I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Maria Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) filed her First Amended Complaint (FAC) against defendants Target Corporation (“Target”) and Edgar Villasenor (“Villasenor”) for damages arising from a slip and fall. The FAC alleges defendants caused a known or discoverable dangerous condition to exist on their property creating a risk of harm to all persons coming onto the described premises. The complaint alleges a single cause of action for general negligence against defendants. On May 10, 2023, the Court granted the parties’ stipulation and order to dismiss Villasenor from the operative complaint. 

At this time, Target moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s FAC. The Court notes that Target filed two motions: the original on April 6, 2023 and the amended version on December 12, 2023. Because the latter filing is still within the timing requirements of CCP §437c, and Plaintiff did not object to it, the Court will consider the December 12, 2023 motion as superseding the original filing. Plaintiff opposes Target’s motion, and Target filed a reply. 

Preliminary, the Court will not entertain any arguments related to conspiracy or fraudulent claims, because it is neither affirmatively supported nor is it material to the disposition of the motion. As such, the Court will not consider Target’s related request for sanctions.  

Target argues the indisputable surveillance footage of the evidence establishes that Target had neither actual nor constructive notice of the spilled detergent that was created mere seconds before Plaintiff’s fall. Target avers that its team members investigated the incident and discovered that the source of the spill came from a bottle of Woolite laundry detergent with a cap that appeared to have been mechanically punctured. The video of the incident demonstrates Plaintiff’s husband grabbing the bottle from the top shelf, and walking several feet ahead of Plaintiff. Within seconds of Plaintiff following her husband, Plaintiff fell. Target asserts Plaintiff and her husband hid the source of the spill, and that there is no evidence Target had any actual or constructive knowledge of the broken cap on the Woolite detergent bottle.  

Plaintiff argues her husband happened to pick up a Woolite bottle with a broken cap, which began to leak immediately. Plaintiff contends Target is negligent because one of its employees had shelved a bottle with a destroyed cap. Further, Plaintiff avers there is no evidence that she or her husband conspiratorially punctured the cap themselves to cause the leak, such that Plaintiff orchestrated her own fall.   

Target contends Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence refuting Target’s lack of actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition, and that Plaintiff assumes that the damaged bottle cap had existed when it as placed on the shelf by a Target employee.  

II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

Plaintiff objects to paragraphs 2-7, 13, 18-19 of Denish Mandalia’s Declaration. The objections to paragraphs 3-7 are sustained because it is not material to the disposition of the motion. Even if Plaintiff filed a late FAC after Target filed its initial motion for summary judgment, Target has since filed an amended motion for summary judgment to the FAC. The objections to paragraphs 18-19 are sustained. The objections to paragraphs 2 and 13 are overruled. 

Plaintiff further objects to the entire declaration of Marco Castillo. The objection is overruled.  

III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment.  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)    

The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if the party does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) 

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).) 

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages.”  (Johnson v. Prasad (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 74, 78.) ¿Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.¿ (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.)  

“A store owner is not the insurer of its patrons' personal safety, but does have a duty to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises reasonably safe for patrons. [Citation.] This includes a duty to keep the floors safe for patrons' use. [Citation.] To establish an owner's liability for negligence, the plaintiff must prove duty, breach, causation, and damages. [Citation.]”  (Peralta v. Vons Companies, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1035.)   

“The owner of premises is not negligent and is not liable for an injury suffered by a person on the premises which resulted from a dangerous or defective condition of which the owner had no knowledge, unless the condition existed for such a length of time that if the owner had exercised reasonable care in inspecting the premises the owner would have discovered the condition in time to remedy it or to give warning before the injury occurred.  Nor may the owner be found to be negligent if, having exercised ordinary care, he discovered such a condition before the time of the injury, but not long enough before to provide him the time reasonably necessary to remedy the condition or to give reasonable warning or to provide reasonable protection.”  (BAJI No. 8.20.)  “The fact alone that a dangerous condition existed at the time the accident occurred will not warrant an inference that the defendant was negligent. There must be some evidence, direct or circumstantial, to support the conclusion that the condition had existed long enough for the proprietor, in the exercise of reasonable care, to have discovered and remedied it.”  (Girvetz v. Boys’ Market, Inc. (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 827, 829.) 

Here, it is undisputed by the parties that Plaintiff and her husband were patrons of the Target store located at 14310 Hawthorne Blvd., Lawndale when Plaintiff fell on laundry detergent on the floor. It is further undisputed that the video surveillance of the incident shows Plaintiff’s husband grabbing the bottle of laundry detergent at 3:22:57 p.m. At 3:23:02 p.m., Plaintiff followed behind her husband, and fell after taking a few steps forward. It is further undisputed by the parties that the source of the spill on the floor came from the bottle of laundry detergent held by Plaintiff’s husband, which leaked liquid due to a broken cap.  

The evidence is sufficient to meet Defendant’s moving burden to show that it did not have actual or constructive notice of a spill that existed for mere seconds before Plaintiff’s fall, thereby providing Defendant with insufficient time to discover and remedy the condition. The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.   

Plaintiff argues that a Target employee shelved a defective bottle, and that therefore Target is responsible for the spill created by the defective bottle. However, the Court notes that this argument is presented only in the motion, but not in Plaintiff’s separate statement. The separate statement must include material facts with citation to the evidence in support of each material fact for the Court’s consideration. In deciding motions for summary judgment, courts disregard evidence that was not referenced in the separate statement, included with the motion, or incorporated by reference with specificity to matter in the court's file. (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1266.) Nonetheless, the Court agrees with Target that Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the gash in the cap existed at the time a Target employee shelved the bottle, or that Target had any actual or constructive notice of the defective bottle. “Negligence is never presumed.”  (Harpke v. Lankershim Estates (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 143, 145.) Plaintiff’s conjecture that an employee must have negligently overlooked the gash in the cap is insufficient.  

“Because the owner is not the insurer of the visitor's personal safety [citation], the owner's actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is a key to establishing its liability.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 1200, 1206.) In the absence of actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition, the owner is not liable. (Moore v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal. App. 4th 472, 476.)  “The decisive point of inquiry is the length of time the condition had existed.”  (Perez, supra, 200 Cal.App.2d at p. 560.) The Court has reviewed the video evidence lodged by Target. The video provides a clear view of the subject incident, and there is no dispute that the persons depicted in the video are of Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s husband. The video demonstrates Plaintiff walking up and down the aisles without issue minutes before the incident. At approximately 3:22 p.m., Plaintiff was with her husband and points to the bottle. Around this time, a Target employee can be seen passing through the aisle with a cart. At 3:22:57 p.m., Plaintiff’s husband grabbed the bottle and swung his arm while carrying it. Plaintiff is seen walking behind him, and then falling after taking a few steps forward at approximately 3:23 p.m. After Plaintiff fell, Plaintiff’s husband did not assist her, and instead placed the bottle back on the top shelf. Based on the Court’s review, the evidence demonstrates that no spill existed prior to Plaintiff’s husband removing the bottle from the top shelf, and that the slippery condition was present on the floor for mere seconds prior to Plaintiff’s slip and fall. The laundry detergent’s existence on the floor existing for seconds is too short of a period for Target to discover the condition and remedy it. (See Girvetz, supra, 91 Cal.App.2d at 832 [one and one-half minutes is too short a period].) 

Target met its moving burden to show it lacked sufficient notice of the spill on the floor, and that there is no evidence to infer that any of its employees had actual or constructive notice of the defective laundry detergent bottle at any point in time. Plaintiff fails to raise any triable issues of material fact in this regard.   

IV. CONCLUSION  

Based on the foregoing, Target’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.  

Moving party is ordered to give notice.   

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

Dated this 11th day of March 2024