SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 

 

 

I. Background 

Plaintiffs, Benjamin Rabbanian, a minor, and Nathan Rabbanian (“Nathan”), a minor, by and through their Guardian Ad Litem, Hourash Khazan, (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendant Igor Lopatonok (“Defendant”) for damages arising from a dog bite. 

Plaintiffs move for trial preference pursuant to CCP §36(b). Defendant opposes the motion, and Plaintiffs filed a reply. 

Defendant moves to continue the trial date to October 15, 2024 and extend discovery cut-off/reopen discovery to August 1, 2024, in addition to a request for the Court to set a mandatory settlement conference (MSC). Trial is currently set for March 29, 2024. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, and Defendant filed a reply. 

 

II. Motion for Trial Preference 

Plaintiffs move for trial preference on the grounds that Nathan “was below the age of 14 at the time of filing the instant action” pursuant to CCP §36(b). (Notice 1:9.)  

 CCP §36(b) provides: “A civil action to recover damages for wrongful death or personal injury shall be entitled to preference upon the motion of any party to the action who is under 14 years of age unless the court finds that the party does not have a substantial interest in the case as a whole.” (Emphasis added.)  

Plaintiff’s counsel declares Nathan’s date of birth is December 10, 2008. Plaintiffs provide no evidence, such as a birth certificate, verifying Nathan’s date of birth. Nonetheless, even if taken as true, then Nathan is currently 15 years old, and therefore does not meet the prerequisite of CCP §36(b). Plaintiffs provide no authority that CCP §36(b) considers the age of the minor retroactively at the time of the filing of the complaint, nor does the plain language of the statute support this interpretation.  

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for trial preference is DENIED.  

 

III. Motion to Continue Trial 

Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits.  (CRC Rule 3.1332(c).)  The Court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance.  (CRC Rule 3.1332(c).) The Court may look to the following factors in determining whether a trial continuance is warranted: (1) proximity of the trial date; (2) whether there was any previous continuance of trial due to any party; (3) the length of the continuance requested; (4) the availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion; (5) the prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; and (6) whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial.  (See generally, CRC Rule 3.1332(d)(1)-(11).)  Additional factors for the Court to consider include: a party’s excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; and any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application.  (CRC Rule 3.1332(c), (d).) 

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s counsel is depriving Defendant of a fair trial. Defendant avers he was in pro per for several months because he could not afford counsel, but now that he has counsel, he is able and willing to conduct discovery and to participate in a settlement conference. Defendant argues that, while in pro per, he requested discovery from Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs did not provide any discovery. Therefore, Defendant seeks to continue trial, and to re-open discovery in order for him to examine Plaintiff’s evidence.  

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue Defendant was not diligent in requesting further documents, and that Defendant neither initiated any discovery or sought Plaintiffs’ trial exhibits. Plaintiffs argue that there was a complete exchange of evidence, including video exhibits, during the administrative hearing on July 20, 2022. Plaintiffs oppose setting a MSC as being impractical and unnecessary. Additionally, Plaintiffs contend they will be prejudiced by a continuance and for discovery to be re-opened, because Defendant will be in a better position to seek discovery that he would not have had trial proceeded as scheduled.  

In reply, Defendant disputes an exchange happened on July 20, 2022 at an administrative hearing. Defendant contends he had no access to the discovery that would allow him to compile trial exhibits, and that Defendant requires discovery to be re-opened for a fair trial on the merits. 

Here, the parties heavily dispute the facts and circumstances of the issues leading up to this point. The proposed discovery provided in Defendant’s reply suggests that no substantive discovery had yet to be conducted. Nonetheless, there is strong public policy favoring the determination of an action on the merits with evidence. The only prejudice identified by Plaintiff is one that weighs against public policy of trial proceeding on the merits. Further, there is still time for this action to be brought to trial pursuant to CCP § 583.310, and Defendant’s request for a continuance is relatively brief.  

Under the circumstances, the Court finds good cause to continue the trial date to allow the parties sufficient time to complete the necessary discovery. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to continue trial is GRANTED. At this juncture, there is no justification for a MSC, and this request is therefore denied.