Judge: Michelle C. Kim, Case: 22STCV05251, Date: 2024-02-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV05251 Hearing Date: February 9, 2024 Dept: 31
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
JOSE SIERRA, ET AL. Plaintiff(s), vs.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.,
Defendant(s). | ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) | CASE NO: 22STCV05251
[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Dept. 31 1:30 p.m. February 9, 2024 |
I. Background
Plaintiffs, Jose Sierra, individually, and as successor in interest to the Estate of Jose Jesus Sierra III, and Jessica Sierra (“Plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendants, City of Los Angeles (“City”), County of Los Angeles, State of California, Savannah Lee Johnson, Elecnor Belco Electric, Inc., and The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles for the wrongful death of decedent Jose Jesus Sierra, III (“Decedent”) arising from an automobile collision at the intersection of 47th St./Main St. in the City of Los Angeles. Plaintiffs set forth five causes of action for (1) Dangerous Condition of Public – against the City, County of Los Angeles, State of California, (2) Act or Omission of Employee of Public Entity (Gov. Code § 815.2) – against the City, County of Los Angeles, State of California, (3) Negligence – against Elecnor Belco Electric, Inc. and Elecnor Inc. (4) Negligence – against Savannah Lee Johnson, and (5) Premises Liability – against The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles.
Elecnor Belco Electric, Inc. (“Belco”) and Elecnor Inc. (collectively, “Elecnor Defendants”) now move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s third cause of action against them for negligence.
Any opposition was due on or before January 26, 2024; the motion is unopposed.
II. Motion for Summary Judgment
Burdens on Summary Judgment
A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)
The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if the party does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)
“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).)
Analysis
“The elements of negligence are (1) a legal duty to use due care, (2) the breach of such legal duty, and (3) the breach was the proximate or legal cause of injury.” (Orey v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1255.) “In California, the causation element of negligence is satisfied when the plaintiff establishes (1) that the defendant's breach of duty (his negligent act or omission) was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm and (2) that there is no rule of law relieving the defendant of liability.” (Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 481.)
“While proximate cause ordinarily is a question of fact, it may be decided as a question of law if ' “under the undisputed facts, there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.” ' [Citation.]” (Grotheer v. Escape Adventures, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1283, 1303 [affirming grant of summary judgment on causation].) “To establish the element of actual causation, it must be shown that the defendant's act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. [Citation.]” (Padilla v. Rodas (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 742, 752 [affirming grant of summary judgment for plaintiff's failure to establish causation]; see also Leyva v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1104 [“In order for a plaintiff to satisfy the causation element of a negligence cause of action, he or she must show the defendant's act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm.”].)
As framed by the complaint, Plaintiffs allege the Elecnor Defendants provided public works construction services at the area of 47th street and Main Street, including the installation and activation of traffic signals. (Compl. at ¶ 31.) Plaintiffs allege the necessary traffic signals were installed, but not energized, and thus inoperable at the time of the incident for an unreasonably excessive long period of time prior to and including on March 17, 2021. (Id. at ¶ 33.) As a result of the unreasonable delay in activating the traffic signals, inadequate roadway markings, and lack of adequate controls and warnings, and other features, Plaintiffs allege the Elecnor Defendants proximately caused Decedent to sustain damages from the March 17, 2021 incident. (Id. at ¶ 34-35.)
Here, the undisputed material facts are as follows. The City awarded a public works construction project referred to as “Main Street Improvements – Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard to Imperial Highway” (the “Project”) to Sully-Miller Contracting Company (“Sully-Miller”). Sully-Miller used its own employees to perform some of the General Project Tasks and contracted out the remaining scope of work. The work contracted out to Belco were the Street Lighting Modifications (Bid Items 41 through 43) and the Traffic Signal modifications (Bid Items 44 through 58). The traffic signal scope of work consisted of modifications to existing intersections identified in the bid items, including replacing vehicle signal heads, pedestrian signals, poles, wiring, signal controllers, and other components, and installation of brand-new traffic signals systems at intersections that were previously only controlled by stop signs. Sully-Miller and Belco entered into a written subcontractor agreement for the street lighting and traffic signal scope of work, and Belco performed the specified Signal Work on behalf of Sully-Miller. Belco provides that it installed new traffic signals at the subject intersection in February, but that it could not be activated until after Sully Miller and the City performed additional work on the road at the subject intersection. The additional work included resurfacing of the roadway, which involved removing the top layers of existing asphalt and installing a new asphalt surface, known as grinding and overlay, and new striping. The additional work was not performed by Belco. The proposed completion date of the additional work was March 21, 2021, four days after the subject incident.
The Elecnor Defendants argue that although Belco installed traffic signals at the subject intersection prior to the accident, it was not responsible for the activation of the traffic signals, and that only the City could active the traffic signals after all work at the intersection was completed. Further, the newly installed traffic signal system could not be activated or energized until it was inspected and approved by the City. All of the electrical subcontracted work at the subject intersection was performed by Belco. The parent company, Elecnor Inc., did not have a contract with Sully-Miller nor was it involved in the installation of a traffic signal system.
Accordingly, the Elecnor Defendants have met their prima facie burden establishing that they did not breach a duty of care to Plaintiffs, and that no act or omission on their part caused or contributed to Decedent’s injury at the intersection of 47th St./Main St. The burden shifts to Plaintiffs to raise a triable issue of material fact. However, because Plaintiffs did not oppose the motion, Plaintiffs necessarily fail to meet the shifted burden. Therefore, no triable issue of material fact exists, and the Elecnor Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Elecnor Belco Electric, Inc. and Elecnor Inc. against Plaintiffs’ complaint is GRANTED.
Moving party is ordered to give notice.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement.
If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling,¿the party must send an email to the court at¿sscdept31@lacourt.org¿with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number.¿ The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting.¿¿
Unless¿all¿parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument.¿ You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue.¿¿
If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.¿ After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.¿
Dated this 8th day of February 2024
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| Hon. Michelle C. Kim Judge of the Superior Court
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