SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 

 

 

1. Background  

Plaintiff Kara Sullivan (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Oganes Abdunaryan, Lilit Shadarevian, City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, and State of California for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.  The Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence and premises liability. The SAC and includes a prayer for punitive damages.   

Defendants Oganes Abdunaryan and Lilit Shadarevian (“Defendants”) now move to strike the claim for punitive damages and exemplary damages from the SAC.  Plaintiff opposes the motion.  

 

2. Motion to Strike    

Civil Code § 3294(a) states, “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”   

Allegations that a defendant exhibited a conscious disregard for the safety of others are sufficient to show malice.  (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-96; see also Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 90.)  To properly allege punitive damages in a motor vehicle accident action, a plaintiff needs to "establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences."  (Taylor, 24 Cal.3d at 896.)  Moreover, conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) 

In Brooks v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 669, 679 the court found that a hit and run cannot give rise to damages unless the fact of the hit and run caused additional damages above and beyond the accident itself.  Brooks did not consider the issue of whether punitive damages can be imposed based on a hit and run.  It did, however, hold that such act only constitutes a tort if the act itself causes the plaintiff additional damages above and beyond the damages caused by the accident that precedes the hit and run.  For example, if a plaintiff is struck and is seriously bleeding following the accident, the fact that the defendant hits and runs could cause additional damage due to loss of blood, death, etc.  If, however, the accident causes immediate soft tissue damage, no amount of aid would reduce or minimize the future damages, and the act of hitting and running would not give rise to additional damages.  If the act of hitting and running, in and of itself, does not give rise to a tort, then it logically follows that the act cannot give rise to a claim for punitive damages.  (Id.)   

 

Here, the complaint alleges in relevant part,  

“THE DEFENDANTS, OGANES ABDUNARYAN AND LILIT SHADAREVIAN, WHO OWNED AND OPERATED THE VEHICLE THAT COLLIDED INTO PLAINTIFF'S BICYCLE, WILLFULLY, INTENTIONALLY AND OPPRESSIVELY LEFT THE SCENE OF THE INCIDENT KNOWINGLY, OPPRESSIVELY, FRAUDULENTLY AND/OR INTENTIONALLY, AFTER OFFERING MONEY AND LEAVING $ 150.00, WITHOUT SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFYING HERSELF OR EXCHANGING INSURANCE INFORMATION.” 

(SAC. at p. 7.)  

 

The SAC’s allegations do not rise to the level of malice, fraud, or oppression, as defined by the CCP § 3294.  There are no factual allegations showing a conscious and deliberate disregard of the safety of others, or any allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations.  In order to plead punitive damages, Plaintiff must plead allegations of fraud, malice, or oppression with sufficient particularity.  (Hilliard v. AH Robbins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 392.)  This requires Plaintiff to allege sufficient facts to support conclusory allegations, which Plaintiff has not done.  (Brousseau, 73 Cal.App.3d at 872 [“the second count's conclusory characterization of defendant's conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied,’ ...”].)    

  The SAC conclusory alleges that Defendants engaged in oppressive and fraudulent behavior by offering $150 and leaving the scene of the incident without identification and without exchanging insurance information. The SAC does not allege that Plaintiff suffered any additional damages because of Defendant’s conduct.  (Supra, Brooks, 40 Cal.2d at 679.)  In opposition, Plaintiff cites to California Vehicle Code Sections 20001 and 20003 regarding the driver of a vehicle stopping at the scene of the incident and providing identifying information. Plaintiff conclusory contends that violations of these two Vehicle Code sections is sufficient grounds for punitive damages. As stated above, the SAC does not contain any allegations stating that Defendants’ failure to provide identification and failure to exchange insurance information caused Plaintiff any additional injury, nor can the Court reasonably foresee how this could give rise to additional damages.  Plaintiff alleges only that she was injured as a result of the accident.   

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to strike is granted.   

 

 

3. Leave to Amend    

The burden is on Plaintiff to show in what manner he can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿ (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349; Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742.)¿Plaintiff requests leave to amend to allege additional facts curing the defects in the SAC.  "Where the defect raised by a motion to strike or by demurrer is reasonably capable of cure, leave to amend is routinely and liberally granted to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in question."¿ (CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146.) Under these circumstances, the Court cannot see any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment to state a claim for punitive damages against Defendants. Accordingly, leave to amend is denied.¿ 

 

Defendants’ motion to strike is granted without leave to amend.¿ 

 

 

Moving Defendants are ordered to give notice.   

 

 

Dated this 19th day of April 2023