS flare-up, and Defendant’s employees failed to provide her any accommodation.  

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s authority relies on a misapplication of common law duty. Defendant reasserts that it owed no duty to Plaintiff, and that the harm was not foreseeable.  

II. Request for Judicial Notice 

Defendant requests the Court to take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s complaint filed in this action.  

The request is granted. (Evid. Code § 452(d).) 

III. Motion for Summary Judgment 

A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment.  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)    

The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if the party does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) 

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).) 

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages.”  (Johnson v. Prasad (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 74, 78.) ¿Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.¿ (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) 

A landowner’s liability for injuries to person on the property depends on the balancing of a number of factors, particularly the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant, and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.¿ (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1145.)¿  

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff entered the Walmart store at 1275 N. Azusa Ave. in Covina as a patron. In response to Defendant’s special interrogatory requesting Plaintiff to state all facts in support of her contention that Defendant was negligent or caused the incident, Plaintiff responded as follows: 

“Responding party entered Defendant’s store to purchase doggy pads on the day of the INCIDENT. The doggy pads were behind an anti-theft protective glass. Responding party asked Defendant’s employee to retrieve the doggy pads for her purchase. Responding party told defendant’s employees that she was disabled and could not stand for a long period of time. Defendant’s employees walked away. Responding party experienced radiating back pain as she waited for Defendant’s employee to return.  

Responding party walked to other Defendant employees, told them about her disability, and asked for help. Responding party told Defendant’s employee her back was hurting and she could not stand long. Defendant’s employee did not help Responding party.  

Responding party walked to Defendant’s cashier for help. Responding party told cashier she had been waiting a long time to buy the doggie pads. She told the cashier she was disabled and she felt like she was going to lose function of her legs. The cashier did not help Responding party. Responding party continued to experience back pain radiating to her legs. She sat down near the cashier and lost function of her legs.” 

(Def. Exh. 2.) 

Civil Code §1714(a) provides, “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” Defendant avers that it owed no duty to provide Plaintiff with prompt service, and that there is no exception to the general duty of Civil Code §1714 because the harm was not foreseeable. Defendant asserts it was not reasonably foreseeable that a delay in service would result in injury to a patron, and that there is no moral blame to its conduct because Plaintiff had the option of shopping elsewhere instead of waiting.  

Defendant has met its prima facie burden that it had no duty to Plaintiff, and that the harm suffered was not foreseeable. The burden thus shifts to Plaintiffs to demonstrate an issue of material fact.  

In opposition, Plaintiff argues Defendant had a duty to take reasonable action to protect or aid Plaintiff when she asked for a chair to sit on to control her CRPS flare-up. However, according to the evidence provided by Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s testimony demonstrates that at no point prior to her legs giving out did Plaintiff request a chair or any sitting accommodation, nor did she ever specify the details of her condition until after the fact with the cashier. Plaintiff testified she did not tell the first associate, whom she initially requested assistance from to retrieve the item from the lockbox, that she was disabled. (Plf. Exh. 3; Plf. Depo. 20:20-25.) After speaking to the first associate, she waited for “20 minutes or so” (Id. at 19:16-20) before going out of the aisle to look for somebody else (Id. at 21:1-11). At this point, she felt her back hurting and legs tingling. (Id. at 21:12-20.) She then told a second associate that “‘I’m disabled, I’m not feeling well,’” and that she could not be standing up for a long time. (Id. at 22:1-6, 23:25; 23:1-4.) The second associate left and came back, telling Plaintiff that somebody was on their way. (Id. at 23:5-7.) Plaintiff waited another 15 minutes and told a couple of other associates across from her that she is disabled and requested someone to open the lock. (Id. at 23:17-25, 24:1-4.) Those associates stated that it was not their department, and Plaintiff did not specify her disability. (Id. at 24:4-9.) Plaintiff then left and walked to the front of the store, went the cashier, and sat on the bagging area. (Id. at 24:12-24.) At this point, Plaintiff told the cashier that when her disability acts up, that it causes her legs to go out. (Id. at 25:1-6.) Plaintiff told the cashier at the front that she had CRPS. (Id. at 121:5-9.) 

Under common law duty of care, “[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done.” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 434.) “In general, each person has a duty to act with reasonable care under the circumstances.” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619.)  “Whether a defendant owed a duty of care to an injured plaintiff is a question of law, and the existence of a duty depends on the foreseeability of the risk and a weighing of policy considerations for and against imposition of liability.” (Romero v. Superior Court, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at 1080.) “Such a duty may arise, however, if ‘(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection.’” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203, quoting Rest.2d. Torts (1965) § 315.) Special relationships exist, for example, between businesses and their patrons (Verdugo v. Target Corp., supra, 59 Cal.4th 312) or landowners and their invitees (Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen (1946) 27 Cal.2d 802, 810). Facts supporting the existence of a special relationship must be alleged. (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 536.) 

Here, Plaintiff relies primarily on Verdugo v. Target Corp., supra, 59 Cal.4th 312 to argue the existence of a special relationship. The Court finds Verdugo distinguishable from the facts presented here. In Verdugo, the decedent was shopping at a Target store when she suffered a sudden cardiac arrest and collapsed. Paramedics arrived within several minutes, but were unable to revive the decedent. At issue was whether there was a common law duty to acquire and make available an automatic external defibrillator (AED), and whether the language of Health and Safety Code section 1797.196 and Civil Code section 1714.21 precluded the court from determining whether there was this common law duty. (Id. at 326.) As a general rule, “‘[u]nless expressly provided, statutes should not be interpreted to alter the common law, and should be construed to avoid conflict with common law rules.’”. (Id. citing to California Assn. of Health Facilities v. Dep't of Health Servs. (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 284, 297.) As framed by the complaint, “Defendants, and each of them, were negligent and careless in that they failed to provide consumer(s) the adequate care while on their premises.” (Compl. at p. 5.) Plaintiff’s theory of liability against Defendant does not involve cardiac arrest or availability of an AED, nor does the complaint allege any specific statutory or regulatory violation by Defendant to create a duty of care.  

Indeed, “past California cases have recognized that a business may have a duty, under the common law, to take reasonable action to protect or aid patrons who sustain an injury or suffer an illness while on the business's premises, including “undertak[ing] relatively simple measures such as providing ‘assistance [to] their customers who become ill or need medical attention....’ ” [Citations]. (Id. at 312.) However, the cases cited by the Verdugo court in relation to this recognition are distinguishable from the facts presented here: Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224 [assault of patron in a bar parking lot], Breaux v. Gino's, Inc. (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 379 [wrongful death arising from choking on food at a restaurant; appellate court affirmed that defendant restaurant had no duty to assist patron in dislodging food stuck in throat, and that its legal duty was met by summoning medical assistance in a reasonable time], De Vera v. Long Beach Pub. Transportation Co. (1986) 180 Cal. App. 3d 782 [common carrier owing duty to passengers to facilitate claim against third party].  

As already stated, the factual circumstances presented here does not involve cardiac arrest, third party criminal assault, common carrier duties, or any other factually similar circumstances examined in Verdugo, supra, 59 Cal.4th 312. The crux of Plaintiff’s action against Defendant is that its employees did not take precautionary steps, prior to or during the occurrence of her CPRS flare-up, to provide a chair. However, Plaintiff never requested a chair. Plaintiff stated generally that she had a disability, but did not go into any detail of her specific condition nor did she ever request any seating accommodation. “[I]n any analysis of foreseeability, the emphasis must be on the specific, rather than more general, facts of which a defendant was or should have been aware.” (Pamela W. v. Millsom (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 950, 957.) Assertions that are “wholly conclusory” need not be treated as true. (Melton v. Boustred, (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 536.) “Foreseeability, when analyzed to determine the existence or scope of a duty, is a question of law to be decided by the court.” (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 678, disapproved of on other grounds by Reid v. Google (2010) 50 Cal.4th 510.) Here, the Court finds it unforeseeable that Plaintiff’s pre-existing medical condition would occur, especially when Plaintiff failed to request any specific accommodation until after the injury in fact had already occurred. “The most important factor to consider in determining whether to create an exception to the general duty to exercise ordinary care . . . is whether the injury in question was foreseeable.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1145.) Nothing obligated Plaintiff to continue to stand and wait in the area while she felt her condition continue to worsen. To hold Defendant liable for Plaintiff’s medical flare-up due to foreseeability, Defendant would have to have known of the specific injury Plaintiff would suffer because of CPRS, and of this specific condition’s probable imminence. Plaintiff stating generally that she had a disability and that she cannot stand for very long is insufficient.  

IV. Conclusion  

Based on the foregoing, the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.   

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

Dated this 6th day of March 2024